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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Bond markets are an important source of financing for private and public companies as
well as for sovereigns. The total volume of outstanding bonds worldwide amounts to
about 85 trillion USD and exceeds both the annual world GDP (72 trillion USD) and the
market capitalization of global stock markets (53 trillion USD).1 For all investors in bond
markets, the recent financial crisis has highlighted the tremendous importance of liquidity
risk management. Since investors demand higher future expected returns for illiquid assets,
deteriorating liquidity directly transfers to a decrease of a bond’s fair value. Therefore,
as liquidity dried up in many markets during the financial crisis, investors not only faced
large trading costs, but additionally suffered losses due to increased yield spreads of their
bonds. Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012) estimate that after the collapse of
Lehman Brothers, the median yield spread component due to illiquidity for speculative
U.S. corporate bonds increased to a peak of about 10% compared to less than 1% before
the crisis. The decreasing value of illiquid bonds thus contributed to the capital losses
of financial institutions and amplified the financial crisis (see, e.g., Brunnermeier, 2009).
For that reason, an effective liquidity risk management requires both the quantification of
liquidity and an understanding of its impact on bond prices.
However, measuring liquidity in bond markets is difficult. As bond trading is not
centrally organized on exchanges like it is the case for stocks, intraday data on quotes is
not available. Therefore, trading cost measures like intraday effective bid-ask spreads (i.e.,
1Data for 2012, see Bank of International Settlements (2013), International Monetary Fund (2013),
and World Bank (2013).
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the average difference of trade prices from quoted mid prices), which are established as
the standard choice in equity markets (see, e.g., Lee, 1993; Hasbrouck, 2009), cannot be
computed for bond markets. Rather, many researchers either design their own liquidity
measures based on transaction data or simply use liquidity proxies developed and tested
in stock markets. Due to the different market structure of decentralized over-the-counter
(OTC) markets compared to centralized exchange markets, it is unclear whether these
measures originally developed and tested in stock markets work in bond markets as well.
Moreover, the lack of a comparative analysis of the different liquidity measures makes the
choice of a particular measure often arbitrary. Such benchmarking studies are available for
exchange traded stocks (see, e.g., Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009; Fong, Holden, and
Trzcinka, 2010) or commodity futures (see Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti, 2012),
but it is unclear how their results transfer to decentralized OTC bond markets. In this
thesis, we implement and empirically compare all the different liquidity measures used in
the literature so far. Our goal is to provide guidance to researchers and practitioners by
answering the question which liquidity measure is best suited in a particular situation.
Regarding the impact of illiquidity on asset prices, there are also fundamental dif-
ferences between bonds and stocks. First, bonds offer investors the opportunity to wait
until maturity and thereby avoid transaction costs. This opportunity impacts the value
of liquidity and leads to a relation between the time until a bond’s maturity and its yield
spread due to illiquidity. Second, contrary to stock markets, bond issuers usually have
multiple bonds outstanding. These securities are often very close substitutes with respect
to credit risk and other characteristics and differ only in their maturity. Therefore, price
discounts due to illiquidity should be analyzed from an aggregate perspective and not
on an individual security level. Both reasons point to employing the term structure of
liquidity premia as a natural means to describe the impact of illiquidity on bond prices.
From a risk management perspective, it is important to understand how this term
structure of liquidity premia is related to fundamental economic factors. Although there
are studies that analyze such a dependence (see, e.g., Longstaff, 2004; Kempf, Korn, and
Uhrig-Homburg, 2012), it remains an open question how the influence changes in a crisis
compared to normal times. Since the relationship between liquidity and bond prices is
strongly dependent on the economic environment (see Acharya, Amihud, and Bharath,
2013), it is likely that the influence of fundamental factors on the term structure of liquidity
premia is also different in crisis times. If this is the case, calibrating risk management
models in normal times could potentially misjudge illiquidity risk. We analyze this issue
by empirically investigating the difference in the zero coupon yield curves of two bond
2
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classes that only differ in their liquidity within a regime-switching model.
Since bonds of different maturities from the same issuer are often close substitutes,
dependencies between different maturities, which are one of the constituting characteris-
tics of bond markets, are of great importance. However, existing theoretical papers either
analyze liquidity premia of bonds with infinite maturity (see, e.g., Vayanos and Vila, 1999;
Huang, 2003) or look at bonds of one single maturity but do not allow for dependencies be-
tween different maturities (see, e.g., Feldhu¨tter, 2012). There is also little consensus even
on the most fundamental question: What is the shape of the term structure of liquidity
premia in equilibrium? Empirically, the term structure is found to be decreasing (Ericsson
and Renault, 2006), increasing (Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando, 2012), or U-shaped
(Longstaff, 2004). Moreover, the literature offers no explanation for the puzzling observa-
tion that bonds with very short and long maturities are rarely traded, while there is an
active market for bonds with intermediate maturities (Elton and Green, 1998; Hotchkiss,
Warga, and Jostova, 2002). In this thesis, we provide a theoretical framework that al-
lows investors with different investment horizons to simultaneously trade in bonds with
different maturities. With this framework, we are able to unify many previous empirical
results.
1.2 Structure of the Thesis
This thesis is structured as follows:
In Chapter 2, which is based on the working paper Schestag, Schuster, and Uhrig-
Homburg (2014), we analyze how to best measure bond liquidity. We first implement
and compare eight high-frequency liquidity measures based on a full trade record for the
U.S. corporate bond market. We establish that these high-frequency transaction cost and
price impact measures are highly correlated with each other. Based on this result, we
take the high-frequency measures as benchmarks and test whether they are connected to
a battery of transaction cost and price impact proxies that only need daily information
and thus can be computed much more efficiently. We include those liquidity proxies that
have been frequently used in the literature (see, e.g., Chen, Lesmond, and Wei, 2007;
Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov, 2011; Lin, Wang, and Wu, 2013) but also some
measures that have been only applied in stock markets so far (see, e.g., Goyenko, Holden,
and Trzcinka, 2009; Hasbrouck, 2009; Holden, 2009; Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2010;
Corwin and Schultz, 2012). We analyze the ability of liquidity proxies to capture time
3
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series and cross sectional variations of transaction cost and price impact benchmarks as
well as the magnitude of transaction costs.
After having established how to best quantify liquidity, we analyze in Chapters 3 and
4 how illiquidity is priced. In Chapter 3, which builds on the working paper Schuster
and Uhrig-Homburg (2014), we study the term structure of liquidity premia as the dif-
ference between the zero coupon yield curves of German government bonds (BUNDs)
and government guaranteed bonds issued by a German federal agency (Kreditanstalt fu¨r
Wiederaufbau, KfW). Both bond segments differ in their liquidity, but bear the same de-
fault risk. In this clean setting, we empirically analyze how liquidity related risk premia
behave in different economic regimes. Moreover, we identify drivers of different parts of
the term structure of liquidity premia and analyze their relations in crisis and non-crisis
times.
In Chapter 4, which is based on the working paper Schuster, Uhrig-Homburg, and
Trapp (2014), we propose a parsimonious equilibrium model where investors that differ in
their investment horizons trade bonds of different maturities. Our model predicts different
shapes of the term structure for liquidity premia computed from bid and ask prices and
explains the well documented aging effect (see, e.g., Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri, 2000;
Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007), i.e., the observation that other things equal, old
bonds trade less frequently than newly issued bonds. We test and confirm our theoretical
predictions using data for U.S. corporate bonds.
Chapter 5 summarizes the main results of the thesis and gives a concise outlook on
possible future research questions.
4
Chapter 2
Measuring Liquidity in Bond
Markets
2.1 Introduction
As pointed out in Chapter 1, there is no consensus how to adequately measure bond
liquidity. The goal of this chapter is to evaluate and comprehensively benchmark the
different liquidity measures used in the literature so far. We first implement and compare
eight high-frequency liquidity measures based on full intraday information from TRACE,
which contains a full trade record for the U.S. corporate bond market. Due to the OTC
nature of the bond market, this database does not contain data on quotes and it is thus
not possible to calculate intraday effective bid-ask spreads, which are standard in equity
markets. As a consequence, researchers in bond markets have developed a multitude of
different liquidity measures and, so far, there is no comprehensive analysis of whether these
measures work equally well. We therefore first have to establish that these high-frequency
transaction cost and price impact measures are highly correlated with each other. Since
this is the case, we can take the high-frequency measures as benchmarks and test, whether
they are connected to a total of 23 transaction cost and price impact proxies. These
proxies only need daily information, that can be easily downloaded, e.g., from Bloomberg.
To find out whether the daily proxies actually measure intraday transaction costs and
price impact, we run various tests analyzing the ability of liquidity proxies to capture
time series and cross sectional variations of transaction cost and price impact benchmarks
as well as the correct scale of transaction costs. Whereas the ability to capture liquidity
differences is especially important for asset pricing studies, many studies that analyze, e.g.,
5
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trading strategies or portfolio allocations depend on the magnitude of transaction costs.
The correct scale of transaction costs is also most important for all dealers and investors
trading bonds. Our observation period spans the time since the full implementation of
TRACE from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012.
Our results show that most of our liquidity proxies indeed capture transaction costs.
Time series and average cross sectional correlations between benchmark measures and
proxies are on average even higher than in Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for the
stock market. The best measures in our competitions are the bid-ask spread estimator
derived from high and low prices developed by Corwin and Schultz (2012), Hasbrouck’s
(2009) Gibbs measure, and the widely used Roll (1984) measure. The former two also
estimate the magnitude of transaction costs very precisely. All three measures perform
very consistently for different liquidity portfolios and different subperiods. In contrast
to the stock market, the effective tick size measure is not in the winning group, which
is most likely due to the OTC nature of bond markets. Measures based on quoted bid-
ask spreads from Bloomberg are generally suited to capture effective transaction costs
as well. Thereby, measures based on executable quotes do better than proxies based
on the Bloomberg Generic bid-ask spread, which is probably the most widely employed
daily liquidity measure (e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; Chen, Lesmond, and Wei,
2007; Bao, Pan, and Wang, 2011). In one subperiod, this measure even yields a negative
time series correlation with our liquidity benchmarks, presumably due to methodological
changes by Bloomberg in the process to derive bid and ask prices.
For price impact, we find that the daily Amihud (2002) measure and the price im-
pact version of the high-low measure (Corwin and Schultz, 2012; Goyenko, Holden, and
Trzcinka, 2009) are best suited to proxy for the intraday price impact benchmarks. How-
ever, these results have to be interpreted with great caution since measuring price impact
in decentralized OTC bond markets generally poses a conceptual problem. First, due to
the decentralized market structure, it is unclear how information from a trade gets in-
corporated into subsequent prices. Second, without intraday quote data, the impact of a
trade on the quoted midpoint cannot be observed (see Hasbrouck, 1991, who uses quote
data to determine price impact). Third, effective transaction costs, especially for corpo-
rate and municipal bond markets and in sharp contrast to most other markets, decrease
with trade size (see, e.g., Schultz, 2001; Harris and Piwowar, 2006; Edwards, Harris, and
Piwowar, 2007). Thus, with the usual notion of static price impact as the first derivative
of transaction cost with respect to size (see, e.g., Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009),
price impact is negative. Nevertheless, intraday and daily measures of price impact are
6
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widely used in the literature (see, e.g., Mahanti et al., 2008; Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and
Lando, 2012; Lin, Wang, and Wu, 2013). Their value can be justified as they incorporate
volume data and therefore capture an additional dimension of liquidity, which might be
important, e.g., for asset pricing.
Our results imply that for many applications, especially if the focus is on average
market liquidity, it might be sufficient to use liquidity measures based on daily data.
The necessary daily closing, high, and low prices as well as trading volumes or bid-ask
quotations can be downloaded conveniently, e.g., with Bloomberg. By employing daily
liquidity proxies, researchers can circumvent the computationally intensive data handling
and cleaning procedures resulting from using the full TRACE data set (which is by now
more than 10 gigabytes large). Moreover, our results provide guidance for all markets
where a trade reporting system is not implemented and therefore intraday data is not
available which applies to all bond markets except the U.S. For these markets, we recom-
mend using bid-ask spreads derived from executable quotations as data providers cannot
distribute closing, high, and low prices, and daily trading volumes.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 describes the
data used in our analyses. Section 2.3 presents the high-frequency benchmarks and low-
frequency proxies. The testing methodology and our main findings regarding the measure-
ment of bond liquidity are provided in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 Data
To calculate our high-frequency liquidity benchmarks, our main source of data is the
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) established by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Agency (FINRA) in July 2002. Since October 1, 2004, all OTC trades in the
U.S. corporate bond market have to be reported to the TRACE database within a time
window of 15 minutes. These reports contain the date, time, volume,2 and price of a trade.
Since November 2008, the data includes also information on whether the trade is a buy, a
sell, or an interdealer transaction. Our sample ranges from October 1, 2004 to September
30, 2012. Following Bao, Pan, and Wang (2011), we only include bonds in our analysis
that are active for at least one year during our period of observation and are traded on at
least 75% of trading days during their lifespan. Bonds in default are only included up to
2The volume is capped at $5 million for investment grade and $1 million for non-investment grade
bonds.
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics of the overall TRACE database and our sample
The table compares bond characteristics from all bonds reported to TRACE and our sample.
Panel A describes the overall TRACE data set where duplicates, withdrawn entries, and correc-
tions are already accounted for using the filters proposed by Dick-Nielsen (2009). Our sample
consists of all non-defaulted bonds that are active for at least one year within our observation
period and which are traded on at least 75% of the trading days during their lifespan (see Bao,
Pan, and Wang, 2011). A comparison of Panel B and C illustrates the impact of our error
correction filters described in the text. Data on bond characteristics, ratings, and outstanding
amounts is obtained from Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg and averaged over the life of a bond
before calculating summary statistics. The observation period is October 1, 2004 to September
30, 2012.
Mean Q0.05 Q0.25 Q0.5 Q0.75 Q0.95 Not applicable
Panel A: All bonds in TRACE after removing duplicates, withdrawn entries, and corrections (see Dick-Nielsen, 2009)
# Bonds 72571
# Trades per bond 859.57 1 6 47 355 3922 -
Amount outstanding (in mn. USD) 213.2 0.65 4.34 25 203.47 1000 6375
Annual turnover (in %) 57.2 0.78 9.64 25.15 52.01 164.9 6375
Time to maturity at issuance 8.8759 1.1333 3.0278 6.0000 10.0194 29.75 6387
Numerical Rating (1: AAA,..., 22: D) 6.2207 1 2.7791 5.5 8.6667 15.376 15969
Panel B: Selected bonds after removing duplicates, withdrawn entries, and corrections (see Dick-Nielsen, 2009)
# Bonds 3494
# Trades per bond 10449.07 1511 3458 6889.5 12593 30635 -
Amount outstanding (in mn. USD) 987.37 167.43 500 750 1250 2500 -
Annual turnover (in %) 90.27 33.89 56.72 75.94 104.85 190.01 -
Time to maturity at issuance 10.6891 3.0055 4.9639 9.7889 10.0333 30.0028 20
Numerical Rating (1: AAA,..., 22: D) 8.0567 2.4029 5.1591 7.1582 10.2935 15.8338 25
Panel C: Final sample (3494 bonds) after applying all error correction filters
# Trades per bond 10002.55 1374 3274 6531 12060 29481 -
Annual turnover (in %) 86.23 32.42 55 73.21 98.46 183.04 -
three months before the default date to prevent an impact of abnormal trading behavior
around and after the default event. To account for duplicates, withdrawn and corrected
trade entries, we apply the procedures described in Dick-Nielsen (2009). Additionally,
we exclude trades under special conditions and delete records of trades taking place on a
holiday and before the bond’s origination or after it has been fully repaid. Further, we
use the median and reversal filters introduced by Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007)
to eliminate extreme outliers and erroneous entries. After all these corrections, our final
TRACE data sample consists of 3,494 bonds and 34,948,920 single trades, which is about
56% of all trades reported to TRACE.
Table 2.1 gives a brief summary of the characteristics of the bonds in our sample
(Panel B) and compares them to the overall TRACE database (Panel A). Compared to
the full TRACE data set, our bonds are on average more actively traded and have higher
amounts outstanding.3 Further, for time to maturity, the upper quantiles Q0.75 and Q0.95
3This implies that one should be cautious to transfer our results to very illiquid bonds. However, it
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are very similar, whereas the lower quantiles are higher in our sample due to the fact
that we demand a bond to be active for at least one year. In our sample, ratings are on
average about two notches worse than for the overall TRACE database. Panel C shows
the changing values when the error filters are applied. The decline in the number of trades
per bond and annual turnover is only marginal.
In addition to TRACE data, some of our high-frequency liquidity measures depend also
on a bond’s fair market valuation. The Markit Group Limited, a leading global financial
information service, collects price information from more than 30 dealers to compute a
composite price and ensures its quality by running multiple data cleaning procedures on
the contributed inputs (see Markit Group Limited, 2013). Therefore, we follow, e.g.,
Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012) and use Markit composite prices as
fair market valuations. In total, Markit provides composite prices for 3,143 bonds in our
TRACE sample.
To calculate our daily liquidity proxies, we use daily end of day, high, and low prices,
trading volumes, and bid-ask quotations from Bloomberg. End of day prices as well
as high and low prices and volumes are downloaded from Bloomberg’s TRACE pricing
source. Again, we correct the data using the above median and reversal filters, and delete
days outside a bond’s lifespan. Additionally, we delete data for days where the total
trading volume is more than half of the total amount outstanding. We do not correct for
discrepancies between our daily data and our intraday TRACE data set, as this would
also not be possible for someone only employing our daily proxies. We thus fully separate
our daily data from our intraday data set. End of day, high, and low prices as well as
volumes are available for all 3,494 bonds in our sample. Volume data is only available in
Bloomberg since March 29, 2005.
Daily bid-ask quotes are downloaded using the Bloomberg Generic Quote (BGN) and
Composite Bloomberg Bond Trade (CBBT) pricing sources. Amongst others, Bao, Pan,
and Wang (2011), Chen, Lesmond, and Wei (2007), and Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis
(2005) employ BGN bid-ask spreads on the U.S. corporate bond market. BGN prices are
computed as a weighted average of quotes from participating dealers and include indicative
and executable quotes. Similarly, the CBBT pricing source also provides average bid-ask
quotes, but is only based on executable quotes that are listed on Bloomberg’s trading
would hardly make sense to construct intraday liquidity benchmarks for bonds that trade on average, e.g.,
one time per day. On the other hand, our robustness checks for different liquidity portfolios show that
liquidity proxies, if anything, perform better in the more illiquid than in the more liquid portfolios. This
is also found by Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for stocks.
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platform.4 In addition to these already aggregated pricing sources, we use Bloomberg
quotes contributed from 228 investment firms and exchanges where some of our bonds
are listed. We eliminate all entries for BGN, CBBT, and single dealers’ quotes with an
ask quote larger than the corresponding bid quote and days outside the bond’s lifespan.
For the single dealers’ quotes, we additionally delete stale prices,5 duplicate time series,
prices that would allow for arbitrage with Bloomberg’s consensus prices, and quotes with
corresponding bid-ask spreads that are more than ten times larger than the median bid-ask
spread for that bond or all bonds in the sample on that day. After these corrections, we find
BGN, CBBT, and single dealers’ quotes for 3,480, 3,145, and 3,463 bonds, respectively.
For the daily proxies that need a fair market valuation as input, we use composite
prices from the BGN pricing source. We do not use Markit composite prices, which we
use for our intraday benchmarks, to ensure a full separation of our intraday and our daily
data set. For proxies that need a reference index, we obtain price data for the FINRA-
BLP Active Investment Grade US Corporate Bond Price Index and FINRA-BLP Active
High Yield US Corporate Bond Price Index from Bloomberg. These indexes are based on
the most frequently traded fixed coupon bonds in the TRACE database with rebalancing
taking place each month (for details, see Financial Industry Regulatory Authority and
Bloomberg, 2007).
Data on bond characteristics, historical ratings from Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and
Fitch, and outstanding amounts are obtained from Thomson Reuters and Bloomberg.
2.3 Liquidity Measures
In this section, we briefly describe our high-frequency liquidity benchmarks as well as all
liquidity proxies. We compute eight high-frequency measures calculated from our TRACE
intraday sample and 23 liquidity proxies based on daily price, quote, and volume data
collected from Bloomberg. For all bonds, we then compare high-frequency benchmarks
with low-frequency proxies on a monthly basis. Following Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka
(2009), we distinguish between spread and price impact measures and mainly compare our
results within these subgroups.
4The exact methods of calculation are not disclosed by Bloomberg. CBBT prices are available since
November 1, 2004.
5Specifically, we delete a quotation if it is stale for more than five business days (except, the respective
BGN price does not change either, indicating that the fundamental value of the bond stays identical).
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2.3.1 High-Frequency Benchmarks
As there is not one broadly accepted transaction cost benchmark in bond markets, we
implement and compare all commonly used high-frequency transaction cost measures.
Thereby, we slightly modify some of the measures so that they are able to fully exploit
the information in our data set. As an example, we simplify the rather complex methods
in Schultz (2001) or Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) to compute a fair reference
price for a bond by using Markit composite prices. Some of our proxies have been initially
defined on an absolute, and some on a relative (i.e., in percent of trade prices) level. As
we also want to compare the scale of two measures, we standardize all benchmarks and
proxies to measure relative transaction costs. For price impact, we calculate the intraday
Amihud (2002) measure and a modified version of Hasbrouck’s (2009) lambda.
2.3.1.1 Spread Benchmarks
Roundtrip Transaction Costs: Feldhu¨tter (2012) develops an approach to compute
roundtrip transaction costs based on trade prices. He argues that bonds are often traded
with multiple trades taking place in a short time frame with identical trade volumes.
Hence, it is safe to assume that dealers are undertaking what he calls imputed roundtrip
trades (IRT) to coordinate buys and sells of investors. We aggregate all trades per bond
with the same volumes that occur within a 15 minute time window to an IRT. We then
compute the absolute effective spread estimator as the doubled difference between the
lowest and highest trade prices for each IRT.6 To get a relative spread proxy, we divide
the roundtrip transaction costs by the mean of the maximum and minimum prices. A
bond’s monthly liquidity measure is then obtained as the average from all IRTs in a
month.
Inter-Quartile Range: Han and Zhou (2007) and Pu (2009) use the inter-quartile range
of trade prices as a bid-ask spread estimator. They divide the difference between the 75th
percentile P 75tht and the 25th percentile P
25th
t of intraday trade prices on day t by the
6Feldhu¨tter (2012) notes that in his sample, only 4% of the imputed roundtrips after November 2008
consist of one single buy and one single sell transaction. However, nearly 90% include one buy or sell
trade combined with one or two interdealer trades. Therefore, the doubled difference should be used to
estimate bid-ask spreads. As in Feldhu¨tter (2012), we exclude an IRT when the difference between the
highest and lowest price is zero.
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average trade price Pt of that day:
B IQR =
P 75tht − P 25tht
Pt
. (2.1)
This measure is similar to measures based on the price range (see also Han and Zhou,
2007), but is less sensitive to outliers. We calculate B IQR for each day that has at least
three observations and use the monthly mean as our monthly liquidity benchmark.
Roll: Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012) and Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter,
and Lando (2012) employ an intraday version of the Roll (1984) estimator for effective
spreads. We adapt their measure to relative bid-ask spreads:
B Roll =
2
√
−Cov(ri, ri−1) if Cov(ri, ri−1) < 0,
0 otherwise,
(2.2)
where ri =
Pi−Pi−1
Pi−1
is the return of the ith trade.
Adjusted Schultz: Schultz (2001) estimates transaction costs in the corporate bond
market by running the following regression on a data set including a trade side indicator:
∆i = α0 + α1 ·DBuyi + ǫi. (2.3)
For each trade i,DBuyi is a dummy variable indicating whether the trade is a buy (D
Buy
i = 1)
or a sell (DBuyi = 0) and ∆i is the difference of the trade price and the asset’s bid quote.
7
The parameters estimated are α0 and α1 with the latter being an estimator for the ef-
fective bid-ask spread. We refine his model to get a relative spread proxy and to include
information from interdealer trades, exploiting our full TRACE data set:
∆reli = α
rel
0 + α
rel
1 ·Di + ǫi, (2.4)
where ∆reli is the relative deviation of the trade price from the bond’s mid quote. We use
the Markit composite price as proxy for the mid quote and adjust the dummy variable as
follows:
Di =

1 if trade i is a buy,
0 if trade i is an interdealer trade,
−1 if trade i is a sell.
(2.5)
7Schultz estimates bid quotes using a three-step procedure. For further details, see Schultz (2001).
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We exclude the possibility of getting negative bid-ask spreads with the constraint αrel1 ≥
0. Our monthly bid-ask spread estimate is then obtained by first running the regres-
sion in Equation (2.4) on all trades in a given month, including only days on which
a composite price is available. Second, as αrel1 only estimates the half spread, we use
B AdjustedSchultz = 2 · αˆrel1 and calculate this measure for the time when a buy/sell
indicator is available from November 2008 onwards.
Adjusted EHP: Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) and Harris and Piwowar (2006)
use an econometric model to estimate transaction costs utilizing the difference between
returns from trade prices and returns from (unobserved) ‘true values’. We proxy for the
bond’s unobserved true value return rVi with the log return of the Markit composite price
rCompositei :
rVi = r
Composite
i + ǫi. (2.6)
In the spirit of Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007), the error in the measurement of
the unobserved true value return ǫi between trades i− 1 and i is proportional to the time
between both trades ∆Ti. Since we only observe r
Composite
i 6= 0 if trades i − 1 and i take
place on different days, we additionally distinguish between overnight and intraday error
variance:
σ2ǫi = σ
2
overnight ·Dovernight + σ2intraday · (1−Dovernight) ·∆Ti, (2.7)
whereDovernight has value one if r
V
i is an overnight return and zero otherwise. Our modified
version of their model for the observed (log) return rObsi = log
(
Pi
Pi−1
)
is then given by:
rObsi − rCompositei = c · (Di −Di−1) + ηi, (2.8)
where Di is defined as in Equation (2.5) and ηi is an error term with mean zero and a
variance σ2i that is the sum of error variances from the measurement of unobserved true
value returns (σ2ǫi), transaction costs (σ
2
c ), and interdealer price concessions (σ
2
δ ):
σ2i = σ
2
ǫi
+ (2−DInti ) · σ2c +DInti · σ2δ . (2.9)
The variable DInti equals zero, one, or two, when zero, one, or two of trades i − 1 and
i are interdealer trades. We estimate c from Equation (2.8) with the iterated weighted
least-squares method for each bond and month, again starting in November 2008.8 Since
8Following Harris and Piwowar (2006), we estimate the variance Equation (2.9) in a pooled regression
over the whole sample. Since our simplified model has less parameters than the original model, we only
need two observations (with different Di) to identify the regression for a given bond/month combination.
Further, we stop the iteration, if the maximum difference in c for our bonds is less than 10−6 between two
13
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c only measures the half spread, we double the estimates to get our benchmark measure
B EHP.
Price Dispersion: Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam (2011) introduce the
following liquidity measure:
d =
√√√√ 1∑N
i=1Qi
N∑
i=1
(Pi −m)2Qi. (2.10)
This measure gives the daily dispersion of all N intraday trading prices Pi from the market-
wide consensus price m. The higher this dispersion, the higher are the trading costs for
investors. The authors develop a market microstructure model in which dealers’ inventory
risk and investors’ search costs in addition to transaction costs are the drivers of price
dispersion. Due to these additional cost components, the scale of this benchmark cannot
be directly compared to the other transaction cost measures. A transaction’s volume Qi
is used as a weighting factor, because it is assumed that dispersion in large trades reveals
more information. We use a modified version of this measure for relative dispersions and
double it to get an estimate for the effective spread.
B PriceDispersion = 2 ·
√√√√ 1∑N
i=1Qi
N∑
i=1
(
Pi −m
m
)2
Qi. (2.11)
We calculate this benchmark for each day with at least one trade if a composite price m
is available in Markit. Monthly measures are obtained as the mean of daily measures.
2.3.1.2 Price Impact Benchmarks
Amihud: Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012) utilize the Amihud (2002) price im-
pact measure on intraday TRACE data. We apply their approach and define the monthly
price impact measure as
B Amihud =
1
N
N∑
i=1
|ri|
Qi
, (2.12)
where N is the number of consecutive returns ri in a sample month and Qi is the volume
(in USD) of trade i.
Lambda: Hasbrouck (2009) uses the estimator for λ in the following regression as high-
iteration steps. For more details on the regression method, see Harris and Piwowar (2006).
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frequency price impact measure for equities:
rτ = λ · sign(Qτ )
√
|Qτ |+ ǫτ , (2.13)
where rτ is the stock’s return and Qτ is the signed traded dollar volume within the five-
minute period τ . We adjust this measure to our TRACE data as follows. First, we do
not restrict our intraday returns to originate within five-minute intervals, because price
influences of single trades circulate much slower in decentralized OTC markets than it is
the case for centrally cleared equity markets. Second, we do not need to accumulate traded
volumes, since every return included in our regression arises from adjacent transactions.
We therefore run the adjusted regression
ri = λ ·Di
√
Qi + ǫi, (2.14)
where Di is defined as in Equation (2.5). In the estimation of Regression (2.14), we
preclude negative price impact by imposing λ ≥ 0 and we exclude all overnight returns.
B Lambda = λ is computed starting in November 2008 for the lack of a buy/sell side
indicator beforehand. Note, that both price impact benchmarks B Amihud and B Lambda
also capture components of the bid-ask spread as larger bid-ask spreads increase price
fluctuations.
2.3.2 Low-Frequency Proxies
We implement a total of 23 low-frequency liquidity proxies in our analysis, whereof eleven
estimate effective spread and twelve measure price impact. Measures, which need end of
day trade prices, are calculated using the Bloomberg TRACE pricing source. For measures
on quotes, we utilize BGN, CBBT, or single dealers’ quotes from Bloomberg. To ensure
robustness of our results and to allow for fair comparisons between our proxies, we only
calculate a measure for months with at least eight observations.
2.3.2.1 Spread Proxies
Our bid-ask spread proxies that only need end of day prices can be classified in the follow-
ing sub-groups. First, we use two proxies that employ the negative auto-covariance of trade
prices based on the idea of Roll (1984) and refined by Hasbrouck (2009) with his Gibbs
measure. Second, our Effective-Tick proxy estimates bid-ask spreads based on price clus-
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tering. Third, we use two proxies that utilize the number of zero returns based on the paper
of Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) and enhanced by Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka
(2010). Fourth, our high-low proxy developed by Corwin and Schultz (2012) filters bid-ask
spreads out of daily high- and low prices which are also available in Bloomberg. Regard-
ing the proxies that need information on quotes, we calculate quoted bid-ask spreads from
three different pricing sources available in Bloomberg. Our last two proxies measure quote
dispersion based on the idea of the price dispersion benchmark.
Roll: Analogously to our benchmark measure, we compute the daily Roll (1984) proxy as
P Roll =
2
√
−Cov(rt, rt−1) if Cov(rt, rt−1) < 0,
0 otherwise,
(2.15)
where rt is the return on day t.
Gibbs: Hasbrouck (2009) estimates the effective half-spread by using a Bayesian Gibbs
sampler on the following model:
rt = c ·∆Dt + βm · rmt + ǫt. (2.16)
Equation (2.16) adds a market factor m with return rmt on day t to the otherwise identical
Roll (1984) approach with rt being the return of the bond, Dt a sell side indicator
9 and
c the half-spread. For m, we use the FINRA-BLP Active Investment Grade index, if in
month t, the observed bond is rated investment grade on average (using the ratings from
Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, and Fitch) and the FINRA-BLP Active High Yield index,
otherwise. We estimate c using the standard Bayesian normal regression model for each
month and bond and double it to get our effective spread proxy P Gibbs.10
Effective Tick: Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) together with Holden (2009)
develop an effective spread proxy, called Effective Tick, that captures price clustering.11
9Dt = 1 for a buy and Dt = −1 for a sell. Information on Dt is not needed, since Dt is estimated
using the Gibbs sampler.
10We thank Joel Hasbrouck for sharing his programming code on http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/
~jhasbrou/Research/GibbsCurrent/Programs/RollGibbsLibrary02.sas and use his code in our anal-
ysis. As priors for c, βm, and σ2ǫ , we use normal distributions N(µ = 0.01, σ
2 = 0.012), N(1, 1), and the
inverted gamma IG(α = 10−12, β = 10−12), respectively (see, e.g., Marshall, Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti,
2012). We run the sampler for 10,000 sweeps and discard the first 2,000 as burn-in period. For consistency
with the original paper and mathematical tractability, we use log returns for this measure.
11Holden (2009) also develops another measure based on price clustering, called Holden. Like Marshall,
Nguyen, and Visaltanachoti (2012), we do not incorporate this measure as it is very computationally
intensive and therefore not widely used.
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They assume the clustering of trade prices, e.g., at whole dollars, half-dollars, or quarters,
to be determined by spread size, which enables them to compute the spread probabilities
for a given set of possible mutually exclusive effective spreads sj with j = 1, 2, ..., J . Their
spread proxy is then defined as a probability-weighted average of all possible spreads sj:
P EffectiveTick =
J∑
j=1
γˆj · sj
P
, (2.17)
where P is the average trade price in the observation period and γˆj is the (constrained)
probability to trade at the jth spread (see Appendix A.1 for details on the calculation of
γˆj). Based on a histogram of the digits after the decimal point, we employ eight possible
spread sizes, namely s1 = 0.001, s2 = 0.01, s3 = 0.05, s4 = 0.1, s5 = 0.125, s6 = 0.25,
s7 = 0.5, and s8 = 1 and calculate P EffectiveTick for each month and bond.
Zeros and FHT: Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) use the proportion of zero return
days as a measure of liquidity for equity markets. They argue that zero volume days (and
thus zero return days) are more likely in less liquid stocks. We compute their measure on
a monthly basis with T as the number of trading days in a month:
P Zeros =
# of zero return days
T
. (2.18)
Fong, Holden, and Trzcinka (2010) establish a new effective spread proxy based on the
Zeros measure.12 In their framework, symmetric transaction costs of S/2 lead to observed
returns of
R =

R∗ + S
2
if R∗ < −S
2
,
0 if − S
2
< R∗ < S
2
,
R∗ − S
2
if S
2
< R∗,
(2.19)
where R∗ is the unobserved true value return which they assume to be normally distributed
with mean zero and variance σ2. Hence, they equate the theoretical probability of a zero
return with its empirical frequency, measured via P Zeros. Solving for the spread S, they
get:
P FHT = S = 2 · σ · Φ−1
(
1 + P Zeros
2
)
, (2.20)
where Φ−1 is the inverse of the cumulative standard normal distribution. We compute a
12They find their measure to be simpler and perform better than LOT Mixed and Y-split, which also
utilize zero returns. Therefore, we do not include these measures in our analysis.
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bond’s σ for each month and then calculate P FHT.
High-Low Spread Estimator: Corwin and Schultz (2012) approximate bid-ask spreads
for stocks based on high and low prices. They argue that daily high prices are likely
to result from buy orders and low prices correspond to sell orders. Therefore, the ratio
between those two reflects both the security’s variance and the bid-ask spread as well.
To separate these two components, the authors employ the high-low ratio on consecutive
days. The variance component should be proportional to time, whereas the bid-ask spread
should be constant. With this, their effective spread proxy is
P HighLow =
2(eα − 1)
1 + eα
, (2.21)
where
α =
√
2β −√β
3− 2√2 −
√
γ
3− 2√2 , (2.22)
β =
1∑
j=0
(
ln
(
Ht+j
Lt+j
))2
, (2.23)
γ =
(
ln
(
Ht,t+1
Lt,t+1
))2
. (2.24)
Ht (Lt) is the highest (lowest) price on day t and Ht,t+1 (Lt,t+1) is the highest (lowest)
price on two consecutive days t and t+ 1. Again, we take the mean of the daily values in
a month to get a monthly spread proxy for each bond.13
Quoted Spreads: We use quoted bid-ask spreads from the various Bloomberg pricing
sources described in Section 2.2 as effective spread estimators. Let Bt and At be the bid
and ask quotes for a given bond and day t. We get our daily relative spread estimate for
the pricing sources s = BGN and s = CBBT as
P Spread s =
At −Bt
1
2
(Bt + At)
. (2.25)
Additionally, we calculate the daily means of the single dealers’ bid and ask quotes and
replace Bt and At, respectively, to get P Spread Mean. Monthly liquidity proxies are again
obtained as the mean of daily bid-ask spreads.
Quote Dispersion: We apply the idea of our benchmark price dispersion measure to
13We adjust our data for the implicit assumptions made in the derivation of the measure (for details,
see Corwin and Schultz, 2012, Sections 2.1 - 2.3). If the proxy is negative for a day, we follow Corwin and
Schultz (2012) and set it to zero.
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daily bid-ask quotes. Garbade and Silber (1976) show that it is reasonable to approximate
the dispersion of trade prices via the dispersion of quotes. We measure the daily quote
dispersion for a given bond as follows:
P QuoteDispersion = 2 ·
√√√√ 1
2N
N∑
i=1
((
Bi −m
m
)2
+
(
Ai −m
m
)2)
, (2.26)
where N is the number of available pricing sources and Bi and Ai are the Bloomberg
bid and ask quotes of dealer i. In contrast to the above B PriceDispersion, we do not
use Markit data for the consensus market valuation m, but employ the Bloomberg BGN
composite price to fully separate our high- and low-frequency input data sets. Furthermore,
we use the daily average mid quote, calculated from all single dealers’ bid and ask quotes
available, as a proxy for the market valuation m to get an additional effective spread
estimator P QDmid.14 Again, our monthly liquidity proxies correspond to the means of
daily values for P QuoteDispersion and P QDmid.
2.3.2.2 Price-Impact Proxies
Amihud: As Amihud (2002) originally developed his measure for end of day data, we
include it as a price impact proxy in our analysis:
P Amihud =
1
N
N∑
t=1
|rt|
Qt
, (2.27)
where N is the number of positive-volume days in a given month, rt the return and Qt the
traded dollar volume on day t, respectively. As volume data is only available in Bloomberg
since March 29, 2005, all price impact proxies are calculated from April 2005 onwards.
Extended Amihud: Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) derive extended Amihud
measures which for every relative effective spread proxy sp and average daily dollar volume
Q in the period under observation are defined as
P PI sp =
sp
Q
. (2.28)
14Garbade (1978) shows that the market valuation and the average mid-quote are in fact different from
each other, because dealers account for inventory. To account for the degree of freedom we lose when
calculating mid prices from dealer quotes, we use 2N − 1 instead of 2N in the denominator of Equation
(2.26).
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We make use of their findings and compute monthly price impact liquidity measures for
our Roll, Gibbs, Effective Tick (sp = ET), FHT, High-Low (sp = HL), Quoted Spreads,
and Quote Dispersion (sp = QD and sp = QDmid) proxies.
Pastor and Stambaugh: Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) develop a measure for price
impact based on price reversals for the equity market. It is given by the estimator for γ
in the following regression:
ret+1 = θ + φ · rt + γ · sign(ret ) ·Qt + ǫt, (2.29)
where ret is the asset’s excess return over a market index, rt is the asset’s return and Qt is
the traded dollar volume on day t. For our market index, we use the same method as for
the Gibbs proxy to assign Bloomberg’s Investment Grade or High Yield index, respectively.
γ should be negative and a larger price impact comes along with a larger absolute value.
As all of our liquidity measures assign larger (positive) values to more illiquid bonds, we
define P PastorStambaugh = −γ and expect it to be positively correlated with the other
measures in this study.
2.4 Results
We first present descriptive statistics for each measure in Section 2.4.1, assess the consis-
tency of our liquidity benchmarks by comparing them with each other in Section 2.4.2,
and then compare our transaction cost and price impact proxies with the respective bench-
marks in Sections 2.4.3 and 2.4.4. Tests based on time series and average cross sectional
correlations allow us to analyze whether our proxies are useful for asset pricing. For our
transaction cost proxies, we additionally run two tests analyzing to what extent the proxies
are able to capture the correct scale of the benchmarks. In various robustness checks, we
assess the consistency of our results for different liquidity portfolios and subperiods. Since
in the literature, proxies like Amihud’s (2002) price impact measure or the Pastor and
Stambaugh (2003) measure are often used to proxy for liquidity in general, we compare
these measures not only to price impact, but also to transaction cost benchmarks.
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2.4.1 Descriptive Statistics
Table 2.2 shows descriptive summary statistics for our monthly high-frequency and low-
frequency liquidity measures. Benchmarks depending on a buy/sell indicator are calculated
for the last 47 sample months, whereas the remaining ones span our complete observation
period of 96 months. For our effective spread high-frequency benchmarks in Panel A, with
the exception of the price dispersion measure, we get average effective spread estimates
between 0.93% and 1.23%. This means that a roundtrip trade for bonds of $100,000 on
average leads to transaction costs between $930 and $1,230. B Roundtrip and B Roll
yield very similar results in all categories. Although B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP are
calculated only from November 1, 2008 onwards, they are on average of comparable size
compared to the other measures. The different behavior of the price dispersion benchmark
compared to the other transaction cost benchmarks is obvious as it produces by far the
largest spread estimates. This result confirms findings of Jankowitsch, Nashikkar, and
Subrahmanyam (2011) that price dispersion contains additional cost components over and
above direct transaction costs. For this reason, the price dispersion benchmark essentially
constitutes a separate category (in addition to pure transaction cost and price impact
benchmarks). Nevertheless, for the sake of brevity, we discuss this measure together with
the other transaction cost estimators.
Looking at our low-frequency spread proxies, the best measure regarding the magnitude
of our benchmarks seems to be P HighLow with an average value of 0.9738%, followed by
P Gibbs. Proxies calculated from executable quotes (P Spread CBBT, P Spread Mean,
and both quote dispersion measures) are generally larger than effective spread benchmarks
since many trades occur inside the bid-ask spread (see, e.g., Petersen and Fialkowski, 1994).
The average P Spread BGN amounts to less than a third of its CBBT counterpart, indicat-
ing that the BGN does not give the magnitude of the bid-ask spread correctly. Bloomberg
seems to have realized this shortcoming and presumably changed its methodology in March
2011 when bid-ask spreads for the BGN measure increased sharply. Because of this struc-
tural break, we restrict the observation period for P Spread BGN and P PI Spread BGN
to the time before February 28, 2011. P EffectiveTick shows a very small mean of about
0.09% which is due to the fact that although price clustering is clearly present in our data,
the majority of trades does take place at an 1/1000 price tick, leading to an assumed
spread of $0.001 for these trades.15 Also P FHT does not seem to accurately capture the
15In bond markets, price clustering takes place both at the price and the yield level. However, the
effective tick measure only captures clustering at the price level which might be one of the reasons this
measure does not grasp the magnitude of bid-ask spreads correctly.
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Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics for benchmark and proxy liquidity measures
Benchmark liquidity measures are calculated from high-frequency transaction data reported to
TRACE from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Low-frequency proxies are computed based
on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. We calculate monthly measures
as described in Section 2.3. B AdjustedSchultz, B EHP, and B Lambda are only available since
November 2008, resulting in 47 observation months. The remaining benchmarks are calculated for
all 96 sample months. P Spread CBBT is calculated for the last 95 sample months. P Amihud,
P PastorStambaugh, and all other price impact proxies, except P PI Spread BGN, start in April
2005 and span 90 observation months. Both measures linked to the Bloomberg BGN quote are
only calculated until February 2011, resulting in 77 and 71 observation months for P Spread BGN
and P PI Spread BGN, respectively. All other low-frequency proxies are calculated for each of
the 96 months in our observation period.
Unit Mean Std.dev. Q0.05 Q0.25 Median Q0.75 Q0.95 N
Panel A: Effective spread measures
Benchmarks
B Roundtrip % 1.2299 0.8966 0.2478 0.5999 1.0056 1.6124 2.9893 164674
B IQR % 0.9717 0.8413 0.1697 0.3918 0.7049 1.2749 2.6912 165205
B Roll % 1.1882 0.9512 0.2362 0.5636 0.942 1.5388 2.9914 165500
B AdjustedSchultz % 1.2280 1.2005 0.156 0.4723 0.8836 1.5971 3.3972 72468
B EHP % 0.9316 0.8047 0.1329 0.3734 0.688 1.2405 2.5665 72468
B PriceDispersion % 1.8064 3.0239 0.2681 0.6244 1.084 1.9473 5.3214 125209
Proxies
P Roll % 1.7686 1.6676 0.1339 0.6799 1.3102 2.3325 4.9447 163304
P Gibbs % 1.4529 1.0405 0.2552 0.6714 1.2016 2.0006 3.4130 163293
P EffectiveTick % 0.0945 0.1656 0.001 0.005 0.0231 0.1320 0.3772 163304
P Zeros % 11.876 13.410 0 0 8.6957 19.047 40 163304
P FHT % 0.4497 1.0503 0 0 0.1731 0.5035 1.7416 163298
P HighLow % 0.9738 1.0781 0.1201 0.3183 0.6372 1.2729 2.8294 163304
P Spread BGN % 0.4550 0.2834 0.0918 0.2495 0.4049 0.5931 0.9869 111416
P Spread CBBT % 1.7769 2.2315 0.2726 0.6333 1.2016 2.1293 4.9934 103374
P Spread Mean % 1.8585 2.1100 0.2404 0.704 1.337 2.2519 5.0584 133228
P QDmid % 2.6350 2.9794 0.3339 0.9931 1.8845 3.2069 7.1887 133228
P QuoteDispersion % 2.4660 2.7381 0.3331 0.9538 1.7875 3.0058 6.6539 122652
Panel B: Price impact measures
Benchmarks
B Amihud 10−6 0.8308 2.0311 0.0389 0.1851 0.408 0.8752 2.7558 165616
B Lambda 10−6 10.980 35.557 −0.0001 1.0944 2.8767 7.7279 50.758 97990
Proxies
P Amihud 10−6 0.2207 1.0308 0.0017 0.0101 0.0399 0.1552 0.8775 156216
P PI Roll 10−6 0.0511 0.5089 0.0002 0.0021 0.006 0.0189 0.2059 156216
P PI Gibbs 10−6 0.0365 0.3352 0.0006 0.0021 0.0056 0.0164 0.1662 156205
P PI ET 10−6 0.0029 0.0312 0 0 0.0001 0.0009 0.0095 156216
P PI FHT 10−6 0.0257 0.3703 0 0 0.0007 0.0041 0.0684 156210
P PI HL 10−6 0.0285 0.3053 0.0003 0.0011 0.0031 0.0093 0.1069 156216
P PI Spread BGN 10−6 0.0089 0.0332 0.0002 0.0007 0.0018 0.0048 0.0370 104257
P PI Spread CBBT 10−6 0.0168 0.0914 0.0006 0.0019 0.0048 0.0125 0.0585 100126
P PI Spread Mean 10−6 0.0286 0.1731 0.0006 0.0023 0.0059 0.0161 0.0949 128516
P PI QD 10−6 0.0322 0.1864 0.0008 0.003 0.0076 0.0195 0.1028 118176
P PI QDmid 10−6 0.0402 0.2393 0.0008 0.0032 0.0084 0.0229 0.1350 128516
P PastorStambaugh 10−6 0.0009 0.1454 −0.0076 −0.0005 0 0.0004 0.0080 156210
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scale of the effective spread when compared to the benchmark measures.
Panel B compares the different price impact measures. As discussed in the introduction,
measuring price impact in the U.S. corporate bond market poses a conceptual problem.
Most importantly, the fact that transaction costs are smaller for larger trades (see, e.g.,
Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar, 2007), implies that a static definition of price impact as
the ‘first derivative of the effective spread with respect to order size’ (see, e.g., Goyenko,
Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009) leads to a negative price impact (which is precluded in the
definition of most of the price impact measures). However, price impact measures are used
in the literature and provide additional value as they depend on both effective transaction
costs and trading volume. Therefore, we include them in our correlation analyses, but
refrain from interpreting their magnitudes.
2.4.2 High-Frequency Benchmarks Correlation Analysis
Figure 2.1 presents the evolution of our high-frequency bid-ask spread benchmarks. Fol-
lowing Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009), we compute the monthly average for each
measure as the equally weighted mean across all bonds. We find a high level of co-
movement between all measures. With the exception of price dispersion, which besides
measuring transaction costs also captures inventory risk and search costs (see Jankow-
itsch, Nashikkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2011), all benchmarks are always located within a
narrow range. Consistently, we find lowest levels of liquidity in the months that followed
the default of Lehman Brothers in September 2008.
Next, we determine time series correlations based on the monthly means and provide
our results in Panel A of Table 2.3. Regardless of whether effective spread measures, price
impact measures, or a combination of both is considered, all of our benchmarks show high,
positive, and significant pairwise time series correlations.16 The smallest value is 0.8739
for B PriceDispersion and B Roundtrip and the highest correlation of 0.9978 comes from
B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP.
Panel B shows average cross sectional correlations. We determine cross sectional cor-
relations for each month across all bonds, transform them using Fisher’s Z, compute the
mean of the transformed values and re-transform the results (see, e.g., Fama and MacBeth,
16In this study, we test whether time series correlations ρ are significantly different from zero at the 5%
level, using the test statistic t = ρ ·
√
n−2
1−ρ2
(see, e.g., Swinscow, 1997) with n as the sample size. Under
the null hypothesis, t is t-distributed with n− 2 degrees of freedom.
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Figure 2.1: Time series of monthly effective spread benchmarks
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. All
measures are described in Section 2.3. B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP are calculated since November 2008, resulting in 47 observation
months. The remaining benchmarks are calculated for all 96 sample months.
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Table 2.3: Monthly benchmark comparison
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October
1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. B AdjustedSchultz, B EHP, and B Lambda are calculated since
November 2008, resulting in 47 observation months. The remaining benchmarks are calculated
for all 96 sample months. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level.
B Round- B IQR B Roll B Adjusted- B EHP B Price- B Amihud
trip Schultz Dispersion
Panel A: Time series correlations
B IQR 0.9494
B Roll 0.9533 0.9689
B AdjustedSchultz 0.9823 0.9975 0.9937
B EHP 0.9887 0.9951 0.9874 0.9978
B PriceDispersion 0.8739 0.9595 0.8991 0.9811 0.9721
B Amihud 0.9298 0.9652 0.9638 0.9773 0.9667 0.9392
B Lambda 0.935 0.9621 0.9729 0.9709 0.9597 0.9484 0.9775
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B IQR 0.7465
B Roll 0.7775 0.8247
B AdjustedSchultz 0.7209 0.8186 0.7751
B EHP 0.7875 0.7941 0.8215 0.9103
B PriceDispersion 0.5627 0.6815 0.6337 0.6277 0.5814
B Amihud 0.5242 0.5832 0.5386 0.5412 0.4896 0.4595
B Lambda 0.5232 0.5031 0.5267 0.5721 0.5801 0.5201 0.4463
1973). As in Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009), average cross sectional correlations
of our benchmark measures do not reach the level of Panel A, but they are always positive
and significantly different from zero.17 Also, they have a wider bandwidth than the time
series correlations, ranging from 0.4463 to 0.9103. The highest value comes again from
our adjusted versions of the Schultz (2001) and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007)
measures, which is not surprising considering their similarities in design. We find that all
correlations within the group of spread benchmarks are higher than the correlation of the
two price impact benchmarks.18
17We test average cross sectional correlations for significance at the 5% level by running a t-test with
a Newey-West correction of four lags (see, e.g., Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009).
18Friewald, Jankowitsch, and Subrahmanyam (2012) also conduct a correlation analysis for three of
our high-frequency benchmarks. In contrast to our findings, their correlations are much lower, e.g., only
0.20 for the correlation between Roll and price dispersion. Possible reasons for the different results are
(i) that the authors compute liquidity measures on a weekly rather than monthly basis leading to more
noise, (ii) that they include also very illiquid bonds in their analysis with presumably very little trade
data leading to large outliers, and (iii) that they compute correlations on a bond-week level, whereas
we compute time series correlations aggregated over all bonds and average cross sectional correlations.
However, if we calculate correlations on an individual bond-month level, we get, e.g., 0.51 for the Roll vs.
price dispersion measure compared to the 0.20 they find.
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2.4.3 Monthly Spread Proxy Results
2.4.3.1 Correlation Analysis and Prediction Errors
Figure 2.2 presents the evolution of our monthly low-frequency spread estimates together
with one of our benchmark measures B Roll. In the financial crisis, our quote based mea-
sures increase most strongly, which confirms results of Petersen and Fialkowski (1994)
that in stock markets, effective spreads increase only up to 22% of the increase of quoted
spreads. It seems that in times of stress, dealers protect themselves against further de-
teriorating conditions by quoting extremely wide spreads that do not represent actual
transaction costs. The evolution of P FHT closely resembles our quoted bid-ask-spread
measures, indicating that the use of zero return days leads to a good approximation of
quoted spreads.
Table 2.4 shows the main findings of our analysis regarding the question which daily
spread proxies are best suited to approximate intraday effective bid-ask spreads. We also
include P Zeros, P Amihud, and P PastorStambaugh as these measures are often used to
capture liquidity in general. Panel A reports time series correlations of each high-frequency
spread benchmark with all low-frequency spread proxies and therefore analyzes the ability
of our proxies to capture liquidity dynamics over time. Drawn through boxes mark the
best-performing proxy for each benchmark and values significantly different from zero are
written in boldface. Dashed boxes identify correlations which are insignificantly different
from the best correlation in the same row. We test whether two measures are significantly
different from each other at the 5% level by applying Steiger’s Z test. Again, we find very
high levels of correlation for all benchmarks and spread estimates and also for P Amihud.
P Zeros and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measures are clearly outperformed by the
other proxies. The highest correlations with our high-frequency benchmarks are mostly
found for P Roll and P Gibbs which are both based on the auto-covariance of daily trade
prices. The high-low measure also performs quite well. From the quoted spread proxies,
those based on executable quotes (P Spread CBBT) and on the average of all dealers’
quotes (P Spread Mean) clearly dominate the Bloomberg Generic Quote (P Spread BGN).
Panel B provides our average cross sectional correlations results to analyze the ability
of our proxies to capture liquidity differences between bonds. We test for significant
differences between the proxies by computing the differences in monthly cross sectional
correlations and t-testing their mean.19 Again, the level of correlations is lower than for
19For calculating the mean, Fisher’s Z is applied. Standard errors are computed with a Newey-West
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Figure 2.2: Time series of monthly spread proxies
Monthly low-frequency spread proxies are calculated from daily Bloomberg price, volume, and quote data from October 1, 2004 to
September 30, 2012. B Roll is computed based on intraday TRACE data. All measures are described in Section 2.3. P Spread BGN is
only computed until February 2011 and spans the first 77 sample months. P Spread CBBT is not available for the first sample month,
resulting in 95 observation months. The remaining proxies and B Roll are calculated for all 96 months in the observation period.27
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Table 2.4: Monthly spread proxies compared to spread benchmarks
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Monthly
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described
in Section 2.3. B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP are calculated since November 2008, resulting in 47 observation months. The remaining
benchmarks are calculated for all 96 sample months. P Spread BGN is only computed until February 2011 and spans the first 77
sample months. P Spread CBBT is not available for the first sample month, resulting in 95 observation months. Both price impact
measures start in April 2005 spanning the last 90 sample months. The remaining proxies are calculated for all 96 months in the
observation period. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row and
dashed boxes give numbers that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
Panel A: Time series correlations
B Roundtrip 0.943 0.9486 0.9429 0.278 0.8356 0.938 0.7241 0.7768 0.7551 0.7311 0.7405 0.8986 0.3351
B IQR 0.9978 0.9896 0.9682 0.4135 0.9331 0.9782 0.7607 0.9034 0.8851 0.8652 0.8729 0.9493 0.3897
B Roll 0.9657 0.9708 0.9405 0.4525 0.9269 0.9471 0.6207 0.8159 0.7839 0.7609 0.769 0.9662 0.4358
B AdjustedSchultz 0.9961 0.9936 0.9879 0.3906 0.9281 0.994 0.9512 0.9652 0.9665 0.954 0.9586 0.9571 0.3189
B EHP 0.9934 0.9944 0.9828 0.3598 0.908 0.9884 0.9646 0.9519 0.952 0.9385 0.9437 0.9401 0.2973
B PriceDispersion 0.9625 0.9222 0.9614 0.3761 0.9415 0.9769 0.8201 0.9673 0.9626 0.9514 0.9562 0.9111 0.435
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B Roundtrip 0.567 0.5422 0.33 0.0513 0.3578 0.6979 0.4357 0.4661 0.4969 0.4636 0.4681 0.3027 0.0088
B IQR 0.7019 0.6731 0.4255 0.0983 0.4656 0.7571 0.5349 0.6483 0.6385 0.5883 0.5977 0.3845 0.0081
B Roll 0.6738 0.6426 0.3635 0.0832 0.4416 0.7273 0.5187 0.5883 0.5948 0.5533 0.5573 0.3622 0.0075
B AdjustedSchultz 0.6443 0.6039 0.3236 −0.01 0.2992 0.7294 0.4201 0.5529 0.5361 0.5229 0.5179 0.2738 −0.0249
B EHP 0.6053 0.5766 0.2548 −0.0584 0.2198 0.7589 0.3729 0.4918 0.4904 0.4892 0.4812 0.1951 −0.0073
B PriceDispersion 0.5474 0.4715 0.3429 0.0845 0.3802 0.555 0.429 0.5572 0.5484 0.5043 0.5037 0.309 0.0069
Panel C: Mean bias
B Roundtrip 0.0054 0.0022 −0.0113 −0.0078 −0.0025 −0.0078 0.0069 0.0071 0.0133 0.0149
B IQR 0.008 0.0048 −0.0088 −0.0052 0.0000 −0.0056 0.01 0.0098 0.016 0.0175
B Roll 0.0058 0.0027 −0.0109 −0.0074 −0.0021 −0.0077 0.0077 0.0077 0.0139 0.0155
B AdjustedSchultz 0.0035 0.0008 −0.0114 −0.009 −0.0029 −0.0092 0.0083 0.0085 0.0163 0.0173
B EHP 0.0065 0.0037 −0.0085 −0.006 0.0001 −0.0055 0.0107 0.0113 0.0191 0.0201
B PriceDispersion −0.0021 −0.0046 −0.0171 −0.0144 −0.0089 −0.0146 0.0025 0.0008 0.0076 0.0084
Panel D: Root mean squared error (RMSE)
B Roundtrip 0.0149 0.0093 0.0141 0.0137 0.0089 0.0109 0.0216 0.0202 0.0283 0.031
B IQR 0.0146 0.0088 0.0117 0.0111 0.0072 0.0093 0.0211 0.0195 0.0282 0.0308
B Roll 0.0139 0.0084 0.0138 0.0125 0.0083 0.0111 0.0207 0.0193 0.0276 0.0303
B AdjustedSchultz 0.0121 0.0093 0.016 0.0146 0.0093 0.0155 0.0195 0.0186 0.0272 0.0296
B EHP 0.0135 0.0085 0.0114 0.0114 0.0077 0.0096 0.0218 0.0211 0.0302 0.0327
B PriceDispersion 0.0254 0.0269 0.0335 0.0302 0.0269 0.0329 0.0196 0.023 0.025 0.0278
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the time series case,20 but still most figures are significantly different from zero. Medium
and high values are obtained for the Roll, Gibbs, High-Low, and quote based proxies,
whereas P EffectiveTick, P Zeros, P FHT, P Amihud, and P PastorStambaugh do not
seem to capture cross sectional variation well. P HighLow clearly dominates this analysis,
showing the highest correlations for all benchmarks except B PriceDispersion for which it
is insignificantly different from the winning proxy P CBBT.
To examine the capability of our proxies to capture the correct magnitude of our
benchmarks, we report two metrics for the prediction errors: mean bias in Panel C and
root mean squared error (RMSE) in Panel D. As before, we cannot compare the scales of
our spread estimators with P Zeros, P Amihud, and P PastorStambaugh.
We find mean biases for all benchmarks ranging from 0.0000 to 0.0201 in absolute
terms. Especially the Roll, Gibbs, FHT, High-Low, and quoted spread proxies yield small
biases, but with the exception of one mean bias, all are significantly different from zero.21
P Gibbs and P HighLow show the smallest errors for all benchmark measures except
B PriceDispersion which is best captured by the average of dealers’ quotes P Spread Mean.
Panel D paints a similar picture when it comes to RMSEs with P Gibbs and P HighLow
again winning all benchmarks except B PriceDispersion. We also test whether a proxy
significantly better captures the scale of a benchmark compared to using the benchmark’s
sample mean (values written in boldface). We find that only the best proxies P HighLow
and P Gibbs outperform the mean when it comes to capturing the scale of many bench-
marks.22
2.4.3.2 Robustness Checks
We perform robustness checks to assess the performance of our measures in different
market conditions and to explore their consistency for more liquid and illiquid bonds.
Additionally, we analyze their behavior when calculating them on an annual instead of a
correction of four lags (see, e.g., Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009).
20Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) note that part of this difference may result from a diversifi-
cation effect when forming portfolios in the time series analysis.
21We test the mean bias for significance with a t-test and for significant differences between the measures
by running a paired t-test.
22For this analysis, we compute a benchmark’s sample mean over all bonds and the whole observation
period when the respective proxy is available. We then use the U-Statistic from Theil (1966) to test
whether the RMSE is significantly smaller when using the proxy to predict the benchmark compared to
using the benchmark’s sample mean. To test for significant differences between the RMSEs for each proxy,
we employ a paired t-test (see, e.g., Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka, 2009).
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monthly basis.23
Table 2.5 shows time series and cross sectional correlations for three subperiods, span-
ning around the financial crisis that started in 2007. Our pre-crisis period begins on
October 1, 2004 and ends at March 31, 2007. We follow Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and
Lando (2012) and set the beginning of the financial crisis to April 1, 2007. We define its end
as December 31, 2009. Hence, the final period is January 1, 2010 to September 30, 2012.
Our modified versions of the Schultz (2001) and Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007)
measures can only be computed after November 1, 2008. Hence, the pre-crisis period is
missing for them. Time series correlations in Panel A for nearly all benchmark-proxy
combinations are lowest before and highest during the crisis.
Whereas the price based spread proxies only show low variations between the periods,
measures based on quoted spreads perform poorly in the pre-crisis period, even yielding
some negative correlations. Thus, the latter do not respond consistently in different market
situations.24 Measures based on zero returns (P Zeros and P FHT) also behave badly pre-
and post-crisis as the number of zero returns is only positively correlated during the
crisis period with all benchmarks. The best measures in our main analysis perform very
consistently during all periods. So the two measures based on the auto-covariance of daily
prices (P Roll and P Gibbs) as well as P HighLow almost always produce the highest
correlations.
Panel B provides the results for the subperiods with regard to average cross sectional
correlations. Here, correlations do not vary as much between the periods as in Panel A
and there is no clear direction of variation. Also the magnitudes are very similar to those
in Table 2.4. Again, P HighLow is the clear winner for all benchmarks except the price
dispersion measures. In the last two subperiods, price dispersion is best captured by the
quoted CBBT spread confirming results from our main analysis.
In the spirit of Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009), Table 2.6 presents two additional
robustness checks and assesses the consistency of our measures for more liquid and illiquid
bonds. In Panel A, we form portfolios of equal size ranked by liquidity, which is measured
23In additional robustness checks, we show that results do not change qualitatively when weighting
observations with the number of trades in TRACE in a month. Moreover, we experiment with the
methodology how to handle the situation when a measure cannot be calculated for a bond in a given month
due to missing data. In our main analyses, we ignore such a missing observation when averaging over all
bonds. Alternative ways to handle such a situation, like the use of a default value or the confinement
of our analyses to bonds where we can always calculate all benchmarks and proxies, do not change our
findings. All results are available upon request from the authors.
24Another reason for the bad performance of our quoted spread proxies could be a possible change in
Bloomberg’s methodology in computing and distributing bid and ask prices.
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Table 2.5: Subperiod analysis: spread proxies
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Monthly
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described
in Section 2.3. The pre-crisis period is October 1, 2004 to March 31, 2007. The crisis period is defined as April 1, 2007 until December
31, 2009. The post-crisis period is January 1, 2010 until September 30, 2012. B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP are calculated since
November 2008. The remaining benchmarks are calculated for all 96 sample months. P Spread BGN is only computed for the pre-
crisis and crisis period. P Spread CBBT is only available since November 2004. Both price impact measures start in April 2005. The
remaining proxies are calculated for all 96 months in the observation period. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level.
Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row and dashed boxes give numbers that are not significantly different from this value
at the 5% level.
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
Panel A: Time series correlations
B Roundtrip
Pre-crisis 0.8725 0.8575 0.8573 −0.1878 0.4995 0.9301 −0.5111 −0.0542 −0.0197 0.0793 0.0745 0.8295 0.0281
Crisis 0.9579 0.949 0.976 0.0152 0.8373 0.9642 0.8929 0.914 0.9336 0.934 0.9374 0.8675 0.3114
Post-crisis 0.9008 0.9056 0.922 −0.4515 0.1803 0.9539 0.3872 0.4305 0.3558 0.3303 0.5457 0.0164
B IQR
Pre-crisis 0.9466 0.8875 0.9348 −0.2208 0.4502 0.9669 −0.3495 0.1732 0.238 0.4423 0.4197 0.8064 0.0139
Crisis 0.9986 0.9952 0.9615 0.2105 0.9266 0.9837 0.814 0.9796 0.9827 0.9824 0.9838 0.9322 0.3743
Post-crisis 0.987 0.9886 0.9663 −0.2064 0.4927 0.9411 0.7403 0.7601 0.72 0.6979 0.7898 0.0238
B Roll
Pre-crisis 0.9376 0.9077 0.9182 −0.2324 0.4722 0.9621 −0.4207 0.04 0.0881 0.2487 0.2326 0.8415 0.0399
Crisis 0.9891 0.9829 0.9442 0.3178 0.9657 0.9732 0.7564 0.982 0.9841 0.9834 0.9835 0.9644 0.4509
Post-crisis 0.9843 0.9884 0.9469 −0.2665 0.4409 0.9548 0.6736 0.6787 0.6402 0.6127 0.7321 0.016
B AdjustedSchultz
Crisis 0.9899 0.9862 0.9756 0.6618 0.9232 0.9932 0.9345 0.993 0.9899 0.9911 0.9924 0.9433 0.2878
Post-crisis 0.9797 0.975 0.9632 −0.2265 0.4443 0.9536 0.7031 0.7393 0.6829 0.6645 0.7622 0.0174
B EHP
Crisis 0.9884 0.987 0.978 0.6272 0.9054 0.9889 0.9399 0.9907 0.9841 0.9859 0.9877 0.9263 0.2574
Post-crisis 0.9674 0.961 0.9541 −0.2468 0.4138 0.9608 0.668 0.703 0.6415 0.6238 0.7236 0.0397
B PriceDispersion
Pre-crisis 0.8323 0.8038 0.8965 0.0491 0.6184 0.948 −0.4979 0.0964 0.0873 0.233 0.1912 0.7219 −0.1238
Crisis 0.985 0.969 0.9697 0.1976 0.9322 0.9875 0.8272 0.9779 0.9865 0.9877 0.9884 0.9153 0.4118
Post-crisis 0.8887 0.8741 0.85 −0.0075 0.5993 0.8147 0.8657 0.9102 0.8772 0.8706 0.8593 −0.0304
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Table 2.5 continued
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B Roundtrip
Pre-crisis 0.6129 0.5422 0.4133 0.0899 0.4386 0.7196 0.499 0.4703 0.5574 0.4775 0.4944 0.3968 0.0006
Crisis 0.4992 0.5174 0.2843 0.1442 0.3897 0.6314 0.3939 0.4511 0.5061 0.4997 0.4968 0.3084 0.0309
Post-crisis 0.5874 0.5661 0.2962 −0.0776 0.2448 0.7366 0.4772 0.4273 0.4127 0.413 0.2241 −0.0073
B IQR
Pre-crisis 0.7452 0.6579 0.4903 0.1004 0.5024 0.813 0.6095 0.6107 0.6719 0.5635 0.5835 0.4426 0.0108
Crisis 0.6617 0.6791 0.4046 0.1778 0.497 0.7191 0.4954 0.6643 0.6558 0.645 0.647 0.3575 0.0255
Post-crisis 0.698 0.6807 0.3842 0.0155 0.3969 0.7351 0.6635 0.5867 0.5493 0.5574 0.3675 −0.0112
B Roll
Pre-crisis 0.7308 0.6582 0.4197 0.0804 0.4938 0.78 0.5913 0.5577 0.6324 0.535 0.551 0.4556 0.0046
Crisis 0.6154 0.6169 0.3595 0.1926 0.4866 0.6561 0.4732 0.6112 0.6116 0.6 0.6009 0.3607 0.0319
Post-crisis 0.6724 0.6532 0.3142 −0.0258 0.3419 0.7392 0.5912 0.5397 0.5203 0.5166 0.2908 −0.0149
B AdjustedSchultz
Crisis 0.5613 0.5707 0.3382 0.146 0.3581 0.5899 0.3311 0.5507 0.5397 0.5624 0.5381 0.3118 −0.0012
Post-crisis 0.6756 0.6173 0.3174 −0.0764 0.2734 0.7753 0.5539 0.5345 0.5054 0.5092 0.2575 −0.035
B EHP
Crisis 0.5291 0.5589 0.2522 0.076 0.2728 0.6119 0.2749 0.47 0.4954 0.5171 0.4978 0.2304 0.0119
Post-crisis 0.6347 0.5839 0.2558 −0.115 0.1968 0.8052 0.5009 0.4883 0.477 0.4741 0.1799 −0.0155
B PriceDispersion
Pre-crisis 0.6482 0.4987 0.5018 0.0831 0.4355 0.6739 0.5778 0.6241 0.6414 0.5272 0.543 0.3542 0.0006
Crisis 0.4478 0.4252 0.2585 0.1444 0.3834 0.4578 0.2979 0.5018 0.4766 0.49 0.4716 0.3017 0.0503
Post-crisis 0.5401 0.4913 0.2671 0.0254 0.3241 0.5241 0.5478 0.5244 0.4973 0.4983 0.2827 −0.032
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Table 2.6: Portfolio analysis: spread proxies
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Monthly
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described
in Section 2.3. B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP are calculated since November 2008, resulting in 47 observation months. The remaining
benchmarks are calculated for all 96 sample months. P Spread BGN is only computed until February 28, 2011 and spans the first 77
sample months. P Spread CBBT is not available for the first sample month, resulting in 95 observation months. Both price impact
measures start in April 2005 spanning the last 90 sample months. The remaining proxies are calculated for all 96 months in the
observation period. Portfolios are equally weighted and stratified by the level of liquidity implied by the respective benchmark or the
number of trades in the bond. As the number of a portfolio increases, its liquidity declines. The number of monthly trades is obtained
from TRACE. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row and dashed
boxes give numbers that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
Panel A: Time series correlations based on equally weighted portfolios ranked by the respective benchmark liquidity measure (1: most liquid, 10: least liquid)
B Roundtrip
Portfolio 1 0.733 0.6888 0.7518 −0.4543 0.4378 0.7743 0.7732 0.6929 0.6036 0.528 0.5694 0.4111 0.1437
Portfolio 2 0.8687 0.878 0.8482 −0.3421 0.6523 0.8852 0.8448 0.7731 0.7243 0.6939 0.7033 0.6053 −0.062
Portfolio 5 0.9227 0.9333 0.9111 0.1146 0.7872 0.9445 0.7998 0.8234 0.8104 0.7857 0.7926 0.7295 0.0859
Portfolio 9 0.9298 0.9328 0.8981 0.6549 0.8019 0.9013 0.4929 0.7342 0.7194 0.7257 0.7283 0.8919 0.4136
Portfolio 10 0.9169 0.8777 0.8589 0.8223 0.819 0.8666 0.4733 0.7263 0.7319 0.7429 0.7415 0.8849 0.3662
B IQR
Portfolio 1 0.9627 0.9121 0.8649 0.1859 0.8197 0.9543 0.8288 0.9499 0.9298 0.9035 0.9114 0.6607 −0.0746
Portfolio 2 0.9808 0.9495 0.952 0.1617 0.8415 0.971 0.8351 0.9566 0.931 0.9031 0.9121 0.7554 0.3268
Portfolio 5 0.9849 0.9834 0.9465 0.1408 0.8145 0.977 0.7652 0.9415 0.9033 0.876 0.8831 0.8314 0.2189
Portfolio 9 0.9854 0.9645 0.9322 0.7027 0.9365 0.9584 0.5348 0.9019 0.8871 0.8889 0.8928 0.9201 0.3854
Portfolio 10 0.9558 0.8598 0.8987 0.7958 0.8855 0.9265 0.5536 0.8694 0.844 0.86 0.8505 0.9258 0.3534
B Roll
Portfolio 1 0.6587 0.6536 0.6255 −0.1742 0.5477 0.6396 0.5624 0.5174 0.4927 0.4705 0.4734 0.5805 0.0692
Portfolio 2 0.9523 0.9615 0.9104 −0.1877 0.815 0.947 0.69 0.841 0.7737 0.7408 0.743 0.669 −0.1426
Portfolio 5 0.9695 0.9788 0.899 0.0231 0.8266 0.9533 0.6635 0.8627 0.8103 0.7784 0.7846 0.8366 0.1833
Portfolio 9 0.9533 0.9444 0.9226 0.7656 0.919 0.9216 0.391 0.8321 0.7984 0.8184 0.817 0.9244 −0.1873
Portfolio 10 0.9334 0.7678 0.8533 0.8702 0.9048 0.9137 0.4299 0.784 0.7893 0.7908 0.7917 0.9285 0.5535
B AdjustedSchultz
Portfolio 1 0.8197 0.8518 0.7979 0.0038 0.7009 0.7607 0.8752 0.7268 0.7659 0.7424 0.7515 0.6745 0.3607
Portfolio 2 0.9836 0.9801 0.9181 −0.1923 0.7885 0.9813 0.9372 0.9286 0.943 0.9261 0.9296 0.8335 0.0467
Portfolio 5 0.9916 0.9921 0.9647 −0.2164 0.8207 0.9948 0.8369 0.9541 0.9443 0.9304 0.9308 0.8247 0.0707
Portfolio 9 0.994 0.9916 0.9643 0.5965 0.923 0.9904 0.3632 0.9743 0.9687 0.9524 0.9617 0.9035 0.0876
Portfolio 10 0.9687 0.9078 0.9761 0.9321 0.969 0.9766 0.3887 0.9862 0.9862 0.9779 0.9795 0.9645 0.1091
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Table 2.6 continued
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
B EHP
Portfolio 1 0.9257 0.9357 0.8821 −0.0424 0.8163 0.8935 0.9387 0.8734 0.8574 0.8357 0.8462 0.7445 0.0071
Portfolio 2 0.9898 0.9843 0.9439 0.0013 0.8806 0.9844 0.9376 0.9281 0.9535 0.9404 0.9442 0.7725 0.2747
Portfolio 5 0.9873 0.9865 0.9712 −0.112 0.8014 0.9937 0.872 0.9473 0.9403 0.9267 0.9279 0.8595 −0.2616
Portfolio 9 0.988 0.9901 0.9359 0.5907 0.8891 0.9854 0.4469 0.9477 0.9464 0.9349 0.937 0.8861 −0.0002
Portfolio 10 0.9822 0.9546 0.9487 0.8796 0.9139 0.9674 0.0177 0.9715 0.9614 0.9507 0.9557 0.8848 0.3672
B PriceDispersion
Portfolio 1 0.9642 0.9219 0.8882 0.0286 0.8731 0.978 0.7984 0.9636 0.963 0.945 0.952 0.8014 0.0355
Portfolio 2 0.9734 0.9256 0.9475 0.1425 0.8857 0.9817 0.8378 0.9747 0.9688 0.9524 0.958 0.7427 −0.2657
Portfolio 5 0.9803 0.9544 0.9606 0.1098 0.8794 0.9805 0.7647 0.9812 0.9664 0.9505 0.9545 0.8415 0.1325
Portfolio 9 0.933 0.8783 0.8961 0.5419 0.928 0.9551 0.6 0.9539 0.963 0.9566 0.9618 0.8675 0.4983
Portfolio 10 0.9027 0.7283 0.8306 0.7399 0.9408 0.9003 0.2342 0.9319 0.958 0.9481 0.9542 0.8651 0.4121
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Table 2.6 continued
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
Panel B: Time series correlations based on equally weighted portfolios ranked by the number of trades in the bond (1: highest number of tr., 10: lowest number of tr.)
B Roundtrip
Portfolio 1 0.5808 0.5234 0.4176 0.1015 0.3148 0.8022 0.4096 0.4825 0.4579 0.4858 0.4837 0.0245 0.1541
Portfolio 2 0.7806 0.7628 0.5559 0.1483 0.4606 0.8548 0.5938 0.7085 0.6773 0.674 0.6704 0.2376 0.0226
Portfolio 5 0.9074 0.9096 0.8779 0.0909 0.6505 0.8974 0.7566 0.7175 0.7066 0.6902 0.6944 0.6005 −0.0384
Portfolio 9 0.9356 0.9468 0.8906 0.4794 0.8637 0.9172 0.7615 0.7895 0.7589 0.7333 0.7459 0.9087 0.27
Portfolio 10 0.9568 0.9389 0.9125 0.5644 0.9075 0.9326 0.8337 0.8171 0.8084 0.7928 0.8006 0.9165 0.3772
B IQR
Portfolio 1 0.9513 0.9357 0.5386 0.2822 0.694 0.9015 0.0026 0.8325 0.7777 0.7656 0.7692 0.4662 0.0529
Portfolio 2 0.9812 0.9768 0.7205 0.2671 0.7263 0.9178 0.3294 0.8692 0.8254 0.795 0.8029 0.5818 0.0155
Portfolio 5 0.9912 0.9797 0.9703 0.2841 0.8413 0.9788 0.7688 0.9007 0.8906 0.8762 0.8795 0.7361 0.0299
Portfolio 9 0.9933 0.9737 0.954 0.5083 0.9372 0.9706 0.8843 0.9114 0.8982 0.8799 0.8896 0.9414 0.2721
Portfolio 10 0.9924 0.963 0.9435 0.5416 0.9382 0.9564 0.906 0.8951 0.8972 0.8859 0.8926 0.9241 0.3708
B Roll
Portfolio 1 0.8017 0.8394 0.7261 0.3501 0.7062 0.8249 0.0223 0.5848 0.4812 0.5151 0.504 0.404 0.2427
Portfolio 2 0.8934 0.9177 0.832 0.313 0.7331 0.8361 0.1556 0.7027 0.624 0.5977 0.6037 0.6447 0.0146
Portfolio 5 0.9465 0.9508 0.9035 0.2754 0.7934 0.9202 0.6154 0.7834 0.7395 0.7244 0.7244 0.7862 0.0535
Portfolio 9 0.9702 0.964 0.9147 0.5586 0.9248 0.9553 0.7906 0.85 0.8231 0.8018 0.8119 0.9539 0.2454
Portfolio 10 0.9529 0.9165 0.8999 0.6041 0.9761 0.9809 0.793 0.8613 0.8941 0.8759 0.8876 0.9278 0.5659
B AdjustedSchultz
Portfolio 1 0.8976 0.9133 0.7333 0.0484 0.4693 0.9246 −0.4315 0.9105 0.9173 0.8743 0.8909 0.3479 −0.0023
Portfolio 2 0.975 0.9723 0.8282 0.1352 0.631 0.9793 −0.0932 0.9454 0.9339 0.9059 0.9105 0.5068 0.2043
Portfolio 5 0.9899 0.9854 0.9654 0.1138 0.8028 0.9841 0.8609 0.9456 0.9524 0.9408 0.9448 0.7724 −0.2568
Portfolio 9 0.9921 0.9747 0.9745 0.6227 0.9503 0.9794 0.9648 0.9603 0.9697 0.9621 0.9669 0.9517 0.355
Portfolio 10 0.9706 0.9421 0.9628 0.7439 0.9371 0.9633 0.913 0.9146 0.9728 0.9679 0.9711 0.9724 0.2624
B EHP
Portfolio 1 0.838 0.8533 0.7084 0.0651 0.4396 0.8744 −0.3477 0.8485 0.8554 0.8369 0.8501 0.2702 −0.0358
Portfolio 2 0.9583 0.9575 0.8223 0.1166 0.6003 0.966 −0.0395 0.9285 0.9165 0.8943 0.8968 0.4698 0.1762
Portfolio 5 0.983 0.9796 0.9568 0.0494 0.754 0.9805 0.8581 0.9178 0.9222 0.9109 0.9147 0.7227 −0.2681
Portfolio 9 0.9906 0.9827 0.9622 0.5891 0.9332 0.9703 0.9655 0.9442 0.9529 0.9411 0.9497 0.9398 0.3452
Portfolio 10 0.9792 0.9522 0.9644 0.733 0.9404 0.9651 0.9255 0.9199 0.9737 0.9678 0.9723 0.9559 0.2732
B PriceDispersion
Portfolio 1 0.9283 0.8457 0.2765 0.1715 0.5369 0.8926 0.1481 0.9606 0.9403 0.8901 0.9042 0.4175 −0.1169
Portfolio 2 0.9336 0.8925 0.545 0.1938 0.6435 0.9512 0.5092 0.9544 0.9311 0.9087 0.9135 0.3921 0.0256
Portfolio 5 0.9427 0.9102 0.9407 0.2786 0.843 0.9595 0.7809 0.9612 0.9578 0.9483 0.951 0.6474 −0.0057
Portfolio 9 0.9438 0.8872 0.9594 0.4506 0.9338 0.9577 0.8939 0.9605 0.9571 0.9496 0.955 0.9045 0.2609
Portfolio 10 0.9417 0.8645 0.9258 0.5339 0.9735 0.9782 0.8528 0.9194 0.9627 0.957 0.9586 0.9398 0.5299
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by the respective benchmark. We then calculate means of the benchmark and proxies
within each portfolio. Finally, we calculate time series correlations for each portfolio.
We find high levels of correlations for most of the benchmark-proxy combinations in
Portfolios 2-10. For the most part, our measures show highest correlations in the middle
portfolios and lower figures on the edges. The decline is more severe for the most liquid
bonds in Portfolio 1, which confirms results by Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for
stocks that liquidity measurement is more challenging when liquidity is high. The majority
of wins is claimed again by our auto-covariance measures P Roll and P Gibbs, as well as
by P HighLow. The measures based on quoted spreads from pricing sources CBBT and all
dealers’ quotes (P Spread CBBT and P Spread Mean) also perform quite well, especially
for the price dispersion benchmark. Proxies based on zero returns (P Zeros and P FHT)
always perform best in Portfolio 9 or 10, which confirms the intuition that they work well
for illiquid bonds with many zero returns.
In Panel B, bonds are allocated to portfolios by the number of monthly trades. Again,
Portfolio 1 contains the most liquid and Portfolio 10 the most illiquid bonds. The results
confirm our findings in Panel A. Again, most of the proxies have their lowest correlations in
the most liquid portfolio. The outcome for our effective spread estimators is basically the
same as before. We find that they are the most consistent proxies, taking their maximum
in the small and middle trade size portfolios with somewhat lower correlations in Portfolio
1. B PriceDispersion aside, our benchmarks are best captured by P Roll, P Gibbs, and
P HighLow.
In Table 2.7, we perform the same analysis as in Table 2.4 but aggregate benchmark
and proxy liquidity measures on an annual instead of a monthly basis. Panel A shows
extremely high time series correlations especially for P Roll, P Gibbs, and P HighLow.
Part of this result might be due to the fact that correlations are biased to one if the number
of observations is small which is a side effect for time series correlations when aggregating
annually. Average cross sectional correlations in Panel B are also higher than in the
monthly analysis, but not to the same extent as for time series correlations. Contrary to
the monthly results where the high-low bid-ask spread estimator clearly performed best,
most of the wins in the annual comparisons are claimed by Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs
measure.25 Panels C and D paint a very similar picture for the prediction errors compared
to our main analysis in Table 2.4 with the high-low and Gibbs measure splitting their
25The better performance of the Gibbs measure in the annual compared to the monthly sample is in
line with Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) for the stock market. Hasbrouck (2009) also comments
on problems that arise when calculating his measure on a monthly basis.
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Table 2.7: Annual spread proxies compared to spread benchmarks
Annual high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from January 1, 2005 to September 30, 2012. Annual
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described
in Section 2.3. B AdjustedSchultz and B EHP are calculated since January 2009, resulting in four observation years. The remaining
benchmarks are calculated for all eight sample years. P Spread BGN is only computed until December 2010 and spans the first six
sample years. Both price impact measures start in January 2006 spanning the last seven sample years. The remaining proxies are
calculated for all eight years in the observation period. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes
give the best value in a row and dashed boxes give numbers that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Roll P Gibbs P Effective- P Zeros P FHT P HighLow P Spread- P Spread- P Spread- P Quote- P QDmid P Amihud P Pastor-
Tick BGN CBBT Mean Dispersion Stambaugh
Panel A: Time series correlations
B Roundtrip 0.9609 0.9682 0.9673 0.2003 0.8255 0.9661 0.7789 0.764 0.7657 0.7211 0.7465 0.9033 0.5677
B IQR 0.9987 0.9932 0.9693 0.436 0.9484 0.9904 0.6874 0.8658 0.8559 0.8052 0.8363 0.9744 0.7173
B Roll 0.9651 0.9575 0.9192 0.4883 0.9234 0.9311 0.4879 0.728 0.7098 0.6423 0.6847 0.9883 0.7585
B AdjustedSchultz 0.999 0.9986 0.9987 0.037 0.9881 0.9991 0.9846 0.9833 0.9652 0.9724 0.9904 −0.5782
B EHP 0.99999 0.9999 0.9998 −0.0026 0.9813 0.9998 0.9768 0.9756 0.9545 0.9625 0.9842 −0.5914
B PriceDispersion 0.9508 0.9494 0.9502 0.3181 0.8921 0.9766 0.8289 0.9483 0.9492 0.9244 0.9393 0.9155 0.6233
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B Roundtrip 0.7701 0.797 0.4073 0.038 0.4427 0.8202 0.5293 0.5634 0.5593 0.5501 0.5436 0.4176 0.0566
B IQR 0.8906 0.9067 0.5072 0.0989 0.5544 0.8284 0.6195 0.7184 0.6942 0.658 0.6677 0.5187 0.0409
B Roll 0.8594 0.8809 0.4416 0.0963 0.5317 0.8223 0.6184 0.6756 0.662 0.6424 0.64 0.4641 0.0563
B AdjustedSchultz 0.8317 0.864 0.375 −0.0291 0.362 0.786 0.4695 0.5975 0.604 0.6109 0.601 0.4191 −0.0315
B EHP 0.8048 0.8449 0.303 −0.0876 0.2759 0.8308 0.4478 0.5477 0.5676 0.5995 0.5756 0.3263 −0.0015
B PriceDispersion 0.7484 0.7373 0.3846 0.1081 0.4759 0.6467 0.5073 0.6167 0.5947 0.564 0.5645 0.4875 0.0444
Panel C: Mean bias
B Roundtrip 0.0057 0.0009 −0.0111 −0.0072 −0.0027 −0.0084 0.008 0.0065 0.0127 0.0142
B IQR 0.0085 0.0037 −0.0083 −0.0044 0.0001 −0.0059 0.0111 0.0093 0.0155 0.0171
B Roll 0.0059 0.0011 −0.0108 −0.0069 −0.0025 −0.0085 0.0084 0.0068 0.013 0.0145
B AdjustedSchultz 0.0033 −0.001 −0.0113 −0.0089 −0.0037 −0.0103 0.0074 0.0068 0.0142 0.015
B EHP 0.0065 0.0023 −0.0081 −0.0057 −0.0005 −0.0057 0.0105 0.01 0.0174 0.0183
B PriceDispersion −0.001 −0.0057 −0.0166 −0.0135 −0.0087 −0.0155 0.0025 0.0005 0.0068 0.008
Panel D: Root mean squared error (RMSE)
B Roundtrip 0.0099 0.0059 0.0132 0.0112 0.006 0.0108 0.0187 0.0156 0.0219 0.0248
B IQR 0.0108 0.0058 0.0104 0.0083 0.0046 0.0086 0.019 0.0157 0.0228 0.0255
B Roll 0.0091 0.0049 0.0129 0.0103 0.0057 0.0108 0.0179 0.0148 0.0214 0.0242
B AdjustedSchultz 0.0068 0.0056 0.0152 0.013 0.0076 0.0158 0.015 0.0124 0.0195 0.021
B EHP 0.009 0.005 0.0104 0.009 0.0045 0.0088 0.0177 0.0149 0.0227 0.0243
B PriceDispersion 0.0169 0.0185 0.0272 0.0235 0.0201 0.0292 0.0164 0.0179 0.0202 0.021637
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wins.
Despite of the completely different market design of decentralized bond markets com-
pared to centralized stock markets, low-frequency spread proxies developed mainly for
stock markets generally approximate our high-frequency bond market liquidity bench-
marks very well. Especially the two measures based on the auto-covariance of trade prices,
P Roll and P Gibbs as well as P HighLow show high, consistent, and robust results in time
series and average cross sectional correlations. In contrast, only P HighLow and P Gibbs
are able to measure the scale of transaction costs correctly, resulting in low mean biases
and RMSEs. P HighLow claims the most wins for the monthly comparisons, whereas
P Gibbs performs especially well when aggregating annually. Measures based on zero re-
turns (P Zeros and P FHT) suffer from small time series correlations when bonds are more
liquid. Our quote based measures show small time series correlations before the crisis which
might indicate some consistency problems. However, the quoted spreads from Bloomberg’s
CBBT pricing source and average dealers’ quotes often give the best results in capturing
price dispersion. For quoted spreads, these two pricing sources generally perform better
than quotes from Bloomberg’s Generic Quote (BGN). P PastorStambaugh is clearly dom-
inated by the other proxies. Although P Amihud has high time series correlations with
our benchmarks, it does not do a good job considering cross sectional correlations and
performs somewhat worse for highly liquid bonds and in the pre-crisis period. In compar-
ison to stock markets, our measure based on price clustering (P Effective-Tick) performs
worse which is probably due to the different market design of the bond market.
2.4.4 Monthly Price Impact Results
Table 2.8 presents our main findings for the low-frequency price impact proxies. Panel A
shows time series correlations based on the monthly means of our benchmarks and proxies.
Again, we find high and significant values for all benchmark-proxy combinations. Quote
based measures seem to work better when it comes to capturing B Lambda, whereas for
the other proxies, results for the two benchmarks are very similar. Both high-frequency
benchmarks are best captured by the low frequency Amihud (2002) measure. In contrast
to that, the price impact proxy of Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) performs worst.
Panel B reports average cross sectional evidence. P PastorStambaugh aside, which is
again clearly dominated by all other proxies, all average correlations are significant, ranging
from 0.3642 to 0.7428. With the exception of P Amihud, which captures B Amihud best,
our low-frequency proxies seem to grasp B Lambda better than B Amihud. The price
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Table 2.8: Monthly price impact proxies compared to price impact benchmarks
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Monthly
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described in
Section 2.3. B Lambda is calculated since November 2008, resulting in 47 observation months. B Amihud is calculated for all 96 sample
months. Due to the availability of volume data in Bloomberg, all proxies start in April 2005. P PI Spread BGN is only computed until
February 2011 and spans 71 sample months. The remaining proxies are calculated for the last 90 months in the observation period.
Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row and dashed boxes give
numbers that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Amihud P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P Pastor-
Roll Gibbs ET FHT HL Spread- Spread- Spread- QD Qdmid Stambaugh
BGN CBBT Mean
Panel A: Time series correlations
B Amihud 0.9757 0.9269 0.8433 0.9431 0.9168 0.9675 0.601 0.7599 0.9099 0.9082 0.9064 0.4835
B Lambda 0.9789 0.9021 0.8262 0.8798 0.8392 0.9189 0.849 0.8537 0.942 0.9427 0.9393 0.3245
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B Amihud 0.5702 0.5049 0.538 0.415 0.4291 0.5538 0.4852 0.3653 0.4336 0.4181 0.4331 −0.0017
B Lambda 0.3642 0.6607 0.6985 0.5307 0.5203 0.7428 0.7082 0.6154 0.6415 0.6242 0.6419 −0.0333
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impact adaptation of the high-low spread proxy P PI HL yields the highest correlation
for B Lambda. In contrast to the time series results, the correlation of P Amihud with
B Lambda is relatively low.
In Tables 2.9, 2.10, and 2.11 we perform robustness checks regarding the consistency of
our price impact measures in different subperiods, for more liquid and illiquid bonds, and
when aggregating measures yearly instead of monthly. Due to the conceptual problems in
the interpretation of price impact measures in the corporate bond market (see the intro-
duction), we refrain from discussing these tables in detail but instead directly summarize
the price impact evidence including the robustness checks.
We find that time series and average cross sectional correlations between our bench-
mark and proxy measures are high and significant for the most part. P Amihud and
P PI HL clearly show up as winners in our analysis. The former wins both time series
competitions and is significantly better than the remaining proxies for B Lambda. Cross
sectional correlations are best captured by P Amihud and P PI HL dependent on the cho-
sen benchmark. Both measures, but especially P PI HL, are robust against changes in
market or bond liquidity (see Tables 2.9 and 2.10), being in the leading group in most of
our robustness tests and showing relatively small variations in correlations. Quote based
price impact proxies, like their spread proxy counterparts, show high variations for differ-
ent subperiods, even yielding some unreasonable correlations prior to the financial crisis.
In all analyses, the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure is consistently dominated by
all other measures.
2.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we address the issue of how to best measure liquidity in OTC bond markets.
Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009) answer this question for the stock market, but due
to the fundamental differences in market structure, it is highly questionable whether their
results are valid for bond markets. To provide guidance for researchers and practitioners,
we adapt their empirical methodology on the U.S. corporate bond market. With the help
of the TRACE database, which provides a complete trade record for this market after
October 1, 2004, we calculate a total of eight monthly high-frequency benchmark liquidity
measures. We compare them to 23 liquidity proxies that only need daily data (last price,
volume, high- and low price, or bid-ask quotes) which can be conveniently downloaded,
e.g., from Bloomberg.
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Table 2.9: Subperiod analysis: price impact proxies
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Monthly
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described
in Section 2.3. The pre-crisis period is October 1, 2004 until March 31, 2007. The crisis period is defined as April 1, 2007 until
December 31, 2009. The post-crisis period is January 1, 2010 until September 30, 2012. B Lambda is calculated since November 2008.
B Amihud is calculated for all 96 sample months. Due to the availability of volume data in Bloomberg, all proxies start in April 2005.
P PI Spread BGN is only computed for the pre-crisis and crisis period. The remaining proxies are calculated for the last 90 months in
the observation period. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row
and dashed boxes give numbers that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Amihud P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P Pastor-
Roll Gibbs ET FHT HL Spread- Spread- Spread- QD Qdmid Stambaugh
BGN CBBT Mean
Panel A: Time series correlations
B Amihud
Pre-crisis 0.8546 0.7343 0.6817 0.5273 0.4569 0.8726 −0.2555 −0.3939 −0.4581 −0.3923 −0.4125 0.088
Crisis 0.9731 0.9015 0.7607 0.9293 0.9045 0.9567 0.4599 0.809 0.9377 0.9118 0.9381 0.486
Post-crisis 0.5128 0.7477 0.7115 0.8297 0.3084 0.8148 −0.1378 0.3476 0.7749 0.2943 0.0145
B Lambda
Crisis 0.9662 0.7338 0.4521 0.7377 0.7248 0.8107 0.6659 0.9646 0.9017 0.8915 0.8979 0.2689
Post-crisis 0.7159 0.8999 0.8725 0.8421 0.5803 0.9022 0.1648 0.5893 0.8569 0.5532 −0.0118
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B Amihud
Pre-crisis 0.6006 0.6096 0.6222 0.4746 0.5113 0.6498 0.5344 0.3076 0.4482 0.4378 0.4481 0.0015
Crisis 0.7015 0.6096 0.6717 0.5287 0.5467 0.6783 0.4889 0.3704 0.4693 0.4709 0.4689 0.0165
Post-crisis 0.3729 0.2844 0.2879 0.2363 0.2233 0.3019 0.4006 0.3852 0.3469 0.3845 −0.0221
B Lambda
Crisis 0.4785 0.4957 0.5865 0.5109 0.5024 0.5259 0.6739 0.5649 0.6122 0.6239 0.6218 −0.0772
Post-crisis 0.3119 0.7164 0.7378 0.5389 0.5278 0.8057 0.6355 0.6534 0.6242 0.6503 −0.0146
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Table 2.10: Portfolio analysis: price impact proxies
Monthly high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from October 1, 2004 to September 30, 2012. Monthly
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described in
Section 2.3. B Lambda is calculated since November 2008, resulting in 47 observation months. B Amihud is calculated for all 96 sample
months. Due to the availability of volume data in Bloomberg, all proxies start in April 2005. P PI Spread BGN is only computed until
February 2011 and spans 71 sample months. The remaining proxies are calculated for the last 90 months in the observation period.
Portfolios are equally weighted and stratified by the level of liquidity implied by the respective benchmark or the number of trades in
the bond. As the number of a portfolio increases, its liquidity declines. The number of monthly trades is obtained from TRACE. Bold
numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row and dashed boxes give numbers
that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Amihud P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P Pastor-
Roll Gibbs ET FHT HL Spread- Spread- Spread- QD Qdmid Stambaugh
BGN CBBT Mean
Panel A: Time series correlations based on equally weighted portfolios ranked by the respective benchmark liquidity measure (1: most liquid, 10: least liquid)
B Amihud
Portfolio 1 0.7767 0.7995 0.8339 0.54 0.7581 0.7418 0.7145 0.7196 0.6981 0.6956 0.698 −0.189
Portfolio 2 0.7915 0.8398 0.7934 0.4151 0.6963 0.886 0.5518 0.7137 0.6621 0.6392 0.6397 −0.4804
Portfolio 5 0.8053 0.8851 0.8343 0.7001 0.7882 0.9186 0.4029 0.7702 0.7759 0.7729 0.7534 −0.2067
Portfolio 9 0.9735 0.9427 0.912 0.9322 0.9305 0.9581 0.3232 0.7858 0.8757 0.8499 0.8757 0.4362
Portfolio 10 0.9756 0.8551 0.704 0.9507 0.9127 0.9575 0.6242 0.6783 0.9313 0.9246 0.931 0.4946
B Lambda
Portfolio 1 0.2957 0.1251 0.2731 0.2913 0.0585 0.1633 0.5376 0.4974 0.5347 0.5292 0.5322 −0.051
Portfolio 2 0.9018 0.5516 0.8886 0.5597 0.3958 0.6517 0.8193 0.8956 0.8883 0.9016 0.8706 0.3357
Portfolio 5 0.9116 0.9685 0.9491 0.9408 0.9068 0.9764 0.7928 0.9404 0.9366 0.9406 0.9201 −0.2936
Portfolio 9 0.9307 0.9358 0.9453 0.9465 0.9142 0.9137 0.8796 0.8744 0.9311 0.9257 0.9321 0.4389
Portfolio 10 0.9661 0.8406 0.7529 0.8941 0.9048 0.9252 0.7996 0.8464 0.9385 0.9195 0.9395 0.0508
B Amihud
Portfolio 1 0.5419 0.6035 0.5588 0.4116 0.5469 0.5626 0.103 0.5035 0.4813 0.4417 0.4108 0.1402
Portfolio 2 0.7294 0.5784 0.5567 0.4726 0.5979 0.6712 0.0757 0.5729 0.5689 0.5921 0.5434 0.0546
Portfolio 5 0.8017 0.6319 0.557 0.6693 0.7206 0.7655 0.1519 0.7659 0.7859 0.8166 0.7782 0.0079
Portfolio 9 0.9592 0.8783 0.7922 0.934 0.9074 0.9524 0.6406 0.5646 0.8671 0.8303 0.8641 0.2869
Portfolio 10 0.9679 0.8398 0.7523 0.9531 0.9318 0.951 0.7662 0.6603 0.9187 0.9081 0.9168 0.5565
B Lambda
Portfolio 1 0.3437 0.6119 0.5512 0.5365 0.4363 0.6431 −0.4173 0.7177 0.713 0.7441 0.7707 0.0319
Portfolio 2 0.6116 0.7067 0.6493 0.5258 0.464 0.7868 0.0454 0.7539 0.7443 0.7929 0.7317 0.3518
Portfolio 5 0.7681 0.8011 0.6798 0.8637 0.7543 0.8187 0.5609 0.6742 0.8091 0.796 0.7998 −0.3763
Portfolio 9 0.9704 0.891 0.8556 0.9126 0.8926 0.9497 0.8851 0.8013 0.8851 0.8606 0.8775 0.2799
Portfolio 10 0.96 0.769 0.6638 0.8505 0.8137 0.8349 0.7535 0.7915 0.8721 0.8194 0.8668 0.2982
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Table 2.11: Annual price impact proxies compared to price impact benchmarks
Annual high-frequency benchmarks are calculated from intraday TRACE data from January 1, 2005 to September 30, 2012. Annual
low-frequency proxies are computed based on daily price, volume, and quote data provided by Bloomberg. All measures are described
in Section 2.3. B Lambda is calculated since January 2009, resulting in four observation years. B Amihud is calculated for all eight
sample years. Due to the availability of volume data in Bloomberg, all proxies start in January 2006. P PI Spread BGN is only
computed until December 2010 and spans five sample years. The remaining proxies are calculated for the last seven years in the
observation period. Bold numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. Drawn through boxes give the best value in a row and
dashed boxes give numbers that are not significantly different from this value at the 5% level.
P Amihud P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P PI- P Pastor-
Roll Gibbs ET FHT HL Spread- Spread- Spread- QD Qdmid Stambaugh
BGN CBBT Mean
Panel A: Time series correlations
B Amihud 0.9791 0.8626 0.8917 0.9539 0.9796 0.9836 0.8258 0.7112 0.9502 0.9582 0.9488 0.6911
B Lambda 0.9806 0.9841 0.9838 0.9871 0.9762 0.9861 0.6303 0.9776 0.9908 0.9756 −0.5863
Panel B: Average cross sectional correlations
B Amihud 0.7123 0.5485 0.5708 0.4813 0.5197 0.5996 0.6219 0.5158 0.5829 0.5877 0.5826 0.0437
B Lambda 0.4393 0.8033 0.8088 0.6847 0.615 0.8693 0.7878 0.7629 0.7498 0.7188 0.7504 −0.0017
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We find that although most studies in corporate bond markets use their own approach
to measure liquidity, results of previous studies using high-frequency bid-ask spread mea-
sures should be robust regarding the chosen approach as all of these measures are highly
correlated.
Second, we test whether low-frequency liquidity proxies that only need daily data are
useful to measure intraday transaction costs and price impact. We provide clear evidence
that most of our proxies are able to capture variations in transaction costs on both a
time series and cross sectional level. In contrast, only two of the low-frequency proxies
precisely estimate the magnitude of transaction costs. Consistent with Goyenko, Holden,
and Trzcinka (2009) for the stock market, intraday price impact is somewhat harder to
grasp than transaction costs. Nevertheless, most of our price impact proxies are able to
capture time series and cross sectional variations of price impact benchmarks. For some
of our transaction cost and price impact proxies, the ability to capture the features of our
high-frequency benchmarks varies over time and in different levels of market and bond
liquidity. However, the group of dominant measures mostly stays the same.
When estimating effective spread, we find that, with the exception of our price dis-
persion benchmark, low-frequency proxies calculated from Bloomberg’s TRACE pricing
source, rather than quote data, are the superior choice. The proxies developed for stock
markets by Corwin and Schultz (2012), Hasbrouck (2009), and Roll (1984) give high time
series and cross sectional correlations and also perform well in our robustness tests. Fur-
ther, the first two show low prediction errors. If computational costs are crucial, we
recommend Roll’s measure because of its low data and processing demands. In a monthly
setting, the high-low bid-ask spread estimator of Corwin and Schultz is preferred over
Hasbrouck’s Gibbs measure because of its overall better performance and lower compu-
tational requirements. When aggregating liquidity annually, the Gibbs measure performs
slightly better than the high-low estimator. If daily data on trades is not available, quoted
bid-ask spreads distributed in Bloomberg are also suited to capture intraday liquidity. It
is important to note, however, that one should prefer data from executable quotes (pricing
source: CBBT) over Bloomberg’s Generic bid-ask spread (pricing source: BGN). BGN
bid-ask spreads, although useful in capturing time series and cross sectional variations, do
not provide a correct scale of transaction costs. Quote based measures also do have some
consistency problems especially for the time before 2007.
For price impact, the daily Amihud (2002) measure and the price impact version of
the high-low bid-ask spread estimator win in the most categories with the Amihud (2002)
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measure performing better in the time series and the high-low estimator being superior
in capturing cross sectional variations. Especially the high-low price impact measure,
but also the Amihud (2002) low frequency proxy, give consistent and robust results for
different levels of market and bond liquidity. However, the latter needs less data input and
preprocessing in comparison. The Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) price impact Gamma,
on the other hand, is inferior to merely all other proxies. Although price impact measures
are employed in the bond market literature, we only recommend to use them with great
caution. The reason is that larger sizes trade at better prices in many bond markets. This
induces a negative price impact component and leads to difficulties in the interpretation
of price impact measures.
Summarizing, our results in this chapter provide clear evidence that the reduction
in data requirements and computational burden, when using low-frequency proxies over
high-frequency liquidity measures, for many applications might outweigh the small losses
in accuracy for the U.S. corporate bond market.
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Chapter 3
The Term Structure of Liquidity
Premia Conditional on the Economic
Environment
3.1 Introduction
After having established how to best measure liquidity in the previous chapter, we now
study the pricing implications of illiquidity for bonds of different maturity. For that, we
analyze the term structure of liquidity premia as the difference between the zero coupon
yield curves of two bond segments that differ only in their liquidity. Although, it is
consensus in the literature that a large part of the yield spread compensates investors
for the illiquidity of a bond (see, e.g., Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005), disentangling
illiquidity related risk premia from other systematic factors such as default risk is in most
papers subject to strong assumptions. In contrast, German government bonds (BUNDs)
and government guaranteed bonds issued by the German federal agency Kreditanstalt
fu¨r Wiederaufbau (KfW) provide a near-ideal setting to study liquidity premia. Both
constitute major bond market segments in the eurozone with a sufficient number of bonds
from both issuers in all maturity segments. Since KfW bonds are explicitly guaranteed by
the German government, they bear effectively the same default risk as government bonds.
However, trading volumes and bid-ask spreads indicate that they are less liquid.
In this clean setting, we study the following three questions based on 15 years of data
from 1996 to 2010: How do liquidity related risk premia behave in different economic
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regimes? What are the drivers of different parts of the term structure of liquidity premia?
And are relations between fundamental factors and liquidity premia different in crisis
and non-crisis times? All three questions are relevant for investors and issuers active in
global bond markets as an increase of the liquidity premium directly translates into a price
decrease of a bond.26
Three main results emerge from the analysis. First, our regime-switching approach
identifies the 1998 bailout of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), the period after
the burst of the dot-com bubble as well as the financial crisis starting in summer 2007 as
liquidity stress periods in the European bond market. Within these stress periods, the
extra yield to maturity of an illiquid agency bond compared to a liquid government bond
is on average around 25 bps, compared to 15 bps in normal times. The increase is most
prevalent at the short end, where premia, e.g., for two year bonds reach all-time highs
of more than 120 bps after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. Thus, term structures of
liquidity premia in times of stress are often strongly downward sloping as predicted by
theoretical models when probabilities to sell are above their long-term mean (see Ericsson
and Renault, 2006) or when aggregate liquidity shocks are more likely (see Feldhu¨tter,
2012).
Second, we find that liquidity premia are highly dependent on the global availability
of arbitrage capital as well as on foreign flows into bond markets. As suggested by the
recent literature on slow moving capital, the supply of liquidity depends on sophisticated
arbitrageurs providing liquidity for investors (see, e.g., Gromb and Vayanos, 2010). On
the other hand, demand for liquidity only drives short-term liquidity premia.
Third and probably most importantly, we find that none of our economic drivers plays
a major role in explaining premia in normal times. In contrast, a decrease in the available
arbitrage capital directly translates into higher liquidity premia in crisis periods. This re-
sult goes well together with the theoretical insights of Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009)
that the impact of changes of speculator capital on liquidity is significantly stronger when
funding is scarce and the system is in stress. Additionally, the regime-switching depen-
dency of short-term liquidity premia on liquidity demand translates into an additional
source of risk for short-term bonds. This risk factor mirrors the increasing demand for
short-term and highly liquid bonds during liquidity stress periods. As as direct result,
26As a concrete example, insurance companies currently face the challenge to mark-to-market their
hold-to-maturity assets in the light of Solvency II. In this regard, the European Insurance CFO/CRO
Forum stresses that there is a lack of research regarding the term structure of liquidity premia (see
European Insurance CFO Forum and CRO Forum (2010), p. 55).
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short-term premia in crisis times increase disproportionately leading to pronounced term
structure effects. The highly non-linear influence of fundamentals on liquidity premia
implies that calibrating, e.g., risk management models in normal times, where liquidity
premia are largely invariant to changes in fundamentals, heavily underestimates the sys-
tematic component of liquidity risk.
Our study relates to several strands of literature. First, papers like Longstaff (2004),
Koziol and Sauerbier (2007), Bu¨hler and Vonhoff (2011), and Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-
Homburg (2012) study the term structure of liquidity premia for Refcorp and Treasury
bonds as well as for German Pfandbriefe. All of these studies do not pursue a conditional
approach, rather they analyze ‘average’ effects over the whole business cycle. Second,
Brunnermeier (2009), Dick-Nielsen, Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012), and Acharya, Amihud,
and Bharath (2013) analyze the different behavior of liquidity during stress and normal
times. In contrast to these papers, we study the pricing implications across different
maturity segments and do not rely on strong assumptions regarding the separation between
liquidity and credit risk. Finally, Goyenko, Subrahmanyam, and Ukhov (2011) study the
term structure of Treasury market illiquidity. Although their focus is on bond market
trading cost measured via bid-ask spreads instead of yield differentials, their findings
of increasing illiquidity in recessions is pretty much consistent with our insights on the
premium side.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows: Section 3.2 extracts the term
structure of liquidity premia and provides insights on its characteristics. In Section 3.3,
we analyze economic determinants of liquidity premia of different maturities conditional
on the economic environment in a regime-switching model. Section 3.4 performs several
robustness checks. Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Liquidity Premia
The interpretation of the KfW-BUND bond yield spread curve as the term structure of
liquidity premia (see also, e.g., Schwarz, 2010; Monfort and Renne, 2011, 2013) depends
on two key assumptions: that federal agency bonds are less liquid than government bonds
and that credit risk in both segments is exactly the same. We first provide evidence for
both of these assumptions and describe our data set. We then discuss the economics of
the KfW-BUND yield spread and provide first evidence of its regime-switching nature.
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3.2.1 Data and Term Structure Estimation
We estimate zero coupon yield curves for German government bonds (BUNDs) and bonds
of the Kreditanstalt fu¨r Wiederaufbau (KfW) using the parametric Nelson-Siegel approach
(see, e.g., Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg, 2012). KfW is a promotional bank owned
by the German government and federal states. It was founded in 1948 to further the
reconstruction of the German economy after World War II. Today, it serves as the leading
financier of small and medium size enterprises, provides credit to retail customers for
subsidized projects (e.g., improving energy efficiency of buildings), and acts on behalf
of the German government on special tasks. The government of Germany guarantees
the continuation of KfW through a maintenance obligation (‘Anstaltslast’). In addition,
all KfW bonds are explicitly guaranteed by the German government. Thus, they bear
effectively the same default risk as government bonds. This is recognized, e.g., by the
U.S. economic magazine ‘Global Finance’ honoring KfW as the world’s safest bank in
2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012. Rating reports and conversations with analysts from different
rating agencies suggest that they apply a ‘credit substitution approach’, equalizing the
rating of KfW with that of the Federal Republic of Germany. Analysts state that only
an extremely unlikely change of the legal framework would break down the direct link
between the ratings of the two segments. Therefore, it is safe to assume that credit
risk in both segments is identical. Moreover, KfWs and BUNDs are zero weighted in
determining capital requirements within the Basel regulations, and are also identical in
their tax treatment.
Our data set consists of weekly closing prices for BUNDs and KfW bonds from the
Frankfurt Stock exchange from February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010. During this
period, there are always a sufficient number of bonds from both issuers in all maturity
segments available. Closing prices either result from trades or are determined in an auction
like mechanism. We only include those KfW bonds that are well comparable to BUNDs:
plain vanilla fixed coupon bonds with annual coupon payments that are exchange-tradable
and denominated in Euro. Table 3.1 gives an overview of all bonds in our sample.
In contrast to their identical credit risk, the two segments differ in their liquidity due
to the about eleven times higher outstanding total volume and the more than three times
higher average issue size of BUNDs compared to KfW bonds (see Table 3.1). Regarding
trading volume and turnover, KfW collects information from 25 banks trading in its bonds
and shares the data with us. From July 2011 to June 2012, traded volume in Euro
denominated KfW bonds amounts to 127.4 billion EUR compared to 5.4 trillion EUR
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Table 3.1: Summary statistics for KfW bonds and BUNDs
This table shows summary statistics for the bonds included in the sample. The observation
period is February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010.
Kreditanstalt fu¨r German government
Wiederaufbau (KfW) bonds (BUND)
Number of bonds 68 227
Average time to maturity 6.09 7.52
at issue date (in years)
Average coupon (in %) 4.13 4.90
Average issuing volume (incl. 2.99 9.83
all reopenings) (in bn EUR)
Total volume (in bn EUR) 203 2 231
in BUNDs in 2012. KfW bonds are approximately turned over once per year, compared
to a turnover of five for BUNDs. In contrast to the U.S. bond market, where trading
activity concentrates on just issued on-the-run bonds, trading in KfW bonds is distributed
relatively equally on all maturities (see also, e.g., Ejsing and Sihvonen, 2009, who find the
on-the-run status to have only negligible influence on liquidity for BUNDs). Thus, we do
not separate between on-the-run and off-the-run bonds. Note also that although KfWs
and BUNDs are both accepted by the European Central Bank (ECB) as collateral for
repo transactions, ECB divides securities in liquidity categories. KfWs are in the second
highest category, whereas BUNDs are in the highest.27
The estimation of the zero coupon yield curves for both BUND yBUNDt (T ) (where T
denotes the time to maturity) and KfW yKfWt (T ) using the Nelson-Siegel approach is
detailed in the Appendix B.1. The term structure of liquidity premia at time t is then
obtained as the difference between the two estimated Nelson-Siegel curves
illiqt(T ) = y
KfW
t (T )− yBUNDt (T ). (3.1)
27This leads to small additional haircuts for KfWs of up to 2% for the longest maturities. KfWs
and BUNDs are both accepted by the Federal Reserve for discount window loans with the same margin
haircuts. The Bank of England accepts KfWs only as ‘wider collateral’ which can be used for long-term
open market operations and the discount window facility, whereas BUNDs are accepted for all monetary
policy operations.
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3.2.2 Economics of the KfW-BUND Yield Spread
An obvious question is why yield differences between KfW bonds and BUNDs are not
arbitraged away. The KfW-BUND yield spread is in this aspect in line with the Refcorp-
Treasury spread (see Longstaff, 2004), the spread between Treasury bonds and inflation-
swapped TIPS issues (see Fleckenstein, Longstaff, and Lustig, 2013), or the spread between
Treasuries of different liquidity (see Fontaine and Garcia, 2012; Banerjee and Graveline,
2013). Although the arbitrage strategy of buying a KfW bond and short-selling a gov-
ernment bond of the same maturity (and rolling over the respective repo positions) is
riskless in theory, in practice this strategy is costly, it consumes capital, and it is risky
in the short run. The strategy is costly as, in addition to direct transaction costs, repo
rates for BUNDs are lower than for KfW bonds (see Banerjee and Graveline, 2013, for a
related discussion on Treasury markets). It consumes capital as margins of KfW bonds
and BUNDs are different (see footnote 27) and it is risky, at least in the short-run, as the
yield spread could widen (see Liu and Longstaff, 2004, for a formal discussion).
Thus, besides interpreting our yield-spread as a liquidity measure, it could also be
interpreted as a measure of textbook arbitrage in a frictionless market. In contrast to the
yield-spreads discussed above, but also in contrast to a recent measure of price deviation
in the yield curve of Treasuries (see Hu, Pan, and Wang, 2013), we are able to derive a
full term structure of our measure. Each point on this term structure can be interpreted
as an arbitrage risk premium, i.e., an ex-ante return of a textbook arbitrage strategy in
the respective maturity. It therefore not only incorporates the severeness of frictions, but
also market expectations regarding these frictions for different time horizons, as well as
risk premia. To back up this interpretation, we regress yearly excess returns rxt+1(T ) of
T -year KfW bonds over T -year BUNDs on our liquidity premia of three maturities and
their principal components (see, e.g., Cochrane and Piazzesi, 2005) for maturities T of
two, five, and ten years:
rxt+1(T ) = γ0 + γ1 · illiqt(2) + γ2 · illiqt(5) + γ3 · illiqt(10) + ǫTt+1, (3.2)
rxt+1(T ) = γ0 + γ1 · PCilliq1t + γ2 · PCilliq2t + γ3 · PCilliq3t + ǫTt+1. (3.3)
The large R2s in Table 3.2 show that our measure has indeed explanatory power for
excess returns. In the regression of excess returns on liquidity premia in Equation (3.2),
the premium with the maturity that equals the maturity of the excess return is always
significant at the 1% level. When we use principal components instead of liquidity premia,
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Table 3.2: Excess return regressions
In this table, we regress yearly excess returns rxt+1(T ) of T -year KfW bond over T -
year BUNDs on liquidity premia and their principal components. rxt+1(T ) is the yearly
excess return from buying a T -year KfW bond in t, financing it with a T -year BUND
and liquidating the position one year later, i.e., rxt+1(T ) ≡ rKfWt+1 (T ) − rBUNDt+1 (T ). Log
returns are defined, e.g., for KfW bonds, as rKfWt+1 (T ) ≡ pKfWt+1 (T − 1) − pKfWt (T ), where
pt(T ) denotes the log price of a T -year discount bond that can be derived directly from
the estimated yield curves of KfW bonds and BUNDs. illiqt(T ) refers to T -year liquidity
premia. PCilliq1t, PCilliq2t, and PCilliq3t, denote the first, second, and third principal
component derived from the two, five, and ten year liquidity premia. Standard errors are
calculated using a Newey-West correction with 18 lags and are given in parentheses. The
observation period is from February 1996 to September 2010 (164 monthly observations).
rxt+1(T ) = γ0 + γ1 · illiqt(2) rxt+1(T ) = γ0 · const+ γ1 · PCilliq1t
+γ2 · illiqt(5) + γ3 · illiqt(10) + ǫTt+1 +γ2 · PCilliq2t + γ3 · PCilliq3t + ǫTt+1
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr.
γ0 −0.0019∗∗ −0.0041∗ −0.0095∗ 0.0014∗ 0.0014 0.0013
(0.0006) (0.0017) (0.0039) (0.0006) (0.0014) (0.0029)
γ1 0.0114
∗∗ −0.0112 −0.0192 0.0017∗∗ 0.0028∗∗ 0.0052∗∗
(0.0039) (0.0097) (0.0192) (0.0001) (0.0004) (0.0009)
γ2 0.0084 0.0459
∗∗ −0.0003 −0.002∗∗ 0.0015 0.0117∗∗
(0.0063) (0.0154) (0.0362) (0.0006) (0.0012) (0.0023)
γ3 −0.0035 −0.0025 0.0798∗∗ 0.0004 0.0068∗ −0.0042
(0.0038) (0.0053) (0.0183) (0.0013) (0.0029) (0.007)
adj. R2 0.5473 0.396 0.3701 0.5473 0.396 0.3701
the first principal component is always significant. Interestingly, the second principal
component is significant with oposite signs for two and ten year excess returns which
confirms its interpretation as the slope of the term structure of risk premia.28
To provide further support that liquidity premia are driven by liquidity differences
between the two segments, we analyze the time series relation between liquidity premia and
corresponding transaction cost measures for our three maturity segments in more detail.
In contrast to the U.S. corporate bond market, the last price of a trade on a day, but
also high- and low prices for a given German government or agency bond are not publicly
28As in Cochrane and Piazzesi (2005), we use month-end instead of weekly data to reduce overlapping
of yearly excess returns. R2s are slightly lower when we exclude the financial crisis and are larger when
only incorporating the crisis. The results are robust when using lagged liquidity premia (see Cochrane
and Piazzesi, 2005) or when calculating excess returns of T -year KfW bonds over 1-year BUNDs (instead
of T -year BUNDs).
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available. Therefore, we cannot use transaction cost measures based on trade prices like
Roll (1984), Hasbrouck’s (2009) Gibbs measure, or the high-low spread estimator from
Corwin and Schultz (2012), which performed best in our analyses in Chapter 2. From the
quote based measures, we cannot use bid-ask spreads calculated from CBBT prices as this
pricing source is not available before 2004. Based on the results in Chapter 2, we therefore
use average bid-ask spreads from all dealers quoting prices in Bloomberg. As Table 2.4
shows, average bid-ask spreads from all dealers (P Spread-Mean) have higher time series
and cross sectional correlations with our benchmark measures than bid-ask spreads from
Bloomberg’s Generic pricing source (P Spread-BGN) and the quote dispersion measures
(P QuoteDispersion and P QDmid). Especially the high time series correlations between
bid-ask spreads from all dealers’ quotes and our intraday transaction cost benchmarks in
Table 2.4 confirm that this liquidity measure captures liquidity dynamics well. We use
the average bid-ask spreads of all dealers’ quotes to estimate a ‘term structure of bid-ask
spreads’ (for details, see Appendix B.2).
Figure 3.1 presents the evolution of the two, five, and ten year liquidity premia over
time together with the respective quoted bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds
and BUNDs. For all three maturity segments, the figure shows a remarkable connection
between bid-ask spread differences and liquidity premia. Their large unconditional corre-
lations of 0.89 for two years, 0.85 for five, and 0.81 for ten years maturity provide clear
evidence in favor of liquidity-driven yield spreads. But despite of the large unconditional
correlations, when looking only at the period before the beginning of the subprime crisis
from August 2001 to June 2007, correlations are much lower with 0.01 for two years, 0.16
for five years, and with -0.11 for ten years even (insignificantly) negative. In contrast, in
the crisis period since June 2007 up to the end of the observation period, correlations are
between 0.8 and 0.85 for all three series. This observation confirms findings of Acharya,
Amihud, and Bharath (2013) that the impact of liquidity on bond prices is primarily rel-
evant in times of stress. Therefore, in our analysis of the economic drivers of liquidity
premia in Section 3.3, we use a regime-switching model allowing for different sensitivities
during stress and normal times.
Liquidity premia of maturity two, five, and ten years (as well as their first principal
component) are all significantly negatively correlated with German GDP. More impor-
tantly, the slope of the term structure of liquidity premia, i.e., the difference between ten
year and two year liquidity premia, is significantly positively correlated with GDP. Thus,
the shape of the term structure of liquidity premia is related to the economic environ-
ment. To further analyze the different shapes over time, Figure 3.2 plots the slope of
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Figure 3.1: Liquidity premia and quoted bid-ask spreads
This figure shows the development of liquidity premia (solid lines) and quoted relative
bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds and BUNDs (dotted lines) over time. The
upper graph depicts a time to maturity of two years, the middle graph provides five years,
and the lower graph ten years time to maturity. Quoted bid-ask spread differences can only
be calculated since January 6th, 1999 for five and ten years and since August 22nd, 2001
for two years maturity. The observation period is from February 14th, 1996 to September
29th, 2010 (764 weekly observations).
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Figure 3.2: Slope of the term structure of liquidity premia and bid-ask spread
differences
This figure shows the development of the slopes of the term structures of liquidity pre-
mia (solid line) and quoted relative bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds and
BUNDs (dotted line) over time. The slope of quoted bid-ask spread differences can only
be calculated since August 22nd, 2001. The observation period is from February 14th,
1996 to September 29th, 2010 (764 weekly observations).
the term structure of liquidity premia together with the slope of the term structure of
bid-ask spreads. Whereas the slope of the term structure of liquidity premia is negative
during the financial crisis and also after the burst of the dot-com bubble, the slope of
bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds and BUNDs is positive during these times.
The fact that rising term structures of bid-ask spreads do not simply transfer to rising
term structures of liquidity premia, together with the close connection of bid-ask spreads
and liquidity premia observed in Figure 3.1, suggests that there is no simple one-to-one
relation between bid-ask spreads and liquidity premia. Rather, more fundamental factors,
that potentially impact liquidity premia of different maturities differently, seem to be at
play. We will explore this question further in the next section and more generally analyze
how liquidity premia depend on global demand and supply of liquidity.
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3.3 Term Structure Dynamics: A Conditional Ap-
proach
We are now ready to study the drivers of the term structure of liquidity premia in a
regime-switching model in order to analyze the influence of liquidity supply and demand
on liquidity premia of different maturities conditional on the economic environment.29
3.3.1 Economic Factors Driving Liquidity Premia
We measure the supply of liquidity with the global availability of arbitrage capital. As
argued, e.g., by Duffie (2010), Gromb and Vayanos (2010), and many other papers in the
context of the current discussion on slow moving capital, the provision of liquidity depends
on sophisticated arbitrageurs providing liquidity to less sophisticated investors. Hu, Pan,
and Wang (2013) proxy for the global availability of arbitrage capital with a measure of
noise in the yields of U.S. Treasuries. They argue that in episodes of low liquidity, a
shortage of arbitrage capital allows prices to fluctuate more freely relative to the yield
curve. Moreover, they show that their measure is more informative on liquidity conditions
than other liquidity measures like the bid-ask spread. The interpretation of this measure is
also consistent with Vayanos and Vila’s (2009) notion of arbitrageurs that arbitrage away
yield differences between different maturities. We use data on the noise measure available
on Jun Pan’s website.
We control for possible differences in the global versus local availability of arbitrage
capital with data on foreign flows into German bond markets. Deutsche Bundesbank
calculates net fund flows of foreign investors into bonds from public and non-public issuers,
where the KfW is classified as a non-public issuer. We expect an inflow of capital in
bonds from public issuers to increase the liquidity difference between KfW and BUND
and therefore widen liquidity premia. On the other hand, a capital inflow into bonds from
non-public issuers might decrease the liquidity difference and thus lower liquidity premia.
Data on net foreign flows (in EUR) is available from Deutsche Bundesbank and we deflate
the data with the consumer price index.
In addition to these market wide proxies, bond specific liquidity differences between the
29The regime-switching behavior of liquidity premia is also supported by Chow tests rejecting the null
hypothesis of parameter constancy in autoregressive models of different lag length for a wide range of
break dates and all three series.
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two segments are proxied by differences in the outstanding volume that is freely available
for trading. For this, we construct measures of the amount of bonds outstanding of the
representative two, five, and ten year KfW bond relative to the outstanding amount of the
corresponding German government bond (for details, see Appendix B.3). As can be seen
in Table 3.3, the average outstanding volume of the representative KfW bond is about
20% of the volume of its BUND counterpart.
We measure demand for liquidity with proxies for future trading needs and market wide
risk premia. As a measure for information flowing into the market and thus for future
trading needs, we select the benchmark volatility index for the German stock market
(VDAX New). VDAX New is calculated by Deutsche Bo¨rse from options on futures on
the DAX. As a measure of global financial uncertainty, which is closely linked to future
liquidation needs, we use the TED spread. Brunnermeier (2009) points out that in times
of higher uncertainty in the banking system, the risk of unsecured loans rises which in turn
leads to higher LIBOR rates. Additionally, in times of higher uncertainty the value of first
rate collateral rises pushing down T-Bill rates and widening the TED spread further. As
a proxy for market wide risk premia or required returns, we select the dividend yield of
the German stock market index DAX. Cochrane (2011) points out that variations in the
market wide dividend yield reflect changes in risk premia rather than changes in future
dividend growth (see also, e.g., Gaˆrleanu and Pedersen, 2011). The dividend yield is
calculated by Bloomberg under the assumption that for all 30 constituents of the DAX,
realized dividends in the year before the observation date are paid as an infinite annuity.
It is available after May 7th, 1997. We use the first principal component of VDAX New,
TED spread, and dividend yield as our aggregate measure for liquidity demand.30
As we want to separate the effects of liquidity supply and demand, we do not use bid-ask
spreads in our main analysis. Bid-ask spreads could be interpreted as price for immediate
liquidity provision, and are thus influenced by both demand and supply of liquidity. How-
ever, we use bid-ask spreads in the robustness section for a shortened observation period
as they are available only since August 2001 for all maturities.
As an additional explanatory variable, we include a measure for the market wide credit
spread to control for perceived credit risk. We use the spread between the Bloomberg index
for the yield of BBB rated industrial USD bonds and the corresponding AA index. Note
30It is not possible to separate the impacts of trading needs and risk premia, since both TED spread and
VDAX New, besides being measures for trading needs, are also expected to be sensitive to an increase
in risk premia. Moreover, the dividend yield is supposed to rise in uncertain times (with high future
liquidation needs) due to declining stock prices.
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Table 3.3: Summary statistics of explanatory variables
This table shows summary statistics for the variables included in the analysis. Noise
refers to a measure of noise in U.S. Treasury yields (in bps, see Hu, Pan, and Wang,
2013). ForeignPub (ForeignNonPub) refers to the capital inflow into German bonds
from public (non-public) issuers deflated with the consumer price index (in trillions of
EUR, prices of 2005). V olume(T ) measures the outstanding volume of the representative
KfW bond compared to its BUND counterpart with T years to maturity and LiqDemand
is the first principal component of the VDAX New, the TED spread, and the dividend yield
of the DAX. Credit(T ) refers to the spread between the Bloomberg indices for AA rated
corporate bonds and BBB rated corporate bonds (in percentage points). The observation
period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010 (700 weekly observations).
Mean Standard Minimum Median Maximum
Deviation
Noise 3.5557 2.7249 1.0424 2.8817 20.4675
ForeignPub 0.0036 0.0077 -0.0151 0.0032 0.0284
ForeignNonPub 0.0047 0.0083 -0.0241 0.0055 0.0223
V olume(2) 0.2117 0.0787 0.0838 0.2108 0.3782
V olume(5) 0.2014 0.0544 0.0923 0.2051 0.3031
V olume(10) 0.2452 0.0624 0.1324 0.2456 0.3763
LiqDemand 0 1.2989 -1.6635 -0.2836 7.8201
Credit(2) 0.7344 0.4583 0.1500 0.5992 2.3919
Credit(5) 0.7783 0.4309 0.1400 0.6947 2.4948
Credit(10) 0.7955 0.3577 0.3308 0.7293 2.4632
that we cannot utilize credit spreads of EUR bonds since these are available only after
August 2001. The credit spread indexes are available with different maturities and we use
the index with the corresponding time to maturity in the regression equations for short-,
medium-, and long-term liquidity premia. Table 3.3 shows summary statistics for our
explanatory variables.
3.3.2 Methodology
Most authors put liquidity stress periods on a level with financial crises and rely on ex-
ceptional events to identify them (see, e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam, 2005).31
In contrast, we endogenously identify liquidity stress periods by means of the Markov
regime-switching model first proposed by Hamilton (1989). So essentially the data tell us,
when the system is likely to be in the stress regime. We also check the robustness of our
31See also Barrell et al. (2010) for a short discussion of the problems of exogenous crisis identification.
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results using exogenously specified financial crisis periods in Section 3.4
To analyze the different behavior of liquidity premia during liquidity stress periods and
normal times, we estimate a two-regime AR model for two, five, and ten year liquidity
premia and augment it with the economic drivers discussed in Section 3.3.1 An autore-
gressive model in levels is used to capture level relations between liquidity premia and our
explanatory factors (see also Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg, 2012).32
illiqt(2) = a
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p∑
i=1
(
b2yi,silliqt−i(2)
)
+ a2y1,sNoiset + a
2y
2,sForeignPubt (3.4)
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where the state s ∈ {1, 2} follows a homogeneous Markov chain with constant transition
probabilities33
P (st = 1|st−1 = 1) = p1,1, (3.7)
P (st = 2|st−1 = 2) = p2,2.
The vector of error terms (ǫ2ys,t, ǫ
5y
s,t, ǫ
10y
s,t ) is multi-normally distributed with mean zero and
32Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) tests for the time series of liquidity premia reject the non-stationary
hypothesis for the time period before the beginning of the financial crisis in June 2007 for all three time
series of liquidity premia. If we include the whole time period, non-stationarity can only be rejected for
two and five year premia. As these results are inconclusive regarding the stationarity of the variables,
lagged values of the endogenous variables ensure that asymptotic distributions of the regression coefficients
maintain their standard form (see Sims, Stock, and Watson, 1990).
33Although switching probabilities are assumed to be constant, the probability to be in the stress
regime depends on the economic environment as illustrated in Section 3.3.3, Figure 3.3. See also Acharya,
Amihud, and Bharath (2013) for a related discussion.
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variance-covariance matrix Ωs where
Ωs =
 (σ
2y
s )
2 ρ2y,5ys · σ2ys · σ5ys ρ2y,10ys · σ2ys · σ10ys
ρ2y,5ys · σ2ys · σ5ys (σ5ys )2 ρ5y,10ys · σ5ys · σ10ys
ρ2y,10ys · σ2ys · σ10ys ρ5y,10ys · σ5ys · σ10ys (σ10ys )2
 . (3.8)
We select this flexible variance-covariance matrix to allow for heteroskedasticity between
the two regimes. Also, correlations of the error terms of different segments can be regime-
switching. The model is estimated along the lines described in Hamilton (1994) using the
expectation-maximization (EM) algorithm to maximize the log-likelihood function.
3.3.3 Results
Table 3.4 gives the estimation results of Model (3.4)-(3.8) with p = 2 lags. Due to the
availability of data for our exogenous variables, the observation period is May 7th, 1997
to September 29th, 2010. We choose a lag-length of two to allow for a possible influence
of past changes of liquidity premia, but results are generally robust if we use different
lag lengths. We first present results regarding regime identification and average term
structures of liquidity premia within the two regimes. We then discuss the results regarding
our economic drivers.
The estimation of the parameters delivers the probability of the system being in the
stress regime for each date in the sample. This probability is plotted in Figure 3.3. Stress
periods can often be associated with economic events that might be causal for poor liq-
uidity. So the 1998 bailout of LTCM, the period after the burst of the dot-com bubble
as well as the financial crisis starting in summer 2007 are all identified as liquidity stress
periods.
Figure 3.4 shows average term structures of liquidity premia in both regimes. A clear
separation in the two regimes can be recognized. Whereas in the non-stress regime (regime
1), on average the extra yield to maturity of an illiquid KfW bond compared to the liquid
BUND is around 15 bps, this liquidity premium nearly doubles in the stress regime (regime
2). Additionally, the standard deviation of the innovations is about two to three times
larger in the stress regime. The shape of the term structure is slightly U-shaped in both
regimes, but the decreasing part is much more pronounced in the stress regime due to
large short-term liquidity premia. This result confirms our observation from Figure 3.2
that within crisis periods, the slope of the term-structure is negative.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results for Markov regime-switching AR model with ex-
ogenous variables
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (3.4)-(3.8)
with p = 2. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate sig-
nificance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September
29th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr.
mean illiq. 16.6 bps 14.1 bps 15.1 bps 31.3 bps 24.5 bps 25.3 bps
premium (T)
σ 0.0255 0.022 0.0246 0.0695 0.0584 0.0551
(0.0024) (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0047) (0.0041) (0.0035)
correlation ρ2y,10y1 ρ
2y,5y
1 ρ
5y,10y
1 ρ
2y,10y
2 ρ
2y,5y
2 ρ
5y,10y
2
parameters 0.0915 0.6702 0.3899 0.171 0.4801 0.4008
(0.0702) (0.0537) (0.0626) (0.0702) (0.0691) (0.0605)
transition p1,1 p2,2
probabilities 0.907 0.8483
(0.0231) (0.0495)
Constant 0.0047 0.0043 0.0073 0.0564∗∗ 0.0651∗∗ 0.0127
(0.0069) (0.0065) (0.0112) (0.021) (0.0235) (0.034)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.6728
∗∗ 0.7594∗∗ 0.7009∗∗ 0.5224∗∗ 0.5404∗∗ 0.5181∗∗
(0.0916) (0.1003) (0.0705) (0.0766) (0.081) (0.0851)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.2607
∗∗ 0.186 0.2659∗∗ 0.2207∗∗ 0.2095∗∗ 0.2871∗∗
(0.0859) (0.1089) (0.072) (0.0589) (0.0686) (0.0757)
Noiset 0.001 0.0012 0.0013 0.006 0.005
∗ 0.0061∗
(0.002) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.0023) (0.0029)
ForeignPubt 0.1586 0.2585 0.3128 0.6017 1.0487 0.9702
∗
(0.2261) (0.1807) (0.218) (0.6955) (0.548) (0.4921)
ForeignNonPubt −0.0129 −0.0454 −0.066 −2.2655∗∗ −2.0112∗∗ −1.34∗
(0.2472) (0.2069) (0.2482) (0.7953) (0.6731) (0.643)
V olumet(T ) 0.0013 0.0159 −0.0097 0.0529 −0.1515 0.0595
(0.023) (0.0262) (0.041) (0.0658) (0.0803) (0.1164)
LiqDemandt 0.0023 0.0037 0.0003 0.031
∗∗ 0.0115 0.0034
(0.0038) (0.0033) (0.0037) (0.0079) (0.0061) (0.0049)
Creditt(T ) 0.0058 −0.0039 −0.0077 −0.0342∗ −0.0005 −0.0094
(0.0099) (0.01) (0.0119) (0.0152) (0.0163) (0.0205)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
4196.85 700 -8257.7 -7873.52
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Figure 3.3: Endogenously derived probability to be in the stress regime
This figure shows smoothed probabilities of being in the stress regime (regime 2) estimated
from the Markov regime-switching Model (3.4)-(3.8) with two lags. Additionally, events
anecdotally linked to financial stress or low liquidity are marked. Recessions, defined as
at least two consecutive quarters of negative real GDP growth in Germany (Q4 2002 – Q2
2003, and Q2 2008 – Q1 2009) are shaded.
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Figure 3.4: Shapes of liquidity premia in different regimes
This figure shows the shapes of the term structure of liquidity premia in the stress regime
(solid line) and in the non-stress regime (dashed line). The average term structure of
liquidity premia in one regime is calculated by weighting the term structure of each day
with the probability to be in that regime on that date (see Figure 3.3).
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We now discuss our main results concerning the explanatory variables in Table 3.4.
First, the large and significant values of the lagged parameters for all maturities and both
regimes show the high persistence of liquidity premia over time.
Second, liquidity supply proxied by the global availability of arbitrage capital as well as
capital inflows into the German bond market is only significant in the stress regime. More
available arbitrage capital proxied by lower noise in U.S. Treasury prices as well as capital
inflows into bonds from non-public issuers (the KfW is classified by Bundesbank as a non-
public issuer) lead to lower liquidity premia. On the contrary, more available arbitrage
capital in the market for public bonds increases the KfW-BUND spread. To illustrate the
economic significance, we look at a 10 billion Euro re-allocation of foreigners from public
to non-public bond markets. Such a re-allocation leads to a decrease of, e.g., the ten year
KfW-BUND spread of 2.3 bps. In Table 3.5, we analyze the regime-switching behavior
of the sensitivities. The null hypotheses of identical influence of liquidity supply in both
regimes (i.e., H0 : a
2y
j,s=1 = a
2y
j,s=2, a
5y
j,s=1 = a
5y
j,s=2, and a
10y
j,s=1 = a
10y
j,s=2 for j ∈ {1, 2, 3})
can only be rejected for capital inflow into bonds of non-public issuers and short- and
medium-term premia, but parameter estimates for all nine liquidity supply parameters
are clearly higher in the stress regime. The more important influence of liquidity supply
in stressful times is consistent with Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2009) result that ‘the
effect of speculator capital on market liquidity is highly nonlinear: a marginal change in
capital has a small effect when speculators are far from their constraints, but a large effect
when speculators are close to their constraints’.
The measured impact of capital inflows into the market for bonds of non-public issuers
is well comparable to the effect of ECB’s 2009 Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP)
on the covered bond market. Purchases of covered bonds in 2009 and 2010 amount to 60
billion Euro and tighten the spread of covered bonds on average by 12 bps (see Beirne,
Dalitz, Ejsing, Grothe, Manganelli, Monar, Sahel, Susˇec, Tapking, and Vong, 2011). This
translates to a sensitivity of 2 bps per 10 billion Euro and approximately fits our sensitivity
for medium-term liquidity premia of 2.0112 (% per trillion Euro = bps per 10 billion
Euro).34
Third, liquidity differences, proxied by the fraction of outstanding volume of the rep-
resentative KfW bond compared to its BUND counterpart, do not have any significant
influence. A similar result is also observed for the Pfandbrief market by Kempf, Korn,
34The total outstanding notional volume of bonds from non-public issuers in prices of 2005 amounts
to on average 1.7 trillion Euro during our observation period and is somewhat larger than the total
outstanding volume of covered bonds of approximately 1.1 trillion Euro.
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Table 3.5: Regime-switching behavior of economic determinants
This table shows the differences of the parameter estimates between the two regimes. The
null hypothesis H0 is that parameter estimates are identical in both regimes, i.e., the
difference is 0. The Wald chi-squared statistics W = (Rαˆ − r)′(RVˆ R′)−1(Rαˆ − r)′ are
given in square brackets, where R and r define the hypotheses for the parameter vector α.
*, ** indicate rejection of H0 at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 7th,
1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Differences between regimes
Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr.
Constant : a0,s=2 − a0,s=1 0.0517∗ 0.0608∗ 0.0054
[5.5435] [6.3438] [0.0236]
illiqt−1(T ) : b1,s=2 − b1,s=1 −0.1504 −0.219 −0.1828
[1.1564] [2.0708] [2.0653]
illiqt−2(T ) : b2,s=2 − b2,s=1 −0.04 0.0235 0.0212
[0.1139] [0.0235] [0.0308]
Noiset : a1,s=2 − a1,s=1 0.005 0.0038 0.0048
[1.5277] [1.3964] [1.6014]
ForeignPubt : a2,s=2 − a2,s=1 0.4431 0.7902 0.6574
[0.3352] [1.8265] [1.4862]
ForeignNonPubt : a3,s=2 − a3,s=1 −2.2526∗∗ −1.9658∗∗ −1.274
[6.826] [7.5632] [3.194]
V olumet(T ) : a4,s=2 − a4,s=1 0.0516 −0.1674∗ 0.0692
[0.5212] [3.9848] [0.279]
LiqDemandt : a5,s=2 − a5,s=1 0.0287∗∗ 0.0078 0.0031
[9.4873] [1.0987] [0.2247]
Creditt(T ) : a6,s=2 − a6,s=1 −0.04∗ 0.0034 −0.0017
[4.6878] [0.0275] [0.0045]
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and Uhrig-Homburg (2012). A possible explanation the authors provide is that perceived
liquidity differences do not change with each issued bond but are rather static. Another
explanation could be that the value investors attribute to liquidity increases with less
available liquid BUNDs due to the law of supply and demand (see Krishnamurthy and
Vissing-Jorgensen, 2010). If this is the case, there are two opposite effects from an increase
of the BUND volume. First, the relative liquidity of KfW bonds decreases leading to an
increase in liquidity premia. Second, the value of liquidity decreases which should decrease
liquidity premia.
Fourth, coefficients on liquidity demand suggest that investors concentrate on short-
term bonds when disengaging from illiquid securities in times of stress. The effect is
both statistically and economically significant. A one standard deviation shock of our
variable on liquidity demand leads to an impact on the two year liquidity premium of
4 bps in the stress regime. This is about 13% of the average premium in this regime.
Moreover, the regime-switching impact of liquidity demand on the short end is confirmed
by Table 3.5. In contrast, coefficients are insignificant both in normal times and for
longer maturities. These results are particularly interesting as on the one hand, they
constitute pronounced term-structure effects. On the other hand, they help to identify
flight-to-liquidity periods that coincide with stressful periods. The increased demand for
short-term and highly liquid BUNDs within these periods leads first to a strongly increased
level of the short-term KfW-BUND yield spread (see Figure 3.4). Second, amplified by
the increased wariness to bear risks within stress periods, effects stemming from liquidity
demand become more important. This result also explains the opposite behavior of the
slopes of the term structures of liquidity premia and bid-ask spreads in Figure 3.2: In
stressful times, especially long-term bid-ask spreads increase strongly (presumably due to
liquidity providers demanding larger compensations for the increased interest rate risk in
long-term bonds). On the premium side, the effect is much more pronounced for short-
term bonds with low risk due to flight to liquidity effects that drive up short-term yield
difference between liquid BUNDs and illiquid KfW bonds.
Credit risk seems to have no effect on liquidity premia. Like in Longstaff (2004) for
Refcorp bonds or in Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg (2012) for the Pfandbrief market,
parameter estimates are mostly negative and insignificant (for all but one maturity). For
the one maturity, where credit risk is significant at the 5% level, the sign is negative. If
credit spreads had an influence on the KfW-BUND spread, we would expect the parameter
estimates to be positive. Note that our analysis does not simply imply that credit risk
and liquidity premia are unrelated. Instead, unreported results show that economy wide
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credit spreads have significant explanatory power for the probability to be in the liquidity
stress regime.
Overall, our results confirm the prediction of the theoretical literature (see, e.g., Brun-
nermeier and Pedersen, 2009) that the impact of changes in fundamentals on liquidity
premia is significantly stronger when the system is in stress. Moreover, flight-to-liquidity
effects contribute to declining term structures of liquidity premia in times of stress. Thus,
calibrating, e.g., risk management models in normal times, when the influence of funda-
mentals on liquidity premia is weak, strongly underestimates the contribution of illiquidity
to systematic risk and might systematically misjudge term structure effects.
3.4 Robustness
In this section, we perform several robustness checks. Most importantly, we use bid-
ask spreads to proxy for the bonds’ liquidity instead of our proxies for liquidity supply
and demand. Additionally, we check the robustness against our regime identification
methodology.35
Bid-ask spreads, as the price of immediate liquidity provision, are influenced by both
liquidity supply and demand. Since our objective was to separate both effects on liquidity
premia, we could not employ bid-ask spreads in Section 3.3 However, to validate our
finding that the influence of economic factors on liquidity premia is much more pronounced
in times of economic stress, we substitute our proxies for liquidity supply and demand
through quoted bid-ask spread differences (see Figure 3.1) and re-estimate Model (3.4)-
(3.8).
Table 3.6 presents the results for the shortened observation period since August 22nd,
2001 for which bid-ask spreads are available on a continuous basis. Bid-ask spread differ-
ences are significant for all maturities only in liquidity stress periods. The insignificance of
bid-ask spread differences in normal times confirms the low correlations of bid-ask spreads
and liquidity premia before the financial crisis discussed in Section 3.2.2
Next, we control for the mechanism to identify liquidity stress periods. As Boldin
(1996) argues, the regime identification in Markov regime-switching models is sometimes
35In further unreported robustness checks, we control for the level of interest rates as well as specialness
of BUNDs, look at the influence of the principal component analysis on our results, and exclude the time
after the collapse of Lehman Brothers until the end of 2008 from the estimation. In all cases, our main
results are qualitatively unchanged. The results are available from the authors upon request.
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Table 3.6: Robustness check: bid-ask spread
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (3.4)-(3.8)
with p = 2 with BidAskDifrt(T ) instead of the proxies for liquidity supply and demand.
BidAskDifrt(T ) refers to quoted relative bid-ask spread differences between KfW bonds
and BUNDs (see also Figure 3.1). White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses.
*, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is August 22nd,
2001 to September 30th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr.
mean illiq. 16.0 bps 10.4 bps 12.0 bps 33.1 bps 25.1 bps 25.8 bps
premium (T)
σ 0.022 0.0171 0.0166 0.0767 0.06 0.053
(0.0025) (0.0013) (0.0017) (0.0055) (0.004) (0.0036)
correlation ρ2y,10y1 ρ
2y,5y
1 ρ
5y,10y
1 ρ
2y,10y
2 ρ
2y,5y
2 ρ
5y,10y
2
parameters −0.0682 0.5958 0.1445 0.2148 0.5014 0.4358
(0.1268) (0.0793) (0.0896) (0.0685) (0.0671) (0.0589)
transition p1,1 p2,2
probabilities 0.8372 0.8535
(0.04) (0.0366)
Constant 0.0102∗∗ 0.0016 0.0112 0.0041 0.0099 0.0099
(0.0035) (0.0034) (0.0062) (0.0105) (0.0084) (0.0119)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.6923
∗∗ 0.7446∗∗ 0.5949∗∗ 0.6141∗∗ 0.5565∗∗ 0.5211∗∗
(0.082) (0.0731) (0.0633) (0.0712) (0.0731) (0.0683)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1372
∗∗ 0.1109 0.2783∗∗ 0.2619∗∗ 0.2243∗∗ 0.3053∗∗
(0.0451) (0.0763) (0.0455) (0.062) (0.0684) (0.0786)
BidAskDifrt 0.13 0.0046 −0.0072 0.1965∗∗ 0.2448∗∗ 0.0825∗
(0.076) (0.0267) (0.0259) (0.0681) (0.0525) (0.0323)
Creditt(T ) 0.0059 0.015 0.0003 0.0032 −0.0056 0.0173
(0.0081) (0.0087) (0.0106) (0.0136) (0.0148) (0.0178)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
2741.12 476 -5394.23 -5162.62
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vulnerable to relatively small changes in the data. To rule out such an effect in our study,
we perform our analysis (a) with a new data set with month-end liquidity premia and
explanatory variables and (b) by exogenously specifying crisis and non-crisis periods.
The monthly analysis with the new data set in Table 3.7 confirms our main results. In
the stress regime, the influence of liquidity supply proxied by the noise in U.S. Treasury
prices and the two flow variables is significant in the expected direction in six out of nine
cases. In contrast, in normal times, only three parameter-maturity combinations yield
significant results. Additionally, all but one of the estimated sensitivities are larger in the
stress regime. Although liquidity demand is now significant also for short-maturities in
normal times, the influence is about three times larger during times of economic stress.
For the exogenous crises specification, we define the LTCM crisis as the time between
June and October 1998 (see Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). The beginning of the dot-com
stress period is dated on May 10th, 2001, the day the ECB started cutting back interest
rates. As the end of the crisis, we select the end of the 2002-03 recession in Germany in
June 2003. The financial crisis starts in June 2007 when two of Bear Stearn’s hedge funds
ran into trouble and transforms into the European debt crisis which lasts up to the end of
the observation period.
The results in Table 3.8 confirm our main findings. In crisis times, less available arbi-
trage capital proxied by more noise in U.S. Treasury prices significantly increases medium-
and long-term liquidity premia. Additionally, the foreign flow variables are significant in
the expected direction in three out of six cases. Again, liquidity demand is only significant
in stress periods and for short-term maturities. In normal times, none of the explanatory
variables are significant. Although conclusions do not change when using exogenously
defined crisis dates, our approach to endogenously identify stress periods does not require
to assume that liquidity stress periods and financial crises fully coincide.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, we extract the term structure of liquidity premia from the spread be-
tween two bond classes differing only in their liquidity. The availability of a data set of
homogeneous bonds spanning a large time to maturity segment over a long period of time
allows us to quantify the term structure of liquidity premia without strong assumptions
regarding the separation of credit and liquidity risk. We analyze this term structure in a
setting allowing for a different behavior during stressful and normal periods. We find that
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Table 3.7: Robustness check: monthly analysis
This table shows the results of the maximum likelihood estimation of Model (3.4-(3.8) with
p = 2. White’s (1982) standard errors are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance
at the 5% or 1% level. The observation period is May 31th, 1997 to September 30th, 2010.
Regime 1 (normal times) Regime 2 (stress regime)
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr.
mean illiq. 13.2 bps 10.2 bps 10.3 bps 41.0 bps 35.4 bps 37.8 bps
premium (T)
σ 0.0331 0.0298 0.0414 0.0725 0.0593 0.0636
(0.0031) (0.0034) (0.0044) (0.0084) (0.0048) (0.0053)
correlation ρ2y,10y1 ρ
2y,5y
1 ρ
5y,10y
1 ρ
2y,10y
2 ρ
2y,5y
2 ρ
5y,10y
2
parameters −0.0064 0.1121 0.0674 −0.1371 0.4163 0.6444
(0.1084) (0.1291) (0.0897) (0.2188) (0.1653) (0.0931)
transition p1,1 p2,2
probabilities 0.9614 0.9375
(0.0171) (0.0407)
Constant 0.0636∗∗ 0.0251 −0.0559 0.0771 0.1733∗∗ 0.2018∗∗
(0.0208) (0.0175) (0.0317) (0.0836) (0.0647) (0.063)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.5203
∗∗ 0.3846∗∗ 0.373∗∗ 0.5199∗∗ 0.3381∗ 0.4194∗∗
(0.108) (0.1138) (0.1223) (0.1151) (0.1483) (0.1179)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.1202 0.166 0.0924 −0.3214∗∗ −0.0315 0.111
(0.125) (0.0871) (0.0721) (0.1062) (0.1214) (0.1077)
Noiset 0.0019 0.0178
∗∗ 0.0134∗∗ 0.0103 0.0139∗∗ 0.0213∗
(0.0046) (0.0047) (0.0046) (0.0095) (0.0052) (0.009)
ForeignPubt 0.3677 0.7525
∗ 0.7661 3.5481∗∗ 1.7063 1.5629
(0.3814) (0.3378) (0.4954) (1.3459) (1.0037) (1.2025)
ForeignNonPubt −0.158 −0.3314 0.1837 −3.2908 −2.878∗ −3.2047∗∗
(0.5604) (0.3728) (1.0312) (1.7255) (1.4405) (1.1282)
V olumet(T ) 0.0423 0.0484 0.2581 0.4814 −0.3251 −0.2809∗
(0.0572) (0.0677) (0.1326) (0.3362) (0.3588) (0.1392)
LiqDemandt 0.0237
∗∗ 0.0133 0.0067 0.063∗ 0.011 −0.0074
(0.0077) (0.0071) (0.0066) (0.0278) (0.0125) (0.0232)
Creditt(T ) −0.0394 −0.0585∗ 0.0168 0.0441 0.0518 −0.0427
(0.0265) (0.0281) (0.0317) (0.0418) (0.0495) (0.0592)
Log-Likelihood N AIC BIC
847.46 161 -1558.91 -1274.67
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Table 3.8: Robustness check: exogenous crises specification
This table shows the results of the estimation of Model (3.4) - (3.6) with exogenously
specified stress periods (LTCM-crisis: June, 1st to October 31st, 1998; burst of dot-com
bubble: May 10th, 2001 to June 30th, 2003; financial and subsequent European debt crisis:
June 1st, 2007 to September 29th, 2010). Newey and West’s (1987) standard errors with
five lags are given in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level. The
total observation period is May 7th, 1997 to September 29th, 2010.
Non-Crisis Crisis
Short Medium Long Short Medium Long
T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr. T=2 yr. T=5 yr. T=10 yr.
mean illiq. 14.1 bps 12.0 bps 13.5 bps 32.6 bps 25.7 bps 26.0 bps
premium(T)
Constant 0.049∗∗ 0.0042 −0.0045 0.0567∗ 0.0311 −0.021
(0.0127) (0.0054) (0.0123) (0.0235) (0.017) (0.0209)
illiqt−1(T ) 0.3952
∗∗ 0.756∗∗ 0.641∗∗ 0.5886∗∗ 0.6702∗∗ 0.6055∗∗
(0.0646) (0.0496) (0.0657) (0.0682) (0.0637) (0.0668)
illiqt−2(T ) 0.2637
∗∗ 0.1694∗∗ 0.3197∗∗ 0.2225∗∗ 0.1972∗∗ 0.2115∗∗
(0.0511) (0.0513) (0.0618) (0.0592) (0.0649) (0.0663)
Noiset 0.0015 0.0021 0.0032 0.0039 0.0039
∗ 0.006∗
(0.0023) (0.0019) (0.0022) (0.0029) (0.0017) (0.0024)
ForeignPubt −0.0282 0.1365 0.2895 0.2765 0.8315∗ 0.9995∗∗
(0.2262) (0.1556) (0.2153) (0.4874) (0.3915) (0.3363)
ForeignNonPubt −0.1056 −0.2627 −0.2689 −1.0905 −0.8993 −0.9107∗
(0.246) (0.1633) (0.2578) (0.6211) (0.4778) (0.3753)
V olumet(T ) −0.0368 −0.0065 −0.0077 −0.0963 −0.0452 0.1847∗∗
(0.0276) (0.0361) (0.0521) (0.0799) (0.0695) (0.0691)
LiqDemandt 0.0083 0.0024 −0.0019 0.0207∗∗ 0.007 0.0037
(0.0046) (0.0042) (0.004) (0.0055) (0.0037) (0.0031)
Creditt(T ) 0.0164 0.0061 0.0047 −0.0056 −0.0114 −0.0167
(0.0115) (0.012) (0.012) (0.0151) (0.0124) (0.0174)
adj. R2 0.5393 0.8978 0.9267 0.9465 0.9332 0.9347
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the term structure of liquidity premia varies over time and is strongly dependent on the
general financial and economic situation. The availability of arbitrage capital influences all
maturities, whereas our measure for liquidity demand only impacts short-term maturities.
The regression coefficients display a significant impact only in the stress regime.
Our findings imply that systematic liquidity risk is prone to be underestimated. Through
its regime-switching behavior, the illiquidity discount increases sharply when the general
state of the economy is bad. Additionally, the sensitivity of liquidity premia to funda-
mentals increases in stressful periods. Ignoring one of these two channels systematically
underestimates liquidity risk. From the issuer’s perspective, our results show that in times
of stress, it is even more important to optimize the liquidity of an issue. This is particu-
larly true in the light of systematically different term structure effects during normal times
and liquidity stress periods.
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Chapter 4
A Heterogeneous Agents Equilibrium
Model for the Term Structures of
Liquidity Premia and Trading
Volume
4.1 Introduction
After exploring the term structure of liquidity premia empirically in crisis and non-crisis
times in the previous chapter, we now derive an equilibrium model for this term structure
as well as for trading volumes. The model provides a new perspective on our previous
results and at the same time helps to unify the different empirical outcomes regarding the
shape of the term structure of liquidity premia of other papers. Our unified framework
also explains the empirically observed hump-shaped term structure of trading volume and
the well-documented aging effect (see, e.g., Alexander, Edwards, and Ferri, 2000; Edwards,
Harris, and Piwowar, 2007): other things equal, old bonds trade less frequently than newly
issued bonds.
In our model, agents with heterogeneous investment horizons trade bonds with a con-
tinuum of different maturities in a market with two simple frictions: transaction costs and
shocks to investors’ time preference parameter. If a preference shock occurs, the investor
faces the trade-off between the cost (in terms of utility) of awaiting the asset’s maturity,
which is higher for long-term bonds, and the bid-ask spread charged by an exogenous
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market maker or dealer. Prior to the preference shock, the investor determines her opti-
mal portfolio allocation by comparing the higher return earned when holding a long-term
bond until the maturity date to the higher expected costs of selling this asset in case of
a potential preference shock. Due to these investor-specific endogenous decisions on the
portfolio composition and bonds’ decreasing time to maturity, we obtain spill-overs from
the short to the long end of the term structure. This agrees with the empirical evidence on
liquidity transmission between different maturity segments by Goyenko, Subrahmanyam,
and Ukhov (2011).
Our model offers four key testable predictions. First, assets with very short maturities
are traded less frequently, as are assets with long maturities. The first effect arises because
investors prefer the disutility from waiting to paying the bid-ask spread when maturity
is short. As only investors with low preference shock probabilities hold assets with long
maturities, these assets are rarely traded as well. Second, since these low preference shock
investors still hold a proportion of aged (formerly long-term, but now short-term) bonds,
our model endogenously explains the well-documented aging effect. We believe that ours
is the first equilibrium model to explain the impact of aging on trading volume via a simple
transaction cost friction. Third, liquidity premia in bond yields computed from ask prices
are negligible for short maturities, and increase for longer maturities. The increasing term
structure arises, even for constant bid-ask spreads, because the disutility from waiting
increases with maturity. For longer maturities, the term structure flattens out as investors
with low probabilities of preference shocks dominate. Fourth, liquidity premia from bid
yields depend on the term structure of bid-ask spreads. If transaction costs do not depend
on the bond’s maturity, short-term liquidity premia are large, then decrease and flatten
out at longer maturities. If transaction costs are increasing in maturity, the term structure
takes on a U-shape.
We verify these key model predictions empirically using transaction data for highly
rated U.S. corporate bonds from the TRACE database. The results of multiple regressions
confirm the intuition from our equilibrium model. Transaction volume is hump-shaped and
securities are traded less frequently as they age. Liquidity premia computed from ask prices
are monotonously increasing with a decreasing slope. Liquidity premia computed from bid
prices are U-shaped with significant liquidity premia even for very short maturities.
Our model also sheds new light on our previous results on the average shape of the
term structure of liquidity premia in crisis and non-crisis times. Due to the availability
of data and to enhance comparisons with other empirical studies, we used closing prices
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to calculate liquidity premia in Chapter 3. As closing prices are a mixture of bid and ask
prices, the on average U-shaped term structure of liquidity premia of KfW bonds is in line
with the model predictions. Additionally, the more inverse shape of the term structure in
crisis times can be attributed to an increased demand for liquidity within the model as
discussed in Section 4.3.2.
Our study adds to several strands of literature. Ericsson and Renault (2006) model
the liquidity shock for assets with different maturities as the jump of a Poisson process
that forces investors to sell their entire portfolio to the market maker, who charges a pro-
portional spread. Liquidity premia are downward-sloping because only current illiquidity
affects asset prices, and because investors have the option to sell assets early to the mar-
ket maker at favorable conditions. Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg (2012) extend this
analysis by modeling the intensity of the Poisson process as a mean-reverting process. In
this setting, liquidity premia depend on the difference between the average and the current
probability of a liquidity shock, and can exhibit a number of different shapes. In contrast
to these papers, we allow investors to trade-off the transaction costs when selling immedi-
ately versus the disutility from awaiting the bond’s maturity. By endogenizing investors’
trading decisions in bonds of different maturities, our model provides an equilibrium-based
explanation for spill-overs of liquidity shocks between different ends of the maturity range.
Feldhu¨tter (2012) is most closely related to our study, since he considers an investor’s
optimal decision to a holding cost shock. Search costs allow market makers to charge a
spread, which results in a difference between the asset’s fundamental value and its bid
price. However, Feldhu¨tter (2012) abstracts from aging as in his model, bonds mature
randomly with a rate of 1
T
. Additionally, his model cannot accommodate any spill-over
effects between maturities because bonds of different maturities T are not considered
simultaneously.
Besides supporting the equilibrium model predictions, our results provide an explana-
tion for the variation in the term structures found in previous empirical studies. Studies
that document a decreasing term structure (Amihud and Mendelson, 1991; Ericsson and
Renault, 2006) or a U-shaped term structure (Longstaff, 2004) use mid quotes or ask
quotes net of a spread component such as brokerage costs. In contrast, Dick-Nielsen,
Feldhu¨tter, and Lando (2012) find an increasing term structure for the U.S. corporate
bond market computed from average quarter-end prices. However, average trade prices in
this market are dominated by buy transactions as the numbers of observations in our Ta-
ble 4.5 document. Hump-shaped (Koziol and Sauerbier, 2007) or variable term structures
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(Kempf, Korn, and Uhrig-Homburg, 2012; Feldhu¨tter, 2012) arise from a varying mixture
of bid and ask prices. Hence, consistent with our theoretical predictions, the shape of
the liquidity term structure is crucially driven by whether most transactions occur at the
dealer’s bid or ask price.
Last, our study contributes to the growing literature on asset pricing in heterogeneous
agents models. Similar to Beber, Driessen, and Tuijp (2012), we study optimal portfolio
choice of heterogeneous investors faced with exogenous transaction costs in a stationary
equilibrium setting. Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005), Vayanos and Wang (2007),
and Weill (2008) endogenize transactions costs through search costs and bargaining power.
None of these studies, however, can address the relation between maturity and liquidity
as they do not simultaneously consider assets with different finite maturities.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. We introduce our model setup
and derive the equilibrium in Section 4.2. In Section 4.3, we display the resulting turnover
and liquidity term structure. Section 4.4 describes the data used for the empirical tests of
our model predictions, and discusses the results. We check the robustness of our empirical
results in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 summarizes and concludes.
4.2 Model Setup
4.2.1 Assets and Investors
We consider a continuous-time model with an infinite horizon and cash as the nume´raire.
There are two types of assets: the money-market account, which is in infinite supply and
which pays a constant non-negative return r, and a continuum of illiquid zero-coupon
bonds with time to maturity between 0 and Tmax. Bonds are perfectly divisible and pay
one unit of the nume´raire at maturity. Each bond is characterized by its initial maturity
at issuance Tinit ≤ Tmax, and bonds of each initial maturity are issued with rate a. Thus,
in steady state, for each Tinit, there are in total a · Tinit bonds outstanding, and equally
distributed with respect to their remaining time to maturity T in (0, Tinit]. Hence, total
outstanding volume of all bonds amounts to
∫ Tmax
0
a ·Tinit dTinit = 12 · a · (Tmax)2. Note that
with the assumption of a given issuance rate a, we take maturity dispersion as given. This
assumption is supported for example by firms managing rollover or funding liquidity risk
by spreading out the maturity of their debt (Choi, Hackbarth, and Zechner, 2013; Norden,
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Roosenboom, and Wang, 2013).36
There are three types of agents, one unit measure of short-horizon investors (type S),
one unit measure of long-horizon investors (type L), and dealers who act as market makers.
Dealers continuously quote competitive bid and ask prices at which they stand ready
to trade. As in Amihud and Mendelson (1986), dealers are compensated for providing
liquidity by a bid-ask spread s(T ) dependent on the (remaining) time to maturity T .37
Hence, dealers quote an ask price P ask(T ) =P (T ) and a bid price P bid(T ) = (1− s (T )) ·
P (T ) for a bond with remaining maturity T . Investors are risk-neutral, i.e., they discount
all cash flows with the risk-free rate r, and each investor is infinitesimally small. Type-i
investors have aggregate wealth Wi and utility from consumption Ui (c) , i ∈ {S, L}. An
investor can consume cash she either receives from the money-market account or as the
proceeds from sold or matured bonds.
4.2.2 The Liquidity Shock
The liquidity shock arises in our model as follows. Each investor experiences a single
preference shock with Poisson rate λi, i ∈ {S, L}, that increases her time preference
rate from r to r + b > r. We can economically interpret this event as a funding shock
that leads to an incentive for the investor to reduce her positions (see Brunnermeier and
Pedersen, 2009).38 Hence, total utility from consumption for an infinitesimally small
investor of group i, given that a liquidity shock occurs at time T˜i, is given by Ui (c) =
T˜i∫
0
e−r·tct dt+
∞∫˜
Ti
e−r·T˜i−(r+b)·(t−T˜i)ct dt, i.e., consumption discounted at the rate r prior to the
shock and at r + b after the shock. Since a short-horizon investor expects to experience
an earlier preference shock than a long-horizon investor, we define that λS > λL. As a
consequence, marginal utility of holding an illiquid bond is larger for long-horizon investors
than for short-horizon investors for bonds of all maturities.
At the preference shock, the investor decides for each bond whether to sell it to the
36In contrast, Greenwood, Hanson, and Stein (2010) endogenize maturity structure with the argument
that firms absorb supply shocks induced by changes in sovereign debt structure by varying the maturity
of the bonds they issue both cross-sectionally and over time. He and Xiong (2012) take liquidity as
exogenously given, and endogenize the choice of debt maturity and a firm’s default decision. He and
Milbradt (2012) endogenize liquidity, but only consider homogeneous investors.
37As bid-ask spreads s(T ) only depend on the remaining maturity T , bonds with the same time to
maturity (but different initial maturities Tinit) are used interchangeably by investors and dealers.
38Feldhu¨tter (2012) or Duffie, Gaˆrleanu, and Pedersen (2005) obtain a similar effect through an in-
creased holding cost for the bond.
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market maker at the bid price and consume the proceeds, or to hold the bond despite the
increased time preference rate. It is intuitive that bonds with shorter maturity lead to
less disutility from waiting, as disutility approaches zero for T → 0. Therefore, investors
will never sell bonds with very short maturities prematurely. We denote the maturity for
which an investor is indifferent between selling the bond (left-hand side of Equation (4.1))
and holding it until maturity (right-hand side) by τ . τ therefore satisfies
P (τ) · (1− s(τ))) = e−(r+b)·τ (4.1)
and is identical for both investors.
4.2.3 The Investors’ Optimization Problem
We consider a steady-state equilibrium where type-i investors experience preference shocks
with a rate λi. Such a shock leads to an incentive for an investor to unwind her portfolio
and exit the market. Investors having experienced a preference shock are replaced by
new investors such that aggregate wealth from each investor group Wi remains constant.
39
As neither aggregate wealth nor the supply of bonds change over time, prices of bonds
for a given time to maturity are constant over time. Note, however, that for aggregate
wealth to remain constant, the wealth of any investor group cannot grow with a higher
rate than members of the respective investor group leave the market. It turns out that in
equilibrium, r + b is an absolute upper bound for the growth rate of wealth. To ensure
that constant aggregate wealth exists, we therefore assume r + b < λL < λS.
From the investors’ risk neutrality and the corresponding additive structure of the
expected utility function, it directly follows that investors either want to invest nothing
or the maximum amount possible in a particular maturity (see, also, e.g., Feldhu¨tter,
2012). Therefore, an investor who initially chooses to invest in a bond of some maturity
T , again invests in a bond with this maturity if her old bond matures – or, in other
words, the investor’s willingness to invest in a particular maturity does not depend on
her wealth or her portfolio holdings in other maturities. Hence, each investor chooses an
initially optimal allocation strategy when she first enters the market and has no incentive
39As investors are infinitesimally small, the distribution of the investors’ age remains constant over
time in steady state. An investor’s age determines how long she was able to collect liquidity premia
and risk-free returns and therefore her individual wealth gains. Hence, as all newly arriving investors
have an identical capital endowment, the constant distribution of investors’ age directly leads to constant
aggregate wealth.
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Figure 4.1: Investor’s decision problem
The figure presents the trade-off within the investor’s decision problem and her optimal
reaction to a preference shock for a bond with given maturity T . At time 0, the investor
buys the bond at a price P (T ). If a preference shock occurs between 0 and T − τ , the
disutility from awaiting the bond’s maturity is larger than the disutility from selling the
bond. Hence, the investor sells the bond prior to maturity. If a preference shock hits the
investor between T −τ and T , disutility from awaiting the bond’s maturity is smaller than
the disutility from selling the bond. Hence, the investor holds the bond until maturity and
realizes the bond’s notional value. If the investor does not experience a preference shock
until time T , she again invests into a bond with maturity T . Since the price of the bond
P (T ) is smaller than the notional value 1, she realizes a wealth gain 1 − P (T ) and her
individual bond position grows over time. We denote the number of investment rounds
during which an investor (re-)invests in bonds of maturity T by j.
to change her portfolio prior to a preference shock. For a given bond maturity T , we
display the investor’s decision problem in Figure 4.1.
Figure 4.1 also incorporates two implicit assumptions that we use in deriving the
investor’s optimization problem. First, we assume that in the case of a preference shock, it
is either optimal to immediately sell the bond or hold it until maturity. Second, we assume
that it is never optimal to sell bonds when no preference shock occurred. In Section 4.2.4
and in Appendix C.4, we discuss these assumptions in more detail and derive general
conditions, under which investors have no incentive to deviate from them.
Since neither prices nor aggregate wealth changes over time, it is sufficient to consider
the decision problem at time t = 0, where each type-i investor maximizes her expected
utility E[Ui(c)] from consumption by choosing the amount of money Xi invested into
the money market account (Xi (0)) and into bonds with maturity T between 0 and Tmax
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(Xi(T )). Short sales are not allowed, such that Xi(T ) ≥ 0, ∀T ∈ [0, Tmax]. Hence, a type-i
investor solves the following optimization problem:
max
Xi
E
{∫ Tmax
0
Xi(T ) ·
∞∑
j=1
1
P (T )j
· (1− s(T · j − T˜i))
·P (T · j − T˜i) · e−r·T˜i · 1{T ·(j−1)<T˜i<T ·j−min(τ,T )} dT
+
∫ Tmax
0
Xi(T ) ·
∞∑
j=1
1
P (T )j
· e−r·T˜i−(r+b)·(T ·j−T˜i) · 1{T ·j−min(τ,T )≤T˜i≤T ·j} dT
+Xi(0)} . (4.2)
The first summand in Expression (4.2) denotes utility of consumption from bonds which
the investor sells to the dealer at the bid price (1− s(T · j− T˜i)) ·P (T · j− T˜i) immediately
after a preference shock. The amount invested in bonds Xi(T ) · 1P (T )j grows for as many
investment rounds j as the investor (re-)invests in the bond until the preference shock and
thereby in each round collects the price difference between the notional value of the bond
and the price of the bond P (T ) (see Figure 4.1). The second summand gives the utility
of consumption from bonds which the investor holds after the preference shock until their
maturity date. The third summand measures the utility from cash invested in the money
market account.
The investor’s budget constraint is given by Wi =
Tmax∫
0
Xi(T ) dT +Xi(0). Simplifying
Expression (4.2), taking expectations, and replacing Xi (0) via the budget constraint yields
the following optimization problem:
max
Xi
{∫ Tmax
0
Xi(T ) · λi · e
λi·T
P (T ) · er·T · eλi·T − 1 ·
∫ T
min(τ,T )
P (x) · er·x · (1− s(x)) · e−λi·(T−x) dx dT
+
∫ Tmax
0
Xi(T ) · λi · (1− e
(λi−b)·min(τ,T ))
(1− P (T ) · er·T · eλi·T ) · (λi − b) dT
+Wi −
∫ Tmax
0
Xi(T ) dT
}
. (4.3)
Taking partial derivatives with respect to each Xi(T ) yields the marginal utility of holding
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bonds with maturity T for a type-i investor:
∂E[Ui(c)]
∂Xi(T )
=
λi · eλi·T
P (T ) · er·T · eλi·T − 1 ·
∫ T
min(τ,T )
P (x) · er·x · (1− s(x)) · e−λi·(T−x) dx
+
λi · (1− e(λi−b)·min(τ,T ))
(1− P (T ) · er·T · eλi·T ) · (λi − b) − 1=: ∆i(T ). (4.4)
The fact that marginal utility does not depend on Xi simplifies our analysis of the equilib-
rium allocation. As investors are indifferent between all bonds they invest in, the marginal
utility of these bonds must be equal. Otherwise, given prices cannot be equilibrium prices.
As marginal utility does not depend on Xi, it is sufficient to consider whether an investor
buys a bond at all. Given that the investor buys the bond, she is indifferent on how she
distributes her wealth across all bonds she invests in.
Equation (4.4) also shows that the time preference rate r which applies prior to the
liquidity shock does not affect the investor’s optimization problem. To see why, we rewrite
bond prices as P (T ) = e−r·T · Q(T ). Here, Q(T ) is the discount of an illiquid bond
compared to the price of a perfectly liquid bond e−r·T . Substituting Q(T ) = er·T · P (T )
into Equations (4.1) and (4.4) would lead to an identical optimization problem independent
of r. To simplify notation, we therefore set r = 0 in the following analysis.
4.2.4 Equilibrium Mechanism
Our model can be viewed as a continuous modification of a linear exchange model (see
Gale, 1960) for which unique solutions exist. The equilibrium mechanism is similar to
the ones in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) and Beber, Driessen, and Tuijp (2012). We
first derive prices for a particular equilibrium allocation, then analyze whether market
clearing holds for these prices, show that no investor has an incentive to deviate from the
allocation for the given bond prices, and last demonstrate that the implicit assumptions
used in formulating the investor’s optimizations problem hold.
Note that marginal utility for holding bonds is larger for long-horizon investors than for
short-horizon investors, whereas the marginal utility of the money-market account is equal
for both. Hence, we are able to exclude the allocation that short-horizon investors buy
bonds and at the same time, long-horizon investors invest in the money-market account.
We therefore focus on the most general remaining allocation: both short- and long-horizon
investors hold bonds, and short-horizon investors additionally invest in the money-market
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account.40
When both short- and long-horizon investors hold bonds and short-horizon investors
additionally invest in the money-market account, we show in Appendix C.2 that for the
derived equilibrium prices there exists a maturity limit Tlim such that long-horizon investors
buy only bonds with maturity between Tlim and Tmax, and short-horizon investors buy only
bonds with maturity between 0 and Tlim. This case corresponds to a clientele effect. The
equilibrium conditions for short-horizon (S) and long-horizon (L) investors are then given
by
∆S(T ) = 0 for all T ∈ (0, Tlim], (4.5)
∆L(T ) = ∆L(Tlim) for all T ∈ (Tlim, Tmax]. (4.6)
Short-horizon investors are indifferent between holding bonds with a maturity up until
Tlim and the money-market account, long-horizon investors are indifferent between buying
bonds with maturities between Tlim and Tmax. For given limiting maturities τ and Tlim,
the conditions in Equations (4.5) and (4.6) lead to closed-form solutions for P (T ). We
summarize these results in Proposition 1, which we prove in Appendices C.1 and C.2.
Proposition 1. (Equilibrium prices and clientele effect)
For constant or monotonously increasing bid-ask spreads s(T ) with 0 < s(T ) < 1, prices
of illiquid bonds P (T ) are given in closed form
P (T ) =

b·e−λS ·T−λS ·e
−b·T
b−λS
, if T ≤ min(τ, Tlim)
e−
∫ T
τ
λS ·s(x) dx · P (τ), if τ < T ≤ Tlim
e
−
∫ T
Tlim
(∆L(Tlim)+s(x))·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
dx · P (Tlim), if τ < Tlim < T
e−T ·λL ·
(
1− λL·(1−e
T ·(λL−b))
(1+∆L(Tlim))·(λL−b)
)
, if Tlim < T ≤ τ
e
−
∫ T
τ
(∆L(Tlim)+s(x))·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
dx · P (τ), if Tlim ≤ τ < T
(4.7)
In equilibrium, there arises a clientele effect that leads to long-horizon investors investing
only in bonds with T > Tlim and short-horizon investors investing in short-term bonds with
T ≤ Tlim.
40The case where short-horizon investors only invest in the money-market account and long-horizon
investors invest in bonds and the money-market account is discussed in Footnote 41. We do not consider
the degenerate allocations where the wealth of long-horizon investors or both investor groups exactly
equals total bond supply. These cases are only valid for rather narrow combinations of total wealth
and bond supply. Additionally, prices would strongly depend on total wealth which is hard to quantify
empirically.
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Both maturity limits τ and Tlim in Proposition (1) themselves depend on bond prices
(because τ solves Equation (4.1), and because the wealth of long-horizon investors must
be sufficient to buy all bonds with maturities larger than Tlim). Hence, we use an iterative
algorithm to simultaneously derive equilibrium prices P (T ) and critical maturities τ and
Tlim for a given parameter set (λL, λS, WL, WS, a, b, Tmax) and bid-ask spread function
s(T ). From initial values of τ and Tlim, we use Proposition 1 to derive bond prices P (T ).
We then use Equation (4.1) to compute a new τ . To determine a new Tlim, we use a market
clearing argument for long-horizon investors that we formally derive in Appendix C.3.
Given the derived equilibrium prices, we analyze whether market clearing holds and
check whether the allocation of bonds is as assumed. Both requirements are satisfied if
aggregate wealth of both investor types exceeds total bond supply (left inequality), but
on the other hand, total wealth of long-horizon investors alone does not suffice to buy all
bonds (right inequality):
WS +WL >
Tmax∫
0
P (T ) ·
Tmax∫
T
a dTinit dT > WL. (4.8)
The right inequality of (4.8) is automatically satisfied if the condition to determine Tlim
(see Appendix C.3) yields a Tlim ∈ (0, Tmax). By inserting the closed form solutions for
P (T ) from Proposition 1 for a given parameter set, it is easy to verify the left inequality
of (4.8).41
Additionally, we analyze whether the two implicit assumptions used in formulating the
investor’s optimization problem hold, i.e., we check that for T > τ , it is always optimal
to immediately sell the bond if an investor experiences a preference shock and second,
that no investor has an incentive to sell bonds prematurely without having experienced
a preference shock. We formalize these assumptions in Appendix C.4 and show that for
constant bid-ask spreads s(T ) = s, they are always satisfied. For an arbitrary bid-ask
spread function s(T ), we show that the first assumption always holds if bid-ask spreads
do not ‘grow too strongly’ with maturity, since investors might otherwise postpone selling
the bond until the bid-ask spread has decreased sufficiently (for a formal condition, see
Appendix C.4). For arbitrary bid-ask spreads s(T ), the condition in Appendix C.4 for the
second assumption has to be verified by plugging in prices P (T ) from Proposition 1.
41If the long-horizon investors’ wealth alone is sufficient to buy all bonds, prices are as in Proposition 1
with Tlim = 0. The market clearing condition is then given as WL >
Tmax∫
0
P (T ) ·
Tmax∫
T
a dTinit dT . However,
this case is not very interesting as short-horizon investors do not play a role.
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Summarizing the results of this section, we have derived the equilibrium prices for
the allocation where the wealth of both investor types is required to absorb total bond
supply. An endogenous clientele effect arises that causes long-horizon investors to invest
exclusively in long-term bonds, whereas short-horizon investors prefer short-term bonds.
This result holds even if bid-ask spreads are identical for all bonds and is thus a more
general case of the clientele effect in Amihud and Mendelson (1986). In analogy with their
paper, short-term bonds are more “liquid” since they offer the opportunity to liquidate
a portfolio without paying transaction costs more quickly. In contrast, such a result is
not obtained if liquidity shocks are modeled as, e.g., in Ericsson and Renault (2006). In
their paper, when investors experience a liquidity shock, they are forced to sell a bond
immediately. Hence, in a continuous time setting, a liquidity shock and the maturity of a
bond never coincide and there is no advantage from investing in short-term bonds.
4.3 Trading Volume and Liquidity Term Structure
4.3.1 Trading Volume
We first present the predictions of our model regarding the relations between trading
volume, maturity, and age. These relations crucially depend on three intuitive effects.
First, bonds of short maturities are not sold prematurely, since the disutility from awaiting
maturity is low. Second, the clientele effect (short-horizon investors with strong trading
needs only hold short-term bonds) translates into lower trading volumes for bonds with
longer maturities. The first and second effect lead to a hump-shaped relation between
maturity and trading volume. Third, an aged formerly long-term but now short-term
bond is still partially locked up in the portfolios of long-horizon investors. This leads
to a lower trading volume of this bond compared to a young short-term bond. We are
not aware of any other model that is both able to endogenously derive relations between
maturity, age, and trading volume and predict term structures of liquidity premia. The
predictions regarding trading volume are summarized in the following proposition, which
we prove in Appendix C.5. We focus on seller initiated turnover as a proxy for trading
volume for two reasons. First, total trading volume equals seller-initiated trading volume
plus trading volume from issuing activities in the primary market, which is exogenous in
our setting. Second, we look at turnover, i.e., trading volume in percent of the outstanding
volume for each maturity since the outstanding volume of short-term bonds exceeds that
of long-term bonds due to the latter’s aging.
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Proposition 2. (Trading volume)
Consider the case that τ < Tlim.
1. Seller initiated turnover is hump-shaped in the time to maturity T , i.e., it is zero
for T < τ and equals λL for T > Tlim. For T with τ < T < Tlim, seller initiated
turnover exceeds λL.
2. For two bonds 1 and 2 that both have a remaining maturity T with τ < T < Tlim, but
a different initial maturity Tinit,1 < Tlim and Tinit,2 > Tlim, seller initiated turnover is
higher for the younger bond 1 compared to the older bond 2.
In the (less interesting) case that Tlim ≤ τ , short-horizon investors never sell bonds
prematurely, and seller-initiated turnover is determined by long-horizon investors only.
Hence, seller-initiated turnover is zero for T < τ , and equals λL for T > τ . Then, no aging
effect arises.
We illustrate the relation between maturity and trading volume with the help of a
baseline parameter specification in Figure 4.2. In this specification, bid-ask spreads are
0.3% for all maturities T , short-horizon investors experience preference shocks with a
rate of λS = 0.6, i.e., they experience on average one preference shock every 20 months.
Long-horizon investors experience half as many shocks compared to short-horizon investors
(λL = 0.3).
42 b equals 2%, i.e., if a shock arises, investors’ time preference rate increases
by 2% which can be thought of as the additional borrowing cost in excess to the risk-free
rate. In Figure 4.2, the solid line presents seller initiated turnover aggregated over all
bonds, i.e., volume from trades triggered by investors who sell their bonds prematurely,
divided by the total outstanding volume of all bonds with the respective maturity:
Turnover(T ) =
1{T>τ} ·
Tmax∫
T
a ·∑i=S,L Yi (T, Tinit, Tlim) · λi dTinit
Tmax∫
T
a dTinit
, (4.9)
where in the numerator and the denominator, we integrate over all bonds with initial ma-
turity Tinit and remaining maturity T that are held by both investor types. Yi(T, Tinit, Tlim)
denotes the fraction of bonds with remaining maturity T and initial maturity Tinit held
in the portfolios of type-i investors (where YS(T, Tinit, Tlim) = 1 − YL(T, Tinit, Tlim) and
42Our parameter values are well comparable to Feldhu¨tter (2012) who estimates for the U.S. corporate
bond market that investors experience a preference shock once every three years.
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YL(T, Tinit, Tlim) is formally defined in Equation (C.31) in Appendix C.3). This fraction
is multiplied with the rate at which preference shocks arrive. The denominator gives the
total volume of all bonds with remaining maturity T and initial maturity Tinit between T
and Tmax. The entire fraction is multiplied by 1{T>τ}, since investors who experience a
preference shock only sell bonds with maturity T > τ .
The dependence of trading volume on the distribution of bonds over the portfolios
of short- and long-horizon investors leads to the endogenous aging effect (second part of
Proposition 2) which we illustrate in Figure 4.2. Bonds with initial maturity Tinit < Tlim
(dotted line in Figure 4.2) are only held by short-horizon investors. These investors sell
the bonds when experiencing a preference shock if the remaining maturity T is larger than
τ . This leads to a turnover of these bonds which equals λS for T > τ and drops to zero
for T < τ .
The same intuition applies for long-horizon investors and bonds with initial maturity
Tinit > Tlim (dashed line in Figure 4.2) when these bonds have a remaining maturity
T > Tlim. If they reach a remaining time to maturity T below Tlim, both long- and short-
horizon investors sell the bonds if they experience a preference shock (for T > τ), but only
short-horizon investors purchase the bonds. Hence, when bonds reach a remaining time to
maturity below Tlim, they gradually move into the portfolios of short-horizon investors who
suffer preference shocks with a higher rate. Therefore, the turnover increases for decreasing
maturity until at τ , it drops again to zero. As a direct consequence, a bond with remaining
maturity T < Tlim has a lower turnover if its initial maturity was larger than Tlim (the
bond is older), compared to a younger bond with initial maturity Tinit < Tlim.
The solid line in Figure 4.2 shows turnover for all bonds. It can be viewed as a weighted
average of the other two lines, where the weights equal the proportion of bonds of remaining
maturity T that have an initial maturity below or above Tlim. Our model predictions are
consistent with the aging effect discussed in Warga (1992) and empirically documented,
e.g., in Fontaine and Garcia (2012) for U.S. Treasuries and Hotchkiss, Warga, and Jostova
(2002) for corporate bonds.
4.3.2 The Term Structure of Liquidity Premia
To demonstrate the effect of illiquidity on the term structure of interest rates, we depict
liquidity premia computed from both ask prices P ask(T ) = P (T ) and bid prices P bid(T ) =
(1− s(T )) ·P (T ). Liquidity premia are then defined as the bond yield minus the risk free
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Figure 4.2: Seller initiated turnover – hump-shaped trading volume and aging
effect
The figure presents seller initiated turnover for the baseline case where the rate at which
preference shocks occur λ equals 0.6 for short-horizon investors and 0.3 for long-horizon
investors, the time preference rate increases from 0 to b = 0.02 if a preference shock
occurs, the bid-ask spread s equals 0.003, the maximum bond maturity Tmax equals 10
years, both investor types have the same aggregate wealth W of 1, and for each initial
maturity, bonds are issued with a rate of a = 0.025, leading to a total bond supply of
1.25. In the resulting equilibrium allocation, short-horizon investors invest in bonds with
maturities up to Tlim = 2.68 years, and only bonds with a maturity higher than τ = 0.16
years are sold if a preference shock arises. The dotted line presents turnover of bonds
with initial maturity Tinit < Tlim, the dashed line depicts turnover of bonds with initial
maturity Tinit > Tlim, and the solid line aggregates turnover over all bonds.
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rate r, i.e.,
Illiqask(T ) = − log
(
P ask(T )
)
T
− r= − log (P (T ))
T
− r,
Illiqbid(T ) = − log
(
P bid(T )
)
T
− r= − log (1− s(T ))
T
− log (P (T ))
T
− r. (4.10)
In the following, we again set r = 0 for ease of exposition. The formulas for liquidity premia
can be interpreted as distributing the “liquidity discount” over the time to maturity T .
Bid premia are increased in addition by bid-ask spreads s(T ), which are distributed over T ,
as s(T ) ≈ − log (1− s(T )) for small s(T ). We summarize our model predictions regarding
the term structure of liquidity premia in Proposition 3, which we prove in Appendix C.5.
Proposition 3. (Term structure of liquidity premia)
1. The term structure of liquidity premia from ask prices Illiqask(T ) is monotonously
increasing in time to maturity T for all T and goes to zero for T → 0. The term
structure flattens at Tlim, i.e.,
lim
T↑Tlim
(
Illiqask(T )
)′
> lim
T↓Tlim
(
Illiqask(T )
)′
. (4.11)
2. The term structure of liquidity premia from bid prices Illiqbid(T ) is decreasing in T
at the short end.
The predictions in Proposition 3 are illustrated in Figure 4.3 for constant and in Fig-
ure 4.4 for monotonously increasing bid-ask spreads. First, ask premia Illiqask(T ) always
go to zero for T → 0 as the disutility from awaiting the bond’s maturity vanishes in the
case of a preference shock. Second, in Figure 4.3, the ask term structure Illiqask(T ) flattens
out quickly. Since the slope is already close to zero for T ↑ Tlim, the small kink at Tlim is
hard to detect as Illiqask(T ) cannot decrease in time to maturity. Otherwise, long-horizon
investors would invest in bonds with shorter maturities. In Figure 4.4, ask liquidity premia
increase more strongly for longer maturities as expected trading costs increase due to the
increasing term structure of bid-ask spreads s(T ). Hence, the kink at Tlim becomes more
apparent. Bid-premia Illiqbid(T ) always exhibit an inverse shape.
Apart from these predictions of Proposition 3, Figure 4.3 and Figure 4.4 allow us to
make two additional observations. First, for constant bid-ask spreads, bid liquidity premia
also flatten out for longer maturities because the fixed bid-ask spread is distributed over a
longer time period.43 Second, for the empirically relevant case of bid-ask spreads increasing
43A recent working paper of Huang et al. (2013) confirms our model predictions empirically. The
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Figure 4.3: Liquidity premia – baseline case and spill-over effects
The figure presents liquidity premia for the baseline case (thick lines) where the rate at
which preference shocks occur λ equals 0.6 for short-horizon investors and 0.3 for long-
horizon investors, the time preference rate increases from 0 to b = 0.02 if a preference
shock occurs, the bid-ask spread s(T ) equals 0.003 for all maturities, the maximum bond
maturity Tmax equals 10 years, both investor types have the same aggregate wealth W of
1, and for each initial maturity, bonds are issued with a rate of a = 0.025, leading to a
total bond supply of 1.25. In the resulting equilibrium allocation, short-horizon investors
invest in bonds with maturities up to Tlim, baseline = 2.68 years, and only bonds with a
maturity higher than τbaseline = 0.16 years are sold if a preference shock arises. Thin lines
present liquidity premia for the case of higher liquidity demand for short-horizon investors
(λS = 1.2). All other parameters are identical to the baseline case. For this specification,
critical maturities τλS=1.2 = 0.17 and Tlim, λS=1.2 = 2.63 only change marginally compared
to the baseline specification. Solid lines depict Illiqask(T ), dashed lines show Illiqbid(T ).
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Figure 4.4: Liquidity premia – bond-specific spreads increase in maturity
The figure presents liquidity premia for the case where we have calibrated bid-ask spreads
to observed prices: s(T ) = 0.00446 + 0.01868 · (1− e−0.1205·T ) (see also Section 4.4.2 and
Figure 4.5). The rate at which preference shocks occur λ equals 0.6 for short-horizon
investors and 0.3 for long-horizon investors, the time preference rate increases from 0 to
b = 0.02 if a preference shock occurs, the maximum bond maturity Tmax equals 10 years,
both investor types have the same aggregate wealth W of 1, and for each initial maturity,
bonds are issued with a rate of a = 0.025, leading to a total bond supply of 1.25. In the
resulting equilibrium allocation, short-horizon investors invest in bonds with maturities
up to Tlim = 2.6 years, and only bonds with a maturity higher than τ = 0.28 years are
sold if a preference shock arises. The solid line depicts Illiqask(T ), the dashed line shows
Illiqbid(T ).
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in maturity, bid liquidity premia increase at the long end. Liquidity premia for long-term
bonds therefore reflect the shape of the bid-ask spread curve, which results in increasing
term structure of liquidity for ask and U-shaped ones for bid liquidity premia.
Finally, Figure 4.3 also illustrates a spill-over effect of short-horizon investors’ liquidity
demand on long-term premia. For the thin lines, all parameters are identical as before,
except λS which is twice as large as in the baseline case. Although only short-horizon
investors’, who hold bonds with maturities smaller than Tlim, are affected by this change,
liquidity premia of all maturities increase. The reason for this spill-over is the same as
above: long-horizon investors would prefer short-term bonds over long-term bonds if long-
term ask liquidity premia were lower than short-term premia.
Taking into account that empirically observed bond yield spreads are typically com-
puted from mid prices and incorporate a liquidity component, our model can also shed
light on the credit spread puzzle. This puzzle refers to the observation that empirically
observed bond yield spreads are too high, especially at the short end, compared to what
structural models a` la Merton (1974) can explain, see, e.g., Huang and Huang (2012). If
we average ask and bid prices to compute mid liquidity premia in our framework, we get
an inverse shape with large premia for very short maturities: in our baseline specification,
we obtain about 185 bps for one month time to maturity.
In summary, the model predicts four main testable effects. First, seller initiated
turnover is hump shaped. Second, for bonds which have identical maturity T but a differ-
ent age, the older bond has lower or equal seller initiated turnover compared to the younger
bond. Third, liquidity premia computed from ask prices are monotonously increasing in
maturity at the short end, and, depending on the shape of the bid-ask spreads s(T ), either
flatten out or keep increasing for longer maturities. Fourth, liquidity premia computed
from bid prices are monotonously decreasing at the short end and, again depending on
the shape of s(T ), flatten out or start increasing for longer maturities.
Before explicitly testing our model predictions using data from the U.S. corporate bond
market, we now discuss the empirical results from Chapter 3 on the shape of liquidity
premia during crisis and non-crisis times through the lenses of our equilibrium model.
To enhance comparisons with previous empirical studies and most importantly due to
missing data on bid and ask prices during our observation period, we used closing prices
from the Frankfurt stock exchange to calculate liquidity premia in Chapter 3. These
authors find that long-horizon investors on average hold more illiquid bonds (with higher liquidity premia),
but demand less compensation for less liquid bonds than short-horizon investors would. These empirical
results correspond to our clientele effect and the flattening term structure of liquidity premia.
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closing prices either result from a buy or a sell trade or are determined in an auction like
setting. Therefore, the resulting term structure of liquidity premia can be interpreted as
a weighted average computed from the term structures of bid and ask prices where the
weightings are the probabilities for a buy or sell, respectively.
Through the lenses of our model, the reason for the more inverse shape of the term
structure of ‘closing price’ liquidity premia in crises times is a mixture of two mechanisms.
First, in crisis times, the incentive to sell in the case of a preference shock modeled though
the increase in the time preference rate b is larger (since the alternatives to get funding
become more expensive). This lowers τ and thus shrinks the maturity range where ask
liquidity premia are small. Second, in crisis times, the probability for a particular trade
to result from a sell order might be higher due to increased liquidity needs. Thus, the
term structure of closing price liquidity premia is closer to the bid curve which results in
a more inverse shape. Both mechanisms are in line with the empirically found increased
impact of liquidity demand at the short end.
4.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, we verify the four main predictions from our equilibrium model using
empirical data. Our model forecasts non-linear relations between maturity T and bid and
ask liquidity premia. More formally, it predicts that the sensitivity of liquidity premia on
time to maturity T is different for short- and long-term bonds. To test these relations, we
employ piecewise linear regressions that explicitly allow for such a different sensitivity for
maturities below and above a breakpoint y. Regressions are of the form
Illiqask(T ) = αa + βa1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βa2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γa · Controls + ε,
Illiqbid(T ) = αb + βb1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βb2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γb · Controls + ε, (4.12)
where Illiqbid(T ) (Illiqask(T )) is the liquidity premium computed from bid (ask) prices, T
is the time to maturity for which the liquidity premium applies, and ε is an error term.
We explore a wide range of possible breakpoints y between 3 months and 3 years and
do not endogenously derive an optimal breakpoint to avoid overfitting. If our hypotheses
regarding the liquidity term structures are confirmed, we expect the following behavior.
For ask premia, we should find positive and significant estimates for βa1 and β
a
2 as the
slope of the ask liquidity premium term structure is positive for all maturities. Because
our model predicts a flattening term structure, we expect βa1 to be larger than β
a
2 . For bid
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premia, we should find significant negative estimates for βb1. The shape of the bid term
structure at the long end depends on the shape of bid-ask spreads s(T ), which we will
show to be strongly increasing in the time to maturity T for our data set. Therefore, we
expect βb2 to be positive.
A similar intuition holds for trading volume. There, we use a regression of the form
Turnover(T ) = α + β1·1{T≤y}· (T − y) + β2·1{T>y}· (T − y) + β3·Age + γ·Controls + ε,
(4.13)
and expect positive and significant estimates for the slope at the short end β1 and negative
and significant estimates of β2. We expect a significant and negative estimate for β3 since
our model predicts a negative relation between the age of a bond and trading volume.
4.4.1 Data
We use bond transaction data from TRACE (Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine) to
test the predictions of our model. This database was introduced by the Financial Industry
Regulatory Agency (FINRA) to increase transparency in the U.S. corporate bond market.
It lists information concerning secondary market transactions of U.S. corporate bonds,
e.g., actual trade prices, yields resulting from these prices, and trade sizes. Trades have
to be reported since July 1, 2002 and reporting requirements have been tightened over
three phases. According to Goldstein and Hotchkiss (2012), transaction information for
nearly all U.S. corporate bonds is disseminated in TRACE since October 1, 2004. For that
reason, the time period of our study starts on October 1, 2004 and ends on December 31,
2011.
We calculate bid and ask liquidity premia based on yields of investment grade bonds
adjusted for riskless interest rates and credit risk. Turnover is based on trading volume
and outstanding amounts. Table 4.1 summarizes the data selection procedure and the
number of observations for our final sample and the subsamples used in our robustness
checks in Section 4.5. We start with filtering out erroneous trades as described in Dick-
Nielsen (2009). For the remaining bonds, we collect information on the bond’s maturity,
coupon, and other features from Reuters and Bloomberg using the bond’s CUSIP. We
drop all bonds which are not plain vanilla fixed rate bonds without any extra rights. We
also collect the rating history from Reuters and drop all observations for bonds on days
where fewer than two rating agencies (S&P’s, Moody’s, Fitch) report an investment-grade
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rating. We exclude private placements, bonds with more than 30 years remaining time to
maturity, and all bonds that are not classified as senior unsecured in the Markit database.
For the analysis of liquidity premia, we follow Dick-Nielsen (2009) and additionally drop all
transactions with non-standard prices, e.g., prices which explicitly include a commission
or only apply for specific settlement conditions.
We then collect the transaction yield, price, and volume, and the reporting date and
time. To differentiate between bid and ask liquidity premia, we require bid and ask bond
yields. As this information is only provided for transactions starting from November 1,
2008 in TRACE, we use the methodology of Feldhu¨tter (2012), which we also employed for
the roundtrip transaction cost measure in Section 2.3.1.1, to calculate bid and ask yields.
As discussed in Section 2.3.1.1, a large part of the trades reported in TRACE are part of so
called imputed roundtrip trades (IRTs), i.e., pre-matched arrangements where a customer
trades a bond with a dealer and the dealer (in the case of a sell) resells it to another
dealer (who possibly again sells it). As over 90% of these IRTs are either dealer-seller
or dealer-buyer arrangements, we interpret the difference between the highest and lowest
yield within an IRT as the half-spread. This half-spread is then added to the midpoint to
get the bid-yield and deducted from the midpoint to get the ask-yield.44 In a robustness
analysis for the subperiod where TRACE information on bid and asks is available, we
explore whether the identification procedure has an impact on our results.
To determine liquidity premia, we adjust for risk-free interest rates and for credit risk.
We derive the risk-free rate that would apply to a specific bond using Treasury yields.
We collect daily constant-maturity yields from the Federal Reserve’s H-15 release, and
derive a full term structure using linear interpolation. In a robustness check, we employ
swap rates instead of Treasury yields as the risk-free rate.45 As a measure of credit risk,
we collect a time series of daily credit default swap (CDS) mid quotes of all available
maturities for each bond issuer from Markit and again derive a full term structure by
interpolating between the available maturities.46 We then compute a bond’s ask (bid)
liquidity premium as the difference between the bond’s ask (bid) yield and the sum of the
44The midpoint of the IRT equals the midpoint of either the bid or the ask and the price at which
dealers trade among each other. Therefore, in about half of the cases we overestimate the real mid and
in the other half, we underestimate the mid. Hence, on average, there should not be any bias from this
methodology.
45We use the USD swap curves available via Bloomberg for maturities larger than three months and
extend the curve at the short end by linearly interpolating the 6-months rate with USD LIBOR rates for
a maturity of 1 and 3 months. We are cautious to account for the different day count conventions in swap
and LIBOR markets.
46Since the shortest available maturity for CDS quotes is six months, we have to extrapolate the term
structure of CDS premia at the short end.
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Table 4.1: Sample description
The table presents the procedure used to arrive at the final samples employed in our main analysis and in the robustness
checks in Section 4.5, the number of trades, the number of bonds, and the traded notional value in billion USD. The sample
period is from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011.
Number of trades Number of bonds Traded notional value
(in bn. USD)
All trades within the TRACE database 57,192,955 65,900 19,901
Subtotal after filtering out erroneous trades with the procedures described in Dick-Nielsen (2009) 53,738,948 65,183 17,558
Subtotal after removing bonds with missing information (in Bloomberg, Reuters, or Markit),
callable bonds (incl. make-whole call provisions), bonds with remaining time to maturity of more
than 30 years, puttable bonds, bonds with sinking funds, zero coupon bonds, convertible bonds,
bonds with variable coupon payments, bonds with other non-standard cash flow or coupon
structures, issues which do not have an investment grade rating from at least two rating agencies
(i.e., Moody’s, S&P, or Fitch) at the trading date, bonds which are not classified as senior
unsecured, private placements (sample used to calculate turnover)
13,544,882 10,327 3,910
Excluding trades under non-standard terms (e.g., special settlement or sale conditions) and
trades where the price explicitly includes a commission (see Dick-Nielsen, 2009)
12,695,725 10,305 3,532
Imputed Roundtrip Trades (IRTs) (see Feldhu¨tter, 2012) 5,983,293 (within
2,458,325 distinct
IRTs)
9,768 1,188
Main sample: IRTs matched with respective Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) yield and
CDS premium, no government guarantee
5,167,485 (2,124,932
IRTs)
8,576 952
Sample swap-implied liquidity premia (Section 4.5.1): IRTs matched with respective
swap rate and CDS premium, no government guarantee
5,202,564 (2,139,337
IRTs)
8,590 973
Sample AAA before financial crisis (Section 4.5.3): IRTs in AAA bonds matched with
respective CMT yield, until Mar. 2007
131,420 (56,514
IRTs)
344 28
Sample TRACE-identified ask trades since Nov. 2008 (Section 4.5.2): dealer is
seller, no interdealer trades, matched with respective CMT yield and CDS premium, no
government guarantee
1,908,478 3,660 432
Sample TRACE-identified bid trades since Nov. 2008 (Section 4.5.2): dealer is
buyer, no interdealer trades, matched with respective CMT yield and CDS premium, no
government guarantee
1,153,607 3,671 378
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risk-free yield and the CDS premium. For the turnover analysis and as a control variable,
we collect the history of outstanding notional amounts for each bond from Reuters. To
prevent an impact of outliers on our results, we winsorize liquidity premia and turnover
at the 1% and 99% quantile.
4.4.2 Liquidity Premia Analysis
Our model predictions for the long end of the term structure of liquidity premia depend
on the shape of the term structure of bid-ask spreads. Therefore, we first calibrate a
parametric form for s(T ) to our data set. Using non-linear least squares, we minimize the
sum of squared errors ǫi in the following equation:
47
si(Ti) = a
bid-ask + bbid-ask ·
(
1− e−cbid-ask·Ti
)
+ ǫi, (4.14)
where bid-ask spreads si(Ti) for each IRT i in a bond with maturity Ti are computed using
the roundtrip transaction cost measure (see Feldhu¨tter, 2012, and Section 2.3.1.1). We
winsorize bid-ask spreads at the 1% and 99% quantile. Figure 4.5 presents the calibrated
function s(T ) together with average bid-ask spreads for monthly time to maturity buckets
and shows three important properties of bid-ask spreads. First, bid-ask spreads are non-
zero even for securities with very short maturities, which corresponds to a fixed component
of transaction cost. Second, bid-ask spreads increase in maturity. Third, the slope of the
bid-ask spread term structure decreases for large maturities.48
We next present an overview over the average term structure of ask and bid liquidity
premia together with the respective model predictions. Visual inspection of Figure 4.6
suggests that our main hypotheses regarding liquidity premia hold for the full sample.
Ask liquidity premia go through the origin and are mostly increasing in maturity, while
bid liquidity premia exhibit a U-shape. At the long end, both bid and ask premia slightly
increase with maturity.
We now formally explore the effect of maturity on liquidity premia in bond bid and
ask yields and estimate Equation (4.12). As control variables, we use age, outstanding
amount, and credit risk effects not captured by subtracting the CDS premium via the
47Since the bond-specific spread should be limited between 0 and 1, a range of simple functions such as a
linear form s(T ) = abid-ask+bbid-ask ·T or its exponential counterpart s(T ) = abid-ask+bbid-ask ·
(
ec
bid-ask
·T
)
for cbid-ask > 0 are not suitable for all possible Tmax.
48We also find these properties when looking at TRACE-identified bid and ask trades.
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Figure 4.5: Empirical term structure of bid-ask spreads
The figure presents the average term structure of proportional bid-ask spreads (squares) to-
gether with the calibrated bid-ask spread function s(T ) = 0.00446+0.01868·(1− e−0.1205·T )
(solid line). To calculate bid-ask spreads, we use the roundtrip transaction cost measure
(for details, see Feldhu¨tter, 2012, or Section 2.3.1.1). The depicted average spread for a
given maturity is computed as the mean spread across all bonds of a given maturity. The
sample period is from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011.
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Figure 4.6: Empirical term structure of ask and bid liquidity premia
The figure presents the average term structure of ask and bid liquidity premia together with
the predictions of our model (see Figure 4.4). The liquidity premium for a given bond is
determined as the TRACE-reported bond yield minus the interpolated constant-maturity
Treasury yield and the interpolated CDS premium from Markit. Bid and ask yields are
calculated using the methodology of Feldhu¨tter (2012). The depicted average liquidity
premium for a given maturity is computed as the mean liquidity premium across all bonds
of a given maturity. Squares indicate average ask liquidity premia, circles show average bid
liquidity premia. The solid line depicts model implied Illiqask(T ), the dashed line shows
model implied Illiqbid(T ). The sample period is from October 1, 2004 to December 31,
2011.
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numerical rating (where AAA (D) corresponds to a rating of 1 (22)). We control for
age and the outstanding amount as, e.g., Edwards, Harris, and Piwowar (2007) report
a dependence of transaction costs on age and outstanding volume which is not directly
captured by our model. We expect a positive coefficient estimate for age and credit risk,
and a negative estimate for the outstanding amount. We use standard errors clustered
by firm as suggested by Petersen (2009) and include month fixed and firm fixed effects.
As the exact location of the limiting maturities depends on unobservable factors like the
wealth of investors, we test our predictions for a range of exogenously specified short-
term breakpoints y. Note, however, that the predictions do not imply the U-shape in bid
premia and the kink in the slope for ask premia for all specifications of y. The results of
the regression are given in Table 4.2.
Table 4.2 confirms our hypotheses regarding liquidity premia. For ask liquidity premia,
the estimates for the slope at the short end, βa1 , are always positive. They are significant
in 5 out of 6 specifications of the breakpoint y. The estimates for the slope at the long
end, βa2 , are also always positive and significant. In 5 out of 6 specifications, the slope
is significantly steeper at the short end. Overall, the results strongly support our model
prediction that ask liquidity premia are more strongly increasing for shorter maturities,
and flatten out for longer maturities.
Regarding the results for bid liquidity premia, we obtain negative and in 4 out of 6
cases significant estimates for the slope at the short end. The positive but insignificant
estimate for the 3-year breakpoint agrees with the intuition from Figure 4.6 that the break
between short and longer maturities occurs at maturities below three years. Consistent
with the increasing bid-ask spreads, all estimates for the slope at the long end (except for
the 3-year breakpoint) are significantly positive. Overall, bid liquidity premia exhibit a
U-shape with a strongly negative slope for short maturities and a subsequent positive, but
flatter, slope for longer maturities.
The impact of the control variables is also as expected. Age, in the one case where it is
significant, has a positive impact on liquidity premia. Outstanding volume has a negative
and significant impact in all cases. The numerical rating always has a positive impact that
is significant in 11 out of 12 cases, which implies that credit risk and liquidity premia are
positively correlated.
Overall, the results of the regression analysis confirm our model predictions. Ask liquid-
ity premia are monotonously increasing with a decreasing slope, while bid liquidity premia
are decreasing for short maturities and, due to increasing bid-ask spreads, increasing at
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Table 4.2: Regression of ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity
The table presents the regression analysis of ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity and control variables for different
breakpoints that separate the short end from longer maturities of the liquidity term structure:
Illiqask(T ) = αa + βa1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βa2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γa · Controls + ε,
Illiqbid(T ) = αb + βb1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βb2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γb · Controls + ε,
where Illiqask/bid(T ) is the liquidity premium computed from the ask or bid yield for a given transaction minus the interpolated
Treasury yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate and the CDS premium as a proxy for the credit risk premium, all in percentage
points. The explanatory variables are the (remaining) time to maturity T (in years) minus the breakpoint y for T ≤ y and
T > y, as well as the control variables age in years, the average numerical rating (Rating), and the natural logarithm of the
outstanding amount (ln(Amt)). The breakpoints y equal three months, six months, nine months, one year, two years, and
three years. We use firm and month fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the firm level are presented in parentheses.
The sample period is from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Ask Bid
y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3 y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3
Constant 2.6982∗∗ 2.6981∗∗ 2.6995∗∗ 2.715∗∗ 2.854∗∗ 3.0569∗∗ 2.8296∗∗ 2.8456∗∗ 2.8466∗∗ 2.8283∗∗ 2.8221∗∗ 2.8626∗∗
(0.5489) (0.5492) (0.5503) (0.5516) (0.5597) (0.5743) (0.6339) (0.6283) (0.6264) (0.6284) (0.6337) (0.6374)
1{T≤y} · (T − y) 2.665 1.2509
∗ 0.8951∗∗ 0.7924∗∗ 0.4493∗∗ 0.2914∗∗ −11.1866∗∗ −2.9179∗∗ −1.2532∗∗ −0.5649∗∗ −0.0184 0.0346
(1.5043) (0.5559) (0.2927) (0.2017) (0.0874) (0.0487) (1.9409) (0.6415) (0.3206) (0.2144) (0.0878) (0.0476)
1{T>y} · (T − y) 0.0389
∗∗ 0.0376∗∗ 0.036∗∗ 0.0333∗∗ 0.0234∗∗ 0.0163∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0192∗∗ 0.02∗∗ 0.0196∗∗ 0.0163∗ 0.0132
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0075) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0071) (0.0077)
Age [in years] −0.0098 −0.0086 −0.007 −0.0047 0.0024 0.0059 0.0065 0.0046 0.0038 0.0044 0.0077 0.01∗
(0.0057) (0.0057) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.005) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Rating 0.1223 0.1245∗ 0.1265∗ 0.1286∗ 0.1362∗ 0.1387∗ 0.2095∗∗ 0.2057∗∗ 0.2054∗∗ 0.2073∗∗ 0.2116∗∗ 0.2141∗∗
(0.0627) (0.0626) (0.0627) (0.0629) (0.0628) (0.0627) (0.068) (0.0675) (0.0674) (0.0677) (0.0683) (0.0686)
ln(Amt) −0.0862∗∗ −0.0867∗∗ −0.0875∗∗ −0.0885∗∗ −0.0922∗∗ −0.0955∗∗ −0.1057∗∗ −0.1047∗∗ −0.1042∗∗ −0.1046∗∗ −0.106∗∗ −0.1073∗∗
(0.0103) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0107) (0.0117) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0128) (0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0132) (0.0137)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes
1{T>y} · (T − y) −2.6262 −1.2133
∗ −0.8592∗∗ −0.7591∗∗ −0.4259∗∗ −0.2751∗∗ 11.2037∗∗ 2.9371∗∗ 1.2732∗∗ 0.5845∗∗ 0.0347 −0.0213
−1{T≤y} · (T − y) (1.5054) (0.5572) (0.2941) (0.2033) (0.0908) (0.0531) (1.9434) (0.6437) (0.3227) (0.2165) (0.0911) (0.0516)
N 2,124,932
R2 0.323 0.324 0.3254 0.3284 0.337 0.3394 0.3155 0.3168 0.3153 0.3127 0.3096 0.3096
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the long end.
4.4.3 Turnover Analysis
To formally explore the hypotheses regarding trading volume, we consider two subsam-
ples. First, we use all transactions available in TRACE, standardized with the outstanding
amount of the bond under consideration. Second, we exclude bonds immediately around
changes in their outstanding volume (through new issues, reopenings, and bond repur-
chases) since we do not consider these events in our model. When bonds are newly issued,
they are often first held by dealers, who distribute them to clients and other dealers.
Hence, the time interval around new issues of bonds might consist of multiple inter-dealer
trades. We therefore exclude transactions two months prior to a new issue and six months
following the issue, and denote this sample by Excl[-2,+6].49 We now apply our piecewise
regression approach with age as an additional explanatory variable according to Equa-
tion (4.13). The control variables we use are again the outstanding amount and credit
risk. Since turnover cannot be calculated on a trade-by-trade basis, we aggregate traded
volume for each bond and calendar month and compute average daily turnover to account
for a different number of business days per month. The regression results are displayed in
Table 4.3.
Table 4.3 confirms our model predictions regarding the hump-shaped turnover. For
both subsamples, trading volume first increases strongly, since the factor loadings for
the slope at the short end, β1, are positive and significant in 10 out of 12 specifications.
Following the breakpoint, trading volume decreases slowly, but the effect is only significant
in the sample where we exclude bonds around changes in the outstanding amount. The
negative loading for age in all specifications is consistent with our second model prediction
regarding the aging effect: bonds which have been outstanding for a longer amount of time
are traded less frequently.50 The results for the outstanding amount are also as expected:
bonds with a higher outstanding volume are on average more liquid, and thus display a
higher trading volume.
49We exclude the time two months before changes in the amount outstanding mainly because of trades
taking place in connection with bond repurchases that are typically announced about one month in
advance.
50As discussed in Section 4.4.2, part of the effect could result from the dependence of bid-ask spreads
on age, which is not explained in our model.
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Table 4.3: Regression of turnover on maturity and age
The table presents the regression analysis of turnover for the two subsamples on maturity, age, and control variables for
different breakpoints:
Turnover(T ) = α + β1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + β2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + β3 · Age + γ · Controls + ε,
where Turnover(T ) is calculated as the average daily turnover for each bond and each calendar month. The left panel contains
the regression results for the full sample, the right panel contains the regression results for the subsample that excludes bonds
two months prior to and six months after changes in their outstanding amount. The explanatory variables are the (remaining)
time to maturity T (in years) minus the breakpoint y for T ≤ y and T > y as well as age (in years). The control variables are
the average numerical rating (Rating) and the natural logarithm of the outstanding amount (ln(Amt)). The breakpoints y are
given by three months, six months, nine months, one year, two years, and three years. We use month fixed effects. Clustered
standard errors at the firm level are presented in parentheses. Parameter estimates and standard errors are multiplied by
1,000. The sample period is from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
All Excl[-2, +6]
y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3 y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3
Constant −1.8381∗∗ −1.8365∗∗ −1.8366∗∗ −1.8379∗∗ −1.8455∗∗ −1.8434∗∗ −1.4082∗∗ −1.408∗∗ −1.4093∗∗ −1.4117∗∗ −1.4258∗∗ −1.4348∗∗
(0.2947) (0.295) (0.2953) (0.2956) (0.2975) (0.2992) (0.2464) (0.2468) (0.2471) (0.2475) (0.2498) (0.2523)
1{T≤y} · (T − y) 3.0653
∗∗ 1.0484∗∗ 0.5219∗∗ 0.3∗∗ 0.0603∗ 0.0321 3.2045∗∗ 1.1245∗∗ 0.5734∗∗ 0.3364∗∗ 0.0684∗ 0.0258
(0.1954) (0.0922) (0.0618) (0.047) (0.0268) (0.0192) (0.1875) (0.0895) (0.061) (0.0469) (0.0272) (0.0196)
1{T>y} · (T − y) −0.0052 −0.0062 −0.0065 −0.0064 −0.005 −0.0055 −0.0137
∗∗ −0.015∗∗ −0.0156∗∗ −0.0157∗∗ −0.0144∗∗ −0.014∗∗
(0.0043) (0.0043) (0.0044) (0.0044) (0.0045) (0.0048) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0042)
Age [in years] −0.0879∗∗ −0.0874∗∗ −0.0873∗∗ −0.0875∗∗ −0.0885∗∗ −0.0886∗∗ −0.0722∗∗ −0.0717∗∗ −0.0716∗∗ −0.0717∗∗ −0.0727∗∗ −0.0731∗∗
(0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0075) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0056) (0.0056)
Rating 0.0301 0.0302 0.0303 0.0304 0.0304 0.0306 0.0316∗ 0.0319∗ 0.032∗ 0.0321∗ 0.0321∗ 0.0321∗
(0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0171) (0.0172) (0.0172) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0158) (0.0159) (0.0159)
ln(Amt) 0.1889∗∗ 0.1891∗∗ 0.1892∗∗ 0.1892∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.189∗∗ 0.1564∗∗ 0.1566∗∗ 0.1567∗∗ 0.1567∗∗ 0.1566∗∗ 0.1565∗∗
(0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.0159) (0.0159) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0131) (0.013)
Firm Fixed Effects No
Month Fixed Effects Yes
1{T>y} · (T − y) −3.0705
∗∗ −1.0546∗∗ −0.5284∗∗ −0.3064∗∗ −0.0652∗ −0.0376 −3.2183∗∗ −1.1395∗∗ −0.589∗∗ −0.3521∗∗ −0.0828∗∗ −0.0398
−1{T≤y} · (T − y) (0.1965) (0.0932) (0.0627) (0.0478) (0.0279) (0.0209) (0.1886) (0.0904) (0.0617) (0.0475) (0.0281) (0.021)
N 385,232 357,826
R2 0.05887 0.05843 0.05804 0.05772 0.05709 0.05704 0.04685 0.04638 0.04592 0.0455 0.04456 0.04436
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4.5 Robustness
In the previous section, we compute ask and bid liquidity premia under three important
assumptions. First, we use U.S. Treasury yields as the risk-free reference curve. Second,
we identify bid and ask trades using the method of Feldhu¨tter (2012). Third, we use
CDS premia as a proxy for the credit risk premium.51 In this section, we show that
these assumptions do not affect the relation between liquidity premia and maturity by
repeating our analysis for different subsamples. In Section 4.5.1, we repeat the regression
analysis using swap rates instead of Treasury yields as a proxy of the risk-free interest rates.
Section 4.5.2 contains the analysis for the TRACE subsample that includes information
of whether a transaction occurred at the ask or at the bid price. In Section 4.5.3, we
restrict liquidity premia to AAA bonds where the impact of credit risk on yield spreads is
minimized and do not subtract the CDS premium.52
4.5.1 Swap Rates as Risk-Free Interest Rates
As mentioned in Section 4.4.1, instead of using Treasury yields, we also interpolate swap
rates with maturities between one month and 30 years to obtain an alternative risk-free
yield curve. Table 4.2 shows the results when we re-estimate Equation (4.12) using swap
rates as the risk-free reference curve to calculate liquidity premia.
Table 4.4 shows that our estimation results are mostly unaffected by the use of swap
rates as risk-free rates. For ask liquidity premia, the estimates for the slope at both the
short and the long end are positive and significant in all specifications, with the estimates
for the short end significantly exceeding those for the long end. For bid liquidity premia,
the slope at the short end for a breakpoint of one year now also becomes insignificant, but
remains negative. The impact of the rating control variable decreases, which may be due
to the higher credit risk contained in swap rates. Our main conclusions, however, remain
unaffected: ask liquidity premia increase in time to maturity, bid liquidity premia exhibit
a U-shape.
51Since we also use daily ratings as a control variable, we already account for a possible correlation
between credit risk and liquidity premia.
52In additional robustness checks, we restrict our dataset on transactions with a volume of $100,000 or
more and only look at the time before the onset of the subprime crisis. All results confirm our hypotheses
and are available upon request.
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Table 4.4: Regression of swap-implied ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity
The table presents the regression analysis of swap-implied ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity and control variables for
different breakpoints that separate the short end from longer maturities of the liquidity term structure:
Illiqask(T ) = αa + βa1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βa2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γa · Controls + ε,
Illiqbid(T ) = αb + βb1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βb2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γb · Controls + ε,
where Illiqask/bid(T ) is the liquidity premium computed from the ask or bid yield for a given transaction minus the interpolated
swap rate as a proxy for the risk-free rate and the CDS premium as a proxy for the credit risk premium, all in percentage
points. The explanatory variables are the (remaining) time to maturity T (in years) minus the breakpoint y for T ≤ y and
T > y, as well as the control variables age in years, the average numerical rating (Rating), and the natural logarithm of the
outstanding amount (ln(Amt)). The breakpoints y equal three months, six months, nine months, one year, two years, and
three years. We use firm and month fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the firm level are presented in parentheses.
The sample period is from October 1, 2004 to December 31, 2011. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Ask Bid
y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3 y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3
Constant 2.3436∗∗ 2.3412∗∗ 2.3452∗∗ 2.3665∗∗ 2.5192∗∗ 2.7234∗∗ 2.4482∗∗ 2.4652∗∗ 2.4721∗∗ 2.4624∗∗ 2.4765∗∗ 2.5229∗∗
(0.5658) (0.5652) (0.5656) (0.5658) (0.571) (0.5834) (0.6382) (0.6343) (0.6327) (0.6338) (0.6358) (0.637)
1{T≤y} · (T − y) 3.6781
∗ 1.8134∗∗ 1.1554∗∗ 0.928∗∗ 0.4677∗∗ 0.2964∗∗ −9.9741∗∗ −2.3077∗∗ −0.971∗∗ −0.4158 0.0053 0.0427
(1.5024) (0.5886) (0.3114) (0.2133) (0.0907) (0.05) (1.9065) (0.6697) (0.3379) (0.225) (0.0907) (0.0489)
1{T>y} · (T − y) 0.056
∗∗ 0.0544∗∗ 0.0527∗∗ 0.0502∗∗ 0.0418∗∗ 0.0363∗∗ 0.0354∗∗ 0.0367∗∗ 0.0373∗∗ 0.037∗∗ 0.0347∗∗ 0.0329∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0061) (0.0062) (0.0063) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0069) (0.007) (0.0077) (0.0081)
Age [in years] −0.0127∗ −0.011 −0.0092 −0.007 −0.0006 0.002 0.0036 0.0023 0.0017 0.0022 0.0046 0.0061
(0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0061) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0053) (0.0055) (0.0055) (0.0054) (0.0055) (0.0055)
Rating 0.1164 0.1195 0.1218 0.1236 0.1304∗ 0.1321∗ 0.2017∗∗ 0.199∗∗ 0.1987∗∗ 0.2003∗∗ 0.2035∗∗ 0.2052∗∗
(0.0629) (0.0628) (0.0628) (0.0629) (0.0626) (0.0625) (0.067) (0.0667) (0.0666) (0.0668) (0.0672) (0.0674)
ln(Amt) −0.0874∗∗ −0.0881∗∗ −0.089∗∗ −0.0898∗∗ −0.0929∗∗ −0.0955∗∗ −0.1064∗∗ −0.1057∗∗ −0.1054∗∗ −0.1056∗∗ −0.1066∗∗ −0.1073∗∗
(0.011) (0.0111) (0.0113) (0.0115) (0.0125) (0.0133) (0.0139) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0138) (0.0142) (0.0146)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes
1{T>y} · (T − y) −3.6221
∗ −1.7591∗∗ −1.1027∗∗ −0.8777∗∗ −0.4258∗∗ −0.2601∗∗ 10.0095∗∗ 2.3444∗∗ 1.0083∗∗ 0.4527∗ 0.0294 −0.0098
−1{T≤y} · (T − y) (1.5041) (0.5904) (0.3132) (0.2153) (0.0943) (0.0545) (1.9096) (0.6725) (0.3405) (0.2275) (0.0942) (0.0528)
N 2,139,337
R2 0.3214 0.3235 0.3253 0.3282 0.3349 0.3356 0.2985 0.2984 0.2974 0.2956 0.2938 0.2937
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4.5.2 Identification of Bid and Ask Quotes
In this section, we focus on the impact of the method we use to identify ask and bid quotes.
In the previous sections, we have followed Feldhu¨tter (2012) to calculate bid and ask yields.
We now exclusively focus on transactions between November 1, 2008 and December 31,
2011, for which TRACE indicates whether a transaction reported by a dealer occurred
at the dealer’s ask or bid quote. For these trades, we compute the liquidity premium by
subtracting the interpolated Treasury yield and the CDS premium from the yield. We
show the regression results where we only use TRACE-identified ask and bid transactions
in Table 4.5.
As Table 4.5 shows, our main results hold for the subsample where bid and ask quotes
are identified directly from TRACE-reported information. For ask premia, the coefficient
estimate for the slope at the short end is always positive and significant, the slope at the
long end is always positive and significant in 4 out of 6 cases, and significantly flatter than
at the short end. For bid premia, the estimates for the short end are always negative
and statistically significant in 4 out of 6 cases, the slope at the long end is, though not
statistically significant, positive. Hence, our identification method does not affect the
results materially.
4.5.3 Analysis of AAA Bonds
In our final robustness analysis, we analyze whether our results are sensitive to how we
adjust the observed yield spreads for credit risk. To do so, we drop all transactions where
the traded bond does not exhibit a AAA rating by at least two rating agencies on the
transaction date. We also drop all transactions which occurred after March 31, 2007 since
a AAA rating might not be indicative of negligible credit risk during the financial crisis.
General Electric bonds, e.g., exhibited increasing yields long before the downgrade from
AAA to AA+ by Standard&Poor’s on March 12, 2009. We then interpret the difference
between the bond’s yield and the interpolated Treasury yield as a pure liquidity premium.53
We explore the relation between liquidity premia and maturity for AAA rated bonds in
Table 4.6. Since all bonds exhibit a AAA rating, we exclude rating as an explanatory
variable.
Table 4.6 shows that our results are, if anything, stronger for the AAA sample than for
53In an alternative robustness check, we use agency bonds instead of AAA rated bonds. The results
are virtually the same.
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Table 4.5: Regression of TRACE-identified ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity
The table presents the regression analysis of ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity and control variables for different
breakpoints that separate the short end from longer maturities of the liquidity term structure:
Illiqask(T ) = αa + βa1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βa2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γa · Controls + ε,
Illiqbid(T ) = αb + βb1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βb2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γb · Controls + ε,
where Illiqask/bid(T ) is the liquidity premium computed from the ask or bid yield for a given transaction minus the interpolated
Treasury yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate and the CDS premium as a proxy for the credit risk premium, all in percentage
points. Bid and ask quotes are identified directly from TRACE-reported information. Hence, all observations are between
November 1, 2008, and December 31, 2011. The explanatory variables are the (remaining) time to maturity T (in years) minus
the breakpoint y for T ≤ y and T > y, as well as the control variables age in years, the average numerical rating (Rating),
and the natural logarithm of the outstanding amount (ln(Amt)). The breakpoints y equal three months, six months, nine
months, one year, two years, and three years. We use firm and month fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the firm level
are presented in parentheses. *, ** indicate significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Ask Bid
y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3 y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3
Constant −0.2156 −0.1168 −0.03 0.0677 0.2782 0.5318 0.0747 −0.0169 −0.0221 0.0015 0.0828 0.1256
(1.2803) (1.2828) (1.2781) (1.2588) (1.2208) (1.229) (2.4159) (2.4114) (2.4166) (2.4226) (2.4355) (2.4386)
1{T≤y} · (T − y) 8.1854
∗∗ 3.8802∗∗ 2.542∗∗ 2.0449∗∗ 0.9296∗∗ 0.5337∗∗ −11.1225∗∗ −2.6877∗∗ −1.1245∗∗ −0.5227∗∗ −0.0537 −0.0073
(2.7247) (1.0627) (0.5405) (0.3375) (0.1262) (0.0641) (0.9474) (0.3638) (0.2126) (0.1491) (0.0649) (0.0377)
1{T>y} · (T − y) 0.0316
∗∗ 0.0298∗∗ 0.0276∗∗ 0.0245∗ 0.0138 0.0061 0.0059 0.0067 0.007 0.0067 0.0056 0.005
(0.0093) (0.0094) (0.0095) (0.0096) (0.0107) (0.0111) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.0074) (0.008) (0.0085)
Age [in years] −0.0458∗∗ −0.0419∗∗ −0.0379∗∗ −0.0329∗ −0.02 −0.0136 0.0007 −0.0012 −0.0014 −0.0006 0.0022 0.0035
(0.0141) (0.0143) (0.0143) (0.0142) (0.0143) (0.0148) (0.005) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0048) (0.0046) (0.0046)
Rating 0.4232∗∗ 0.4227∗∗ 0.4228∗∗ 0.4256∗∗ 0.4568∗∗ 0.4659∗∗ 0.4684 0.4692 0.4694 0.4689 0.4671 0.4676
(0.1431) (0.1437) (0.1434) (0.1413) (0.1346) (0.1347) (0.2407) (0.241) (0.2419) (0.2426) (0.2416) (0.2409)
ln(Amt) −0.0959∗∗ −0.0988∗∗ −0.1022∗∗ −0.1059∗∗ −0.1159∗∗ −0.121∗∗ −0.1628∗∗ −0.1612∗∗ −0.1609∗∗ −0.1616∗∗ −0.1641∗∗ −0.165∗∗
(0.0259) (0.0261) (0.0262) (0.0264) (0.0271) (0.0284) (0.0289) (0.0285) (0.0281) (0.0281) (0.0286) (0.0291)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes
1{T>y} · (T − y) −8.1538
∗∗ −3.8505∗∗ −2.5144∗∗ −2.0204∗∗ −0.9158∗∗ −0.5276∗∗ 11.1284∗∗ 2.6945∗∗ 1.1315∗∗ 0.5294∗∗ 0.0593 0.0123
−1{T≤y} · (T − y) (2.7281) (1.0657) (0.5435) (0.3407) (0.1321) (0.0707) (0.9499) (0.365) (0.2133) (0.1501) (0.0683) (0.0418)
N 1,908,478 1,153,607
R2 0.4779 0.4833 0.4891 0.4983 0.5166 0.5177 0.4941 0.4934 0.4911 0.4886 0.4859 0.4857
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Table 4.6: Regression of ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity for AAA rated bonds
The table presents the regression analysis of ask and bid liquidity premia on maturity and control variables for different
breakpoints that separate the short end from longer maturities of the liquidity term structure:
Illiqask(T ) = αa + βa1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βa2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γa · Controls + ε,
Illiqbid(T ) = αb + βb1 · 1{T≤y} · (T − y) + βb2 · 1{T>y} · (T − y) + γb · Controls + ε,
where Illiqask/bid(T ) is the liquidity premium computed from the ask or bid yield of a AAA rated bond for a given transaction
minus the interpolated Treasury yield as a proxy for the risk-free rate, both in percentage points. All observations are between
October 1, 2004, and March 31, 2007. The explanatory variables are the (remaining) time to maturity T (in years) minus the
breakpoint y for T ≤ y and T > y, as well as the control variables age in years and the natural logarithm of the outstanding
amount (ln(Amt)). The breakpoints y equal three months, six months, nine months, one year, two years, and three years.
We use firm and month fixed effects. Clustered standard errors at the firm level are presented in parentheses. *, ** indicate
significance at the 5% or 1% level.
Ask Bid
y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3 y = 0.25 y = 0.5 y = 0.75 y = 1 y = 2 y = 3
Constant −0.0597 −0.0354 −0.0039 0.0335 0.2053 0.3883 1.0089∗∗ 0.9844∗∗ 0.9776∗∗ 0.968∗∗ 0.9542∗∗ 0.9591∗∗
(0.3053) (0.3013) (0.2944) (0.2879) (0.262) (0.2316) (0.1567) (0.1641) (0.1696) (0.1738) (0.1898) (0.2109)
1{T≤y} · (T − y) 0.1611 0.3071
∗ 0.3109∗∗ 0.2754∗∗ 0.1805∗∗ 0.1409∗∗ −4.9768∗∗ −1.4072∗∗ −0.6178∗∗ −0.3364∗∗ −0.0635∗∗ −0.0149
(0.3316) (0.1152) (0.0673) (0.0468) (0.0197) (0.0109) (0.308) (0.0624) (0.0245) (0.0191) (0.0112) (0.0084)
1{T>y} · (T − y) 0.0651
∗∗ 0.0642∗∗ 0.0623∗∗ 0.0602∗∗ 0.0514∗∗ 0.0426∗∗ 0.0233∗∗ 0.0263∗∗ 0.0279∗∗ 0.029∗∗ 0.0307∗∗ 0.0312∗∗
(0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0129) (0.0123) (0.0051) (0.0057) (0.006) (0.0064) (0.008) (0.01)
Age [in years] 0.0128∗ 0.0135∗ 0.0145∗ 0.0154∗ 0.0167∗∗ 0.0162∗∗ 0.0244∗∗ 0.0222∗∗ 0.0216∗∗ 0.0218∗∗ 0.0234∗∗ 0.0247∗∗
(0.006) (0.0059) (0.0059) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0053) (0.006) (0.0057) (0.0058) (0.0058) (0.0057) (0.0061)
ln(Amt) −0.0277∗∗ −0.0278∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.028∗∗ −0.0283∗∗ −0.029∗∗ −0.0514∗∗ −0.0509∗∗ −0.0511∗∗ −0.0512∗∗ −0.0513∗∗ −0.0512∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0009) (0.0008) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0006)
Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Month Fixed Effects Yes
1{T>y} · (T − y) −0.096 −0.243 −0.2486
∗∗ −0.2152∗∗ −0.1291∗∗ −0.0983∗∗ 5.0001∗∗ 1.4335∗∗ 0.6457∗∗ 0.3654∗∗ 0.0942∗∗ 0.0461∗∗
−1{T≤y} · (T − y) (0.3349) (0.1222) (0.0761) (0.0569) (0.0302) (0.021) (0.3126) (0.0677) (0.0288) (0.0226) (0.0171) (0.0164)
N 56,514
R2 0.3579 0.3589 0.3624 0.3664 0.3798 0.388 0.1963 0.2068 0.2015 0.1958 0.1829 0.1778
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the entire sample. For ask liquidity premia, the estimates for βa1 are always positive and
significant in 5 out of 6 cases. The slope at the long end is always significantly positive
and flatter than at the short end, and the control variables have the expected impact. Bid
liquidity premia exhibit negative (positive) and significant estimates for the slope at the
short (long) end in 5 out of 6 (all) specifications. The impact of the control variables is
again as expected.
Summarizing the robustness section, we find that our results are robust against changes
in the methodology to compute bid and ask liquidity premia.
4.6 Conclusion
In this chapter, we develop a parsimonious equilibrium model that generates a hump-
shaped term structure of trading volume and, depending on whether we consider bid or
ask prices, different shapes for the term structure of liquidity premia. Investors sell bonds
of intermediate and long maturities because they experience a preference shock. Liquidity
is supplied by an exogenous market maker who charges a positive spread. We then analyze
liquidity premia of corporate bonds with a wide range of maturities, and show that the
observed trading behavior and liquidity premia from ask and bid yields are consistent with
our model predictions. The main conclusion from our analysis is that the different term
structures can arise because of two frictions which are prevalent in bond markets: First,
traders who provide liquidity charge a non-zero spread for bonds of all maturities. Second,
investors differ with respect to their probability of experiencing a liquidity shock. Such a
difference is obvious if we, for example, consider insurance companies who are unlikely to
experience frequent liquidity shocks, and bond market funds which frequently experience
cash outflows.
Our model also yields two central implications for market microstructure and financial
stability. First, our model allows us to quantify the well-established price impact of any
given bid-ask spread term structure for assets of different maturities. This is important
because of two effects. First, artificially increasing transaction costs, especially at the short
end such as through a fixed financial transaction tax, lead to uniformly higher required
yields, and thus lower prices, for all bonds. Reversely, a decrease of transaction costs, e.g.,
via a subsidized dealer system, uniformly decreases yields and increases prices. Second, an
increase (decrease) of transaction costs will shift the maturity limit below which investors
do not sell bonds in spite of a preference shock to higher (lower) values. Therefore, our
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model predicts that higher bid-ask spreads can dry out the market for short-term securities.
The second important implication of our results concerns the interplay of liquidity
and credit risk. As He and Xiong (2012) show, liquidity premia for corporate bonds can
have a strong impact on the issuer’s optimal default boundary. Hence, higher bid-ask
spreads, which lead to higher liquidity premia, increase individual and aggregate credit
risk. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to also show that a higher probability
of a liquidity shock for short-horizon investors also affects liquidity premia for long-term
securities. Hence, even firms that issue long-term bonds might be affected by shocks to
institutional investors who hold short-term debt to a similar extent as firms with short-
term debt. This mechanism implies that liquidity risk management of investors with
short investment horizons (e.g., liquidity buffers for banks under Basel III, or for mutual
funds under the Investment Company Act) might increase financial stability for the entire
economy.
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Chapter 5
Summary and Outlook
In this thesis, we analyze how to measure and price illiquidity in bond markets.
In Chapter 2, we comprehensively compare all commonly employed liquidity measures
based on intraday and daily data for the U.S. corporate bond market. We find that
high-frequency measures based on intraday transaction data are very strongly correlated
implying that previous results should be robust regarding the chosen measure. Most low-
frequency proxies based on daily data generally also measure transaction costs and price
impact well. When using a daily liquidity proxy, the best choices for effective transaction
costs are the high-low spread estimator from Corwin and Schultz (2012), Roll (1984), and
a measure based on Gibbs sampling introduced by Hasbrouck (2009). When only daily
data on quotes is available, bid-ask spreads based on executable quotes should be preferred
over data from Bloomberg’s Generic Quote (BGN). To measure price impact, the adapted
version of the high-low measure wins most comparisons, followed by the low-frequency
Amihud (2002) measure. However, the interpretation of price impact in bond markets is
difficult as larger sizes, in contrast to stock markets, often trade at more favorable prices.
Chapter 3 analyzes the term structure of liquidity premia as the difference between
the yield curves of two major bond segments that are both government guaranteed but
differ in their liquidity. We show that its characteristics strongly depend on the economic
situation. In crisis times, liquidity premia are higher with the largest increase for short-
term maturities. Moreover, their reaction to changes in fundamentals is only significant
during stress: Premia of all maturities depend on the availability of arbitrage capital as
a proxy for liquidity supply. In contrast, liquidity demand only impacts short maturities.
Therefore, calibrating risk management models in normal times underestimates illiquidity
risk and misjudges term structure effects.
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In Chapter 4, we develop an equilibrium model to analyze the impact of market frictions
on trading volume and liquidity premia for finite maturity assets when investors differ in
their investment horizons. In equilibrium, short-horizon investors only invest in short-
term bonds and illiquidity spills over from short-term to long-term maturities. The model
predicts i) a hump-shaped relation between trading volume and maturity, ii) lower trading
volumes of older compared to young assets, iii) an increasing liquidity term structure when
considering ask prices, and iv) a liquidity term structure from bid prices that is decreasing
or U-shaped. We verify these predictions empirically using data for U.S. corporate bonds.
Our results lead to interesting starting points for future research. Regarding the mea-
surement of liquidity, it would be interesting to analyze other OTC markets, e.g., CDS or
swap markets. However, in contrast to the U.S. corporate bond market, where transaction
level data is publicly available, data for many other OTC markets is not available at all
or only available on a proprietary basis.54 It is, however, likely that the quest for trans-
parency in response to the recent financial crisis leads to new data sources that could be
exploited for future research endeavors in that direction.
With respect to the dependence of liquidity premia on the economic environment, it
would be interesting to simultaneously model the yield curves of illiquid and liquid bonds
within an integrated and arbitrage free macro finance model (see Ang and Ulrich, 2012,
for a macro finance model with only liquid bonds and equity). Within such a model, the
risk free yield curve and the term structure of liquidity premia could depend on forecasts
for inflation and real output as well as central bank interventions modeled with the help of
a Taylor (1993) rule. Another promising approach is to analyze dependencies of liquidity
premia in different markets, e.g., U.S. and European bond and stock markets. The better
understanding of spill-over effects between different markets could potentially help to
curtail and dampen future liquidity stess periods and thus help to prevent global liquidity
crises like the financial crisis of 2008.55
Regarding possible extensions of our equilibrium framework, it would be interesting to
incorporate the risk of changing interest rates or credit risk into the model. For that, it
would be reasonable to abandon the assumption of risk neutral investors. Both credit and
interest rate risk could potentially impact short- and long-horizon investors differently
and thus interact with our liquidity clientele effect. Further challenging extensions of
54So for example the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation (DTCC) collects data on CDS trans-
actions settled over their platform (see, e.g., Gu¨ndu¨z, Nasev, and Trapp, 2013).
55All of these issues are further explored within an ongoing project funded by the German Research
Foundation (DFG). The working paper Schuster and Uhrig-Homburg (2014), which forms the basis for
Chapter 3 of this thesis, is an outcome of this project.
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our equilibrium model are to endogenize either bid-ask spreads or bond supply. On the
one hand, a meaningful endogenization of bid-ask spreads would require to specify the
optimization problem of dealers who set bid-ask spreads for different maturities dependent
on their inventory risk or other costs. On the other hand, the endogenization of bond
supply would require to model the decisions of bond issuers. Since they are the ones
who finally have to pay for the liquidity premium, they have an incentive to issue those
maturities with small liquidity premia. However, constraints like the matching of cash
flows from investment projects or fixed costs of bond issuances might prevent them from
issuing only bonds with very short maturities.
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Appendix A
Additional Information on Liquidity
Measures
A.1 Details on the Effective Tick Proxy
The (constrained) probabilities γˆj used in Equation (2.17) are calculated as follows:
γˆj =
min[max{Uj , 0}, 1] if j = 1,min [max{Uj, 0}, 1−∑j−1k=1 γˆk] if j = 2, 3, ..., J, (A.1)
with Uj =
A1B1 · F1 if j = 1,Aj
Bj
· Fj −
∑j−1
k=1
Ojk
Bk
· Fk if j = 2, 3, ..., J,
(A.2)
and Fj =
Nj∑J
j=1Nj
for j = 1, 2, ..., J. (A.3)
Fj and Nj give the empirical probability and number of prices, respectively, belonging to
the jth spread, where only positive-volume days are considered. With them, the uncon-
strained probabilities Uj are calculated as input for Equation (A.1). Aj gives the total
number of possible trade prices corresponding to the jth spread. Bj is the number of
so called special price increments, which are defined as prices that can be generated by
the jth spread, but not by any larger spreads in the price grid. Finally, Ojk defines the
number of price increments for the jth spread overlapping the price increments of spread
k, but not overlapping the price increments of any spread between spreads j and k. The
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following table reports Aj, Bj, and Ojk for our price grid:
56
j Corresponding Aj Bj Ojk
spread
1 $0.001 1000 896
2 $0.01 100 80 O21 = 100
3 $0.05 20 8 O31 = 0, O32 = 20
4 $0.1 10 8 O41 = 0, O42 = 0, O43 = 10
5 $0.125 8 4 O51 = 4, O52 = 0, O53 = 2, O54 = 2
6 $0.25 4 2 O61 = 0, O62 = 0, O63 = 0, O64 = 0, O65 = 4
7 $0.5 2 1 O71 = 0, O72 = 0, O73 = 0, O74 = 0, O75 = 0, O76 = 2
8 $1 1 1 O81 = 0, O82 = 0, O83 = 0, O84 = 0, O85 = 0, O86 = 0, O87 = 1
56Please refer to www.kelley.iu.edu/cholden/examples.pdf and Holden (2009) for further details.
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Term Structure Estimations
B.1 Estimation of Zero Coupon Yield Curves
We estimate the term structure of zero coupon yields of BUNDs and KfW bonds using
the Nelson and Siegel (1987) approach. Within this approach, the entire term structure
information at time t is condensed in four parameters (β0,t, β1,t, β2,t, τt). The zero coupon
yield of bond class i ∈ {BUND,KfW} at time t for time to maturity T is given as
yit(T ) = β
i
0,t + β
i
1,t
1− e− Tτit
T
τ it
+ βi2,t
1− e− Tτit
T
τ it
− e−
T
τi
t
 . (B.1)
We minimize the sum of squared differences between observed and Nelson-Siegel im-
plied yields for both segments and each week. To make the β-factors of both BUNDs and
KfWs directly comparable, we impose τBUNDt = τ
KfW
t = τt (see also Nelson and Siegel,
1987 or Kempf et al., 2012 who restrict τ to be constant over time t). To put equal weights
on both segments for the estimation of the common τt, we weight the sum of squared yield
differences with the inverse of the number of bonds in the respective bond class. We
exclude bonds with time to maturity less than three months since for them small errors
in the price would translate to large yield errors (see, e.g., Schich, 1997). Fitting errors
are presented in Table B.1. Root mean square errors (RMSE) are in the same order of
magnitude for all maturities and both segments and there is no systematic bias of yield
curve estimates.
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Table B.1: Fitting errors
This table shows the distribution of observations over different maturity segments, average
root mean square errors (RMSE), and mean estimation errors of the yield curve estimation.
Estimation errors are defined as yldobservedj,t −yldNelson−Siegelj,t where yldobservedj,t is the observed
yield of bond j (calculated from its closing price) and yldNelson−Siegelj,t is the theoretical yield
one gets when discounting all cash flows of the bond with the respective KfW or BUND
zero coupon yield (see Equation (B.1)). The maturity segments (short, medium, and long)
are chosen around our benchmark maturities of two, five, and ten years. The observation
period is February 14th, 1996 to September 29th, 2010.
Distribution of Average RMSE Mean estimation
observations error
KfW BUND KfW BUND KfW BUND
Short: T ≤ 3.5 yr. 49.2% 51.4% 8.7 bps 4.9 bps −0.3 bps 0.6 bps
Medium: 3.5 yr. < T ≤ 7.5 yr. 30.2% 24.7% 5.0 bps 4.4 bps 0.7 bps −1.2 bps
Long: 7.5 yr. < T 20.6% 24.0% 3.5 bps 6.7 bps −0.8 bps 0.1 bps
All 100.0% 100.0% 7.3 bps 5.5 bps 0.0 bps 0.0 bps
B.2 Estimation of Term Structures of Bid-Ask
Spreads
We compute the average relative bid-ask spread for each bond and each date from all
quotations provided in Bloomberg. To calculate a time to maturity dependent measure,
we estimate a linear relation between the duration of the bond and the bid-ask spread for
each segment and each date. With the estimated ‘term structure of bid-ask spreads’, we
are able to aggregate the information from all bonds of a segment in maturity dependent
bid-ask spreads similarly as for the estimation of the term structure of liquidity premia.
Bid-ask quotations are available only since 1999 for a majority of KfW bonds, two-sided
quotes for bonds of durations less than two years are only available after August 22nd,
2001 on a continuous basis.
B.3 Maturity Dependent Outstanding Volumes
We calculate the measures of the amount of bonds outstanding of the representative two,
five, and ten year KfW bond relative to the corresponding German government bond in
three steps. First, we adjust for the effect that as bonds age, an increasing fraction of
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their issue amounts are locked away in the portfolios of buy-and-hold investors (see, e.g.,
Warga, 1992). Ejsing and Sihvonen (2009) estimate for German government bonds that
the trading volume of an issue declines by eight percent each year. Therefore, we multiply
the outstanding volume of each bond with e−0.08·Age of the issuet . Second, we aggregate the
volume of all outstanding bonds from each segment into the outstanding volume of three
representative bonds (with two, five, and ten years time to maturity). More precisely,
we weight the volume of each bond with the influence it has on the zero coupon yield
of the respective maturity. To measure this influence, we calculate the sensitivity of a
small yield change of this bond on the zero coupon yield curve. The advantage of this
weighting scheme is the independence from arbitrarily selected time to maturity bucket
bounds. Additionally, it minimizes the time series variation resulting from bonds changing
buckets. Third, we divide the volume of each representative KfW bond by that of the
respective German government bond.
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Appendix C
Equilibrium Model for Liquidity
Premia and Trading Volume: Proofs
and Derivations
As discussed in Chapter 4, we set r = 0 in all derivations to simplify notation. However, as
discussed in the last paragraph of Section 4.2.3, our results generally hold also for positive
interest rates.
C.1 Derivation of Equilibrium Prices
For given limiting maturities τ and Tlim, we derive equations for P (T ). In total, there are
five different ranges: T ≤ min(τ, Tlim), τ < T ≤ Tlim, τ < Tlim < T , Tlim < T ≤ τ , and
Tlim < τ < T .
(i) For T ≤ min(τ, Tlim), the integral term of Equation (4.4) is zero. Using the first
order condition (4.5), we get
∆S(T ) =
λS · (1− e(λS−b)·T )
(1− P (T ) · eλS ·T ) · (λS − b) − 1
!
= 0. (C.1)
Solving Condition (C.1) for P (T ) directly yields
P (T ) =
b · e−λS ·T − λS · e−b·T
b− λS for T ≤ min(τ, Tlim). (C.2)
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(ii) For τ < T ≤ Tlim, using again the first order condition (4.5), Equation (4.4)
evaluates to
∆S(T ) =
λS · eλS ·T
P (T ) · eλS ·T − 1 ·
∫ T
τ
P (x) · (1− s(x)) · e−λS ·(T−x) dx
+
λS · (1− e(λS−b)·τ )
(1− P (T ) · eλS ·T ) · (λS − b) − 1
!
= 0. (C.3)
The solution of this integral equation is given as
P (T ) = e−
∫ T
τ
λS ·s(x) dx · P (τ) for τ < T ≤ Tlim, (C.4)
which can be verified by plugging in (C.4) into (C.3). It is instructive to note that (C.4)
corresponds to the market value of a defaultable bond with a default intensity λS and a
“recovery-rate” of (1 − s(T )) when using the “recovery of market value assumption” in
Duffie and Singleton (1999).
(iii) For τ < Tlim < T , we insert Equation (4.4) into the first order condition for the
long-horizon investors (4.6) and get
∆L(T ) =
λL · eλL·T
P (T ) · eλL·T − 1 ·
∫ T
τ
P (x) · (1− s(x)) · e−λL·(T−x) dx
+
λL · (1− e(λL−b)·τ )
(1− P (T ) · eλL·T ) · (λL − b) − 1
!
= ∆L(Tlim). (C.5)
By plugging in
P (T ) = e
−
∫ T
Tlim
(∆L(Tlim)+s(x))·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
dx · P (Tlim) for τ < Tlim < T (C.6)
into (C.5), we show that (C.6) solves the integral equation.
(iv) For Tlim < T ≤ τ , we can ignore the first term of Equation (4.4) and then employ
again the first order condition for the long-horizon investors (4.6) to get
∆L(T ) =
λL · (1− e(λL−b)·T )
(1− P (T ) · eλL·T ) · (λL − b) − 1
!
= ∆L(Tlim). (C.7)
Rearranging terms directly yields
P (T ) = e−T ·λL ·
(
1− λL ·
(
1− eT ·(λL−b))
(1 + ∆L(Tlim)) · (λL − b)
)
for Tlim < T ≤ τ. (C.8)
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(v) For Tlim ≤ τ < T , as in (iii), we obtain (C.5). Since Tlim < τ < T , we get the
solution
P (T ) = e
−
∫ T
τ
(∆L(Tlim)+s(x))·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
dx · P (τ) for Tlim < τ < T, (C.9)
which we again verify by plugging it into (C.5), but now use ∆L(Tlim) from (C.7).
C.2 Clientele Effect
In this section, we prove that for the derived equilibrium prices and constant or monot-
onously increasing bid-ask spreads s(T ) with 0 < s(T ) < 1, investors do not have any
incentive to deviate from the assumed allocation of bonds, i.e., short-horizon investors
only buy short-term bonds and long-horizon investors only invest in long-term bonds.
This case corresponds to a clientele effect. It holds if there is a maturity Tlim such that
short-horizon investors have no incentive to invest in bonds with longer maturity:
∆S(T ) < 0 for all T ∈ [Tlim, Tmax], (C.10)
and long-horizon investors have no incentive to invest in bonds with shorter maturity:
∆L(T ) < ∆L(Tlim) for all T ∈ (0, Tlim], (C.11)
nor in cash, since they hold only bonds, i.e., ∆L(T ) > 0. Long-horizon investors have
higher marginal utility for all bonds than short-horizon investors, who have a marginal
utility of 0 for bonds with maturity Tlim, therefore ∆L(Tlim) > ∆S(Tlim) = 0. Hence, the
condition ∆L(Tlim) > 0 trivially holds.
Proof of Equation (C.11): We verify that ∆L(T ) is strictly monotonously increasing
in T for T ≤ Tlim and arbitrary Tlim, i.e., ∆′L(T ) > 0: For the case T ≤ τ , ∆L(T ) is given
as
∆L(T ) =
λL · (1− e(λL−b)·T )
(1− eλL·T · P (T )) · (λL − b) − 1. (C.12)
By employing Equation (C.2) for P (T ), using 0 < b < λL < λS (see Section 4.2.3), and
substituting b = λL − c1 and λS = λL + c2 with c1, c2 > 0 and c1 < λL, ∆′L(T ) > 0
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simplifies to
e(c1+c2)·T · c1 + c2 > ec1·T · (c1 + c2). (C.13)
(C.13) holds for all T > 0 since for T = 0, both sides are equal (c1 + c2), and the first
derivative with respect to T of the left-hand side of (C.13) is larger than that of the
right-hand side, i.e.,
(c1 + c2) · c1 · e(c1+c2)·T > (c1 + c2) · c1 · ec1·T (C.14)
which is always true since c1, c2 > 0.
For the second case with T > τ , rearranging terms and using again 0 < b < λL < λS,
the condition ∆′L(T ) > 0 simplifies to
(1− s(T )) · (eT ·λL · P (T )− 1)−
(1− e(λL−b)·τ) ·
(
−λL − P
′(T )
P (T )
)
(λL − b)
+
(∫ T
τ
e−(T−x)·λL · (1− s(x)) · P (x) dx
)
·
(
eT ·λL · λL + eT ·λL · P
′(T )
P (T )
) > 0. (C.15)
We prove that (C.15) holds in two steps: In step (a), we show that (C.15) holds for T ↓ τ ,
i.e., we look at the right-sided limit of (C.15). In step (b), we then show that the first
derivative with respect to T of the left-hand side of (C.15) is positive. For (a), rearranging
Equation (4.1) yields57
s(τ) =
b · (e(b−λS)·τ − 1)
b · e(b−λS)·τ − λS . (C.16)
Using again our substitutions b = λL − c1 and λS = λL + c2 with c1, c2 > 0 and c1 < λL
and plugging in (C.16) we can simplify (C.15) to
ec2·τ · c1 + e−c1·τ · c2− (c1 + c2) > 0. (C.17)
Again, it is easy to show that (C.17) holds for all τ > 0 by verifying that its left-hand side
equals 0 for τ → 0 and its first derivative with respect to τ is larger than 0.
57Note that for T > τ , we implicitly assume that τ exists. If τ does not exist due to bid-ask spreads
being to large, the already discussed case for T ≤ τ applies for all T .
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For (b), we rearrange (C.15) by employing (C.4) for P (T ) and substituting g(T ) =
T · λL −
∫ T
τ
λS · s(x) dx and g′(T ) = λL − λS · s(T ) to finally get(
eg(T ) · P (τ)− 1) · (λS − λL)
λS
+
(
eλL·τP (τ)− 1
λS
+
e(λL−b)·τ − 1
b− λL
−
∫ T
τ
eg(x) · P (τ) · (λS − λL)
λS
dx
)
· g′(T ) > 0 (C.18)
and it remains to show that the first derivative with respect to T of the left-hand side of
(C.18) has to be positive:(
eλL·τ · P (τ)− 1
λS
+
e(λL−b)·τ − 1
b− λL −
∫ T
τ
eg(x) · P (τ) · (λS − λL)
λS
dx
)
· g′′(T ) > 0. (C.19)
As g′′(T ) = −λS·s′(T ) ≤ 0 for monotonously increasing s(T ) and−
∫ T
τ
eg(x)·P (τ)·(λS−λL)
λS
dx <
0 (since all factors in the numerator of the integrand are positive), a sufficient condition
for (C.19) to hold is that
eλL·τ · P (τ)− 1
λS
+
e(λL−b)·τ − 1
b− λL < 0. (C.20)
Using once more our substitutions b = λL − c1 and λS = λL + c2 with c1, c2 > 0 and
c1 < λL and utilizing (C.2) for P (τ), (C.20) simplifies to
c1 · (λL − c1) + ec2·τ ·
(
c12 − c1 · λL +
(
ec1·τ − 1) · c2 · (c2 + λL)) > 0. (C.21)
As before, it is easy to show that (C.21) holds for all τ > 0 by verifying that its left-hand
side equals 0 for τ → 0 and its first derivative with respect to τ is larger than 0.
Proof of Equation (C.10): Inequality (C.10) directly follows from ∆′L(T ) > 0 for
T ≤ Tlim. To see this, assume that for some parameter set (λS, λL, a, b, Tmax) and given
bid-ask spread function s(T ), the wealth of short-horizon investors is sufficient to buy all
bonds and the wealth of long-horizon investors goes to zero (W ∗L → 0), so that T ∗lim → Tmax.
Suppose now, that for the same parametrization (λS, λL, a, b, Tmax) and bid-ask spread
function s(T ), the wealth of long-horizon investors W+L >> 0, so that T
+
lim << Tmax. Then
it follows with the long-horizon investors’ first order condition (4.6) that
∆+L(T ) = ∆
+
L(T
+
lim) for all T ∈ (T+lim, Tmax], (C.22)
125
Appendix C. Equilibrium Model: Proofs and Derivations
where we use (+) to indicate for which case ofW+/W ∗ ∆L(T ) applies. Moreover, it follows
that
∆+L(T
+
lim) = ∆
∗
L(T
+
lim) (C.23)
as P (T+lim) is not affected from the choice of Tlim ≥ T+lim (dependent on τ , but independent
of Tlim, either Equation (C.2) or (C.4) apply for P (T )). From the fact that ∆
′
L(T ) > 0 for
T ≤ Tlim, we directly get
∆∗L(T
+
lim) < ∆
∗
L(T ) for all T ∈ (T+lim, T ∗lim = Tmax]. (C.24)
Putting together (C.22)-(C.24), we get
∆+L(T ) < ∆
∗
L(T ) for all T ∈ (T+lim, Tmax]. (C.25)
From the last Inequality (C.25), it directly follows that
P+(T ) > P ∗(T ) for all T ∈ (T+lim, Tmax] (C.26)
since lower prices P (T ) directly result in higher marginal utilities due to higher wealth
gains. Turning this argument around, we get
∆+S (T ) < ∆
∗
S(T ) for all T ∈ (T+lim, Tmax]. (C.27)
Employing the short-horizon investors’ first order condition (4.5)
∆∗S(T ) = 0 for all T ∈ (0, T ∗lim = Tmax], (C.28)
it directly follows from (C.27) that
∆+S (T ) < 0 for all T ∈ (T+lim, Tmax], (C.29)
which equals Inequality (C.10) for Tlim = T
+
lim. 
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C.3 Determination of Tlim
To determine Tlim, we exploit the market clearing condition for bonds with maturities
Tinit ∈ (Tlim, Tmax] that are held by long-horizon investors, i.e., we solve
WL =
Tmax∫
0
P (T ) ·
Tmax∫
T
a · YL (T, Tinit, Tlim) dTinit dT (C.30)
for Tlim. Here, YL(T, Tinit, Tlim) denotes the fraction of bonds with remaining maturity T
and initial maturity Tinit for a given Tlim that are held in the portfolios of long-horizon
investors, i.e.,
YL (T, Tinit, Tlim) =

0, if T, Tinit ≤ Tlim
e−λL·(Tlim−T ), if T ≤ Tlim and Tinit > Tlim
1, if T > Tlim .
(C.31)
For bonds with initial maturity Tinit > Tlim and current maturity T ≤ Tlim, a fraction of
e−λL·(Tlim−T ) is held by old long-horizon investors. Bonds with initial and current maturity
smaller than Tlim are not held by long-horizon investors, bonds with current and initial
maturity larger than Tlim are only held by long-horizon investors. To illustrate the me-
chanics of the market clearing argument for long-horizon investors, consider the extreme
case of WL → 0. For Equation (C.30) to hold, YL(T, Tinit, Tlim) has to be 0 for all T and
Tinit. Hence, Tlim → Tmax.
C.4 Optimal Investor Behavior
Bonds are sold immediately after a preference shock occurs if T > τ : To formalize
this requirement, we define the utility of an investor she receives if she sells a T -year bond
d time periods after she experienced a preference shock:
f(d) = (1− s(T − d)) · P (T − d) · e−b·d. (C.32)
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Bonds are always sold immediately, iff f ′(d) ≤ 0. For τ < T ≤ Tlim, this condition holds
iff
s′(T − d) ≤ (1− s(T − d)) · (b− λS · s(T − d)), (C.33)
i.e., if bid-ask spreads do not grow with maturity ‘too strongly’. Note, that for constant
bid-ask spreads s(T ) = s, (C.33) always holds since s′(T ) = 0, s < 1, and b−λS ·s > 0. The
latter condition holds as inserting b−λS ·s ≤ 0 into Equation (4.1) leads to a contradiction
(i.e., τ would not exist). Condition (C.33) also ensures that Equation (4.1) cannot have
more than one solution for τ .
For the other two relevant cases Tlim ≤ τ < T and τ < Tlim < T , it can be formally
shown that f ′(d) < 0 also holds when (C.33) applies. This follows intuitively from the
clientele-effect since P (T ) decreases slower for increasing T when T > Tlim compared to
T ≤ Tlim (due to long-horizon investors demanding lower compensation for holding longer
term bonds compared to short-horizon investors). Thus, the incentive to wait in the case
of a preference shock is reduced, compared to T ≤ Tlim (since gains from increasing prices
when the maturity decreases are smaller).
It is never optimal to sell bonds without preference shock: For short-horizon
investors, this is intuitively clear since they are indifferent between all bonds with matu-
rities between 0 and Tlim. Hence, selling one bond with T ∈ (0, Tlim], paying the bid-ask
spread s(T ), and buying another bond with Tnew ∈ (0, Tlim] can never be optimal. With
the same argument, long-horizon investors can never have an incentive to sell bonds with
maturity T ≥ Tlim. For them, selling bonds with T < Tlim without having experienced a
preference shock can only be optimal if the marginal utility through the early reinvestment
in a bond with maturity Tnew ∈ (Tlim, Tmax] plus the proceeds from selling the bond with
maturity T ∈ (0, Tlim) is higher than the marginal utility from the later reinvestment (at
maturity of the respective bond) plus the proceeds from the maturing bond if no prefer-
ence shock occurs, or the proceeds from the optimal decision given that a preference shock
occurs:
(∆L(Tlim) + 1) · P (T ) · (1− s(T )) > Pr(T˜L > T ) · (∆L(Tlim) + 1)
+
∫ T−min(T,τ)
0
λL · e−λL·y︸ ︷︷ ︸
density function of the preference shock time
·(1− s(T − y)) · P (T − y) dy
+
∫ T
T−min(T,τ)
λL · e−λL·y · e−b·(T−y) dy. (C.34)
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Note that in deriving (C.34), we exploit the fact that marginal utility does not depend
on the invested amount (see Equation (4.4)), i.e., the optimal investment of an amount z
for a long-horizon investor leads to an expected utility of (1 + ∆L(Tlim)) · z. Rearranging
Equation (C.34) shows that long-horizon investors have no incentive to sell bonds without
having experienced a preference shock if
(1 + ∆L(Tlim)) · e−TλL +
e−T ·λL
(−1 + e(−b+λL)·min(T,τ)) · λL
−b+ λL
+
∫ T
min(T,τ)
e(−T+x)·λL · λL · P (x) · (1− s(x)) dx− (1 + ∆L(Tlim)) · P (T ) · (1− s(T )) > 0.
(C.35)
It can be formally shown that Condition (C.35) holds for T ≤ τ . This is intuitively clear
since for T < τ , a sell is not optimal even in the case of a preference shock. As b is
an upper bound for the ask liquidity premium of an arbitrary maturity (and thus the
maximum return a selling investor could gain from her new bonds), the incentive to sell
is lower when no preference shock occurred. For constant bid-ask spreads s(T ) = s, it can
also never be optimal to sell prematurely for τ ≤ T < Tlim, as the relative wealth gain
−P ′(T )
P (T )
is higher than for T > Tlim. Since we have already shown that it is never optimal to
sell prematurely for T ≤ τ and T ≥ Tlim, it can also not be optimal to sell during the time
of highest wealth gains. In the most general case with increasing bid-ask spreads s(T ) and
for T ∈ (τ, Tlim), (C.35) has to be verified by plugging in prices P (T ) from Proposition 1.
C.5 Proof of Propositions 2 and 3
Proposition 2
The fact that seller initiated turnover is 0 for T < τ with τ > 0 follows directly from
Equation (4.1) as P (τ) · (1− s(τ)) < 1. The fact that seller initiated turnover is larger for
T < Tlim than for T > Tlim if τ < Tlim is a direct consequence from the clientele effect. As
elaborated in the main text, the second part of Proposition 2 also directly follows from
the clientele effect proven in Appendix B. 
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Proposition 3
Illiqask(T ) is monotonously increasing in T : To formalize this requirement, we
calculate its first derivative with respect to T and show that it is greater or equal to zero,
i.e.,
(
Illiqask(T )
)′
=
log(P (T )
T 2
− P
′(T )
T · P (T ) ≥ 0. (C.36)
(i) For T ≤ min(τ, Tlim), plugging in prices P (T ) from Equation (C.2) into (C.36) and
multiplying with T 2 leads to the condition
b · T + b · e
b·T · T · (b− λS)
−b · eb·T + eT ·λS · λS + log
(
b · e−T ·λS − e−b·T · λS
b− λS
)
≥ 0. (C.37)
(C.37) trivially holds for T = 0. Moreover, for the first derivative with respect to T of the
left-hand side of (C.37) it holds
b · eT ·(b+λS) · T · (b− λS)2 · λS
(b · eb·T − eT ·λS · λS)2
≥ 0 (C.38)
such that (C.37) is true for all T .
(ii) For T with τ < T ≤ Tlim, multiplying (C.36) by T and exploiting the relation
P ′(T )
P (T )
= −s(T ) · λS from (C.4) as well as − log(P (T ))T = Illiqask(T ) yields
Illiqask(T ) ≤ s(T ) · λS. (C.39)
s ·λS is the liquidity premium for the extreme case that bid-ask spreads s remain constant
and investors are forced to immediately sell after a preference shock (see Equation (C.4)).
As actual bid-ask spreads s(T ) can only decrease when the bond ages and investors have
the option to wait until maturity, s(T ) · λS is an upper bound for Illiqask(T ).
(iii) For T with τ < Tlim < T , multiplying again (C.36) by T and exploiting the relation
P ′(T )
P (T )
= − (∆L(Tlim)+s(T ))·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
from (C.6) yields
Illiqask(T ) ≤ (∆L(Tlim) + s(T )) · λL
1 + ∆L(Tlim)
. (C.40)
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P forced(T ) = e−T ·Illiq
forced
with Illiqforced = (∆L(Tlim)+s)·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
solves the indifference condition
λL · eλL·T
P forced(T ) · eλL·T − 1 ·
∫ T
0
P forced(x) · (1− s) · e−λL·(T−x) dx != ∆L(Tlim). (C.41)
Therefore, Illiqforced can be interpreted as the liquidity premium long-horizon investors
would demand for an artificial bond with the following characteristics: (a) only long-
horizon investors are allowed to invest in this bond, (b) the bond has constant bid-ask
spreads s, (c) investors are forced to immediately sell after a preference shock (see also
(C.5)) . As actual bid-ask spreads s(T ) can only decrease when the bond ages, short-
horizon investors are not excluded, and investors have the option to wait until maturity,
(∆L(Tlim)+s(T ))·λL
1+∆L(Tlim)
is again an upper bound for Illiqask(T ).
The same reasoning as for (iii) applies also for our case (v), i.e., Tlim ≤ τ < T .
(iv) For the last case of T with Tlim < T ≤ τ , we exploit that P (T ) is continuously
differentiable at T = τ (which can be shown using (C.8) and (C.9) for P (T ) as well as (4.1)
solved for s(τ)). If P (T ) is continuously differentiable at τ ,
(
Illiqask(T )
)′
is continuous at
τ (see (C.36)). Since we have already shown that
(
Illiqask(T )
)′
is larger or equal to zero
for T with Tlim ≤ τ < T (case (v)),
(
Illiqask(T )
)′ ≥ 0 then also holds for T = τ . To show
that
(
Illiqask(T )
)′ ≥ 0 for any T with Tlim < T ≤ τ , we introduce an artificial bid-ask
spread function sˆ(T ) ≤ s(T ) such that the corresponding τˆ that solves Equation (4.1)
equals T . Now, we can again exploit case (v) with the artificial bid-ask spread function
sˆ(T ), i.e.,
(
Îlliq
ask
(T )
)′
≥ 0 for T with Tlim ≤ τˆ < T . As prices do not depend on bid
ask spreads when investors wait when experiencing a preference shock (see also Equation
(4.7)), it holds that P (T ) = Pˆ (T ) for T ≤ τˆ < τ . Applying the same continuity argument
as above for
(
Îlliq
ask
(T )
)′
then proves the assertion for all T (= τˆ) with Tlim < T ≤ τ . 
Illiqask(T ) goes to zero for T → 0: Applying l’Hoˆpital’s rule and using (C.2) for
P (T )) directly leads to limT→0 Illiq
ask(T ) = limT→0
− log(P (T ))
T
= 0. 
Illiqask(T ) flattens at Tlim: We prove condition (4.11) separately for Tlim < τ ,
Tlim = τ , and Tlim > τ . For Tlim < τ , using (C.2) and (C.8) for P (T ), (4.11) transforms to
the condition
b · eb·Tlim · (b · (eTlim·λL − eTlim·λS)− eTlim·λL · λS + eb·Tlim · (λS − λL) + eTlim·λS · λL)
(eb·Tlim − eTlim·λL) · Tlim · (b · eb·Tlim − eTlim·λS · λS) > 0.
(C.42)
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Exploiting that the denominator of (C.42) is positive and using our earlier substitution
b = λL − c1 and λS = λL + c2 with c1, c2 > 0 and c1 < λL, (C.42) simplifies to
eTlim·c2 · c1 + e−Tlim·c1 · c2− c1− c2 > 0. (C.43)
We show that this condition holds by again verifying that the left-hand side of (C.43)
equals 0 for Tlim → 0, and its first derivative is strictly positive for Tlim > 0.
For Tlim = τ , exactly the same line of arguments as for Tlim < τ , but using (C.9)
instead of (C.8) proves the assertion.
For Tlim > τ , using (C.2) and (C.4), condition (4.11) evaluates to
s(Tlim) · λS > λL · (∆L(Tlim) + s(Tlim))
1 + ∆L(Tlim)
, (C.44)
which always holds due to the clientele effect. To see why, note that due to the clientele
effect (see Equation (C.10)), short-horizon investors are not willing to invest in long-term
bonds. Thus, for a fixed T , the price P (T ) is lower if Tlim is below T compared to a
situation with Tlim above T . From that, it directly follows that the integrand in Equation
(4.7) for τ < T ≤ Tlim is larger than the integrand for τ < Tlim < T , which directly implies
(C.44). 
Illiqbid(T ) is decreasing in T at the short end: We use (4.10) and (C.2) to
calculate
(
Illiqbid(T )
)′
=
T ·
(
b+ b·e
b·T ·(b−λS)
eT ·λS ·λS−b·eb·T
+ s
′(T )
1−s(T )
)
+ log
(
(1−s(T ))·(b·e−T ·λS−e−b·T ·λS)
b−λS
)
T 2
.
(C.45)
Plugging in T = 0, the numerator of (C.45) evaluates to log(1 − s(0)), which is strictly
negative for s(0) > 0. Hence, limT→0
(
Illiqbid(T )
)′
= −∞. 
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